FORWARD. MAY WE PLEASE HAVE APPEARANCES. (APPEARANCES
TENDERED.) CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WELCOME, COUNSEL. PLEASE BE
SEATED. MR. LO PIANO. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: GOOD MORNING,
CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES. IT IS A PRIVILEGE TO BE HERE ON BEHALF OF MY
CLIENT AND TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU ON THIS MATTER. THE COURT: TRY TO KEEP YOUR
VOICE UP JUST A LITTLE, IF YOU COULD. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THIS MATTER
INVOLVES MY CLIENT WHO IS DRIVING A LS AND IS STRUCK BY AN AUTOMOBILE. THERE IS NO
QUESTION THAT MY CLIENT'S OPERATION OF THIS SCOOTER FALSE SPECIFICALLY WITHIN THE
STATUTE, 394-14.16 AND BEFORE WE GET TO THE SPECIFIC FACTS AND THE LAW WHY, WE ARE
PETITIONING THIS COURT TO FIND THAT HE DIDN'T HAVE NO FAULT BENEFITS AN OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED AN THERE ARE A LOT OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED BECAUSE THIS LAW THAT WENT INTO
EFFECT IN MARCH OF 2019 HAS SERVED BEYOND THE INTENT AND THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW, WHICH IS
TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO USE THESE NEW FORMS OF TRANSPORTATION TO REDUCE TRAFFIC IN THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND FOR PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT; THAT'S THE GOAL AND IT'S
WORKING. AND IT'S WORKED PHENOMENALLY. UNFORTUNATELY WHEN PEOPLE ARE OPERATING
VEHICLES IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY THERE ARE GOING TO BE ACCIDENTS AN THERE ARE GOING
TO BE INJURIES. TO PUT THIS LAW IN CONTEXT, WE HAVE TO FIRST START AT 1972.
1972 IS WHEN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ENACTED A COMPREHENSIVE SOCIAL LEGISLATION L CALLED
NO FAULT. THAT LEGISLATION PROVIDES INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE INJURED IN
MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES. THAT LAW HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE 1972. THE NEXT BLANK
THAT WE HAVE RELEVANT TO OUR STATUTE IS 1988. IN 19878, THIS COURT IN THE NEW IN ADDITION
CASE DECIDED WHEN WE'RE LOOKING AT OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE CLOP PAPER SHUCHLG VERY DIFFICULT
TO HEAR CLOP IF IT'S NOT AN AUTOMOBILE, A SCOOTER OR A BICYCLE OR SOMETHING ELSE, IN KNEW
IN ADDITION, IT WAS ACTUALLY A MOE PEDESTRIAN. IT WAS A MOE PEDESTRIAN BACK IN THE DAY
WHEN PEOPLE WOULD PEDAL THE MOE PEDESTRIAN TO GET IT STARTED AND THEN IT WOULD ENGAGE
THE MOTOR. THE KNEW IN ADDITION COURT, WHICH IS THIS COURT LOOKED L RULED
YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THE NATURE AN CHARACTER OF THE VEHICLE. WHEN THEY LOOKED
AT THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THE VEHICLE IS THAT THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THIS VEHICLE
IS A MOTORIZED VEHICLE AND IT'S PRATSDZ ON THE HIGHWAYS AN IT HAS A LICENSE PLATE AN IT'S
REGISTERED. THEREFORE, DO YOU KNOW WHAT, IT'S NOT SKINTD WITH THE STATUTE IN TERMS OF THE
DEFINITION OF A PEDESTRIAN; THAT'S THE NOOI NATD CASE. IN 1989, THE DUR RAL
CASE SETTLED THE LAW. THIS COURT SETTLED THE LAW, NOT THE LEGISLATURE. THIS COURT SETTLED
THE LAW IN FINDING THAT A BICYCLIST IS A PEDESTRIAN. THEREFORE, THEY ARE ENTITLED TO
PIP BENEFITS UNDERSTAND THE PIP STATUTE, THE NO FAULT STATUTE. THERE ARE TWO
PARTS TO THE DEFINITION OF A PEDESTRIAN. AN ARISING FROM OR USING A NONE MOTORIZED
VEHICLE AND THE VEHICLE MUST BE DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR USE ON HIGHWAYS, RAILS AND TRACKS.
EXCUSE ME. SO THIS COURT FOUND THAT A BICYCLE IS A PEDESTRIAN. THEREFORE
BLANK PEDESTRIAN, 1989. THE NEXT CRITICAL DATE, WE COME TO OUR STATUTE, IN
2019 GOVERNOR MUR SIGNS THIS LAW, LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS AN LOW-SPEED BY SICK ALSO
HAVE TO MEET SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS TO BE ENTITLED TO THIS SPECIFIC LAW. IF
THE LSES AND BICYCLE MEETS THESE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS, ALL LAWS, STATUTES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS THAT ARE GOOD FOR BICYCLES ARE APPLICABLE TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOT ERS
AN LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BY SICK ALSO, EXCEPT THOSE PROFESSIONS, NOT AN ACT, NOT A STATUTE,
EXCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS WHICH MAY NOT BE RELEVANT TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS AND B
ICYCLES. NOW, THE REASON WHY I SAY PROVISIONS IS BECAUSE WORDS MATTER. AND
UNDER JIM VERSUS VELAZQUEZ, IF THE STATUTE IS CLEAR ON ITS FACE AN THE LANGUAGE IS CLEAR,
THEN IT IS THE ROLE OF THIS COURT TO ENFORCE THE STATUTORY TUT AS WRITTEN, NOT TO INTERPRET
SOME OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE INTO THE STATUTE OR TO CHANGE THE LAW OF THE STATUTE OR CHANGE
THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE. SO, OKAY, UNDERSTAND THE CASE LAW, IT IS CLEAR
THAT WORDS HAVE MEANINGS AND IF THE WORD IS COMMONLY USED AND IS NOT DEFINED IN THE
STATUTE, THEN THE LAW SAYS, WELL, WE HAVE TO GIVE IT, IT'S COMMON MEANING. LET'S
START WITH THE STATUTE. THE FIRST WORD IS ALL. I DON'T KNOW IF THERE COULD BE A MORE
ENCOMPASSING WORD OTHER THAN THE WORD. SO, ALL STATUTES RULES AN REGULATIONS
APPLICABLE TO BY SICK ALSO AND THIS IS THE ARGUMENT I HAD WITH JUDGE HUDSON L.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: COULD YOU TELL US WHAT STATUTE YOU'RE READING FROM, PLEASE.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: 39: CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: YOU'RE READING FROM
SECTION G, RIGHT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I'M SORRY, SECTION G, I APOLOGIZE.
YES. THE STATUTE HAS BEEN THROUGH I BELIEVE ITS EEGS A THROUGH H AN IT HAS
SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS OF WHAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER AND A BICYCLE IS. SO, AGAIN,
IT'S UNDISPUTED THAT THIS LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER OPERATED BY MR. GOYCO AT THE TIME
OF HIS CRASH AND BY THE WAY HE WAS ON THE SIDEWALK. HE WAS COMING FROM THE SIDEWALK
WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY THE CAR. OKAY. SO, LET'S LOOK AT WHAT THE
STATUTE SAYS. WHAT IS A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER. WHAT IS IT
DESIGNED FOR? IT'S DESIGNED FOR FOUR THINGS. THE STATUTE
ACTUALLY SAYS FOUR THINGS. STREETS, HIGHWAYS, SIDEWALKS AND BICYCLE PATHS.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: CAN I INTERRUPT YOU THERE FOR A SECOND. I KNOW YOU WANT TO EQUATE OPERATORS
OF LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS WITH BICYCLISTS. SET THAT ASIDE FOR A MINUTE. YOU
JUST SAID LET'S LOOK AT WHAT THE WORDS SAY AND SPECIFIC FLEE FLEE THE DEFINITION OF
LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER, THE LAW THAT YOU'RE POINTING TO THE ONE THAT WAS ENACTED
AND PASSED AND SIGNED INTO LAW IN 2019 SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO 39:1-1 TO HELP US
DEFINE WHAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC CAN SCOOTER, RIGHT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
RIGHT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: IT DEFIANCE THAT AS A DEVICE, CORRECT?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: NOT A VEHICLE, RIGHT?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: STAY WITH
ME FOR A MINUTE. YOUR CLIENT IS ENTITLED TO PIP IF YOUR CLIENT ASK A
PEDESTRIAN. YOUR CLIENT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO PIP UNDERSTAND THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY IF
YOUR CLIENT IS A PEDESTRIAN, RIGHT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: NOW, THE DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN IS PROVIDED FOR US IN THE FA
FAULTED STATUTE UN SUBSECTION H, RIGHT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: LET'S LOOK AT THAT DEFINITION TOGETHER. IT
SAYS, PEDESTRIAN MEANS ANY PERSON WHO IS NOT OCCUPYING, ENTERING INTO OR ALIGHTING FROM
A, QUOTE, VEHICLE, PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POU WEFR, CORRECT?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: ABSOLUTELY. JUSTICE FASCIALE: NOW, STAY WITH ME.
YOU POINTED OUT THAT THE TWO REQUIREMENTS TO PEDESTRIAN ARE OPERATION OF A
NONMOTOR VEHICLE AND THEN THE OTHER PART WHICH IS THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS DESIGNED.
I WANT TO FOCUS ON THE NONE MOTOR VEHICLE SECTION THAT YOU JUST POINTED OUT.
LANGUAGE THAT YOU JUST REFERENCED. THE NO FAULT STATUTE DEFINES A MOTOR VEHICLE
IN SUBSECTION J. AN IN SUBSECTION J THE NO FAULT STATUTE TELLS US TO GO TO 39:1-1.
ARE YOU WITH ME. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I'M WITH YOU. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: AT 39:1-1, IT DEFINES MOTOR VEHICLE AND IT DEFIANCE MOTOR VEHICLE AS ALL VEHICLES
EXCEPT LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOT TERSE AN THERE IS OTHER LANGUAGE IN THE DEFINITION,
AS WELL BUT I'M POINTING OUT THE PERTINENT LANGUAGE FOR OUR CASE. MOTOR
VEHICLE INCLUDES ALL VEHICLES, EXCEPT DOT, DOT, DOT LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS. OF
COURSE WE KNOW THAT #39D VMENTD VMENT 1-1 DEFINES LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER AS A DOOE
VICE NOT A VEHICLE AND #39D:1-1 DEFINES VEHICLE AS ANYTHING -- IT SAYS EVERY DEE VICE
EXCEPT LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS. MY QUESTION TO YOU IS, BEFORE WE GET
TO WHETHER IT'S PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER IS A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER
A VEHICLE? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: NO. JUSTICE FASCIALE:
IT'S A DEVICE. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IT'S A DEVICE. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: IF IT IS NOT A VEHICLE, IS YOUR CLIENT A PEDESTRIAN? CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: YES. JUSTICE FASCIALE: IS THERE ANY PROBABLE LEM IN GOING TO 39:1-1
TO DEFINE WHAT A VEHICLE IS IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE NO FAULT STATUTE HAS ITS OWN
SECTION AND DEFINITIONS AND DOES NOT DEFINE VEHICLE? DO YOU HAVE ANY
PROBABLE LEM WITH GOING TO 39:1-1? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: NO.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: IS THAT BECAUSE 39:6-A-2 H REFERS TO VEHICLE PROPOSAL PELD BY OTHER THAN
MUSCULAR POWER WHICH MEANS A VEHICLE PROPELLED BY SOMETHING WITH A MOTOR AN J DEFINING
MOTOR VEHICLE BRINGS US BACK TO 39:1-1. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: SO IF I AM CORRECT THAT LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS
ARE NOT VEHICLES THEN YOUR CLIENT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE A PEDESTRIAN EVEN TIELTHED
TO PIP BENEFITS AM I RIGHT. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: YES. JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS: UNDERSTAND 39:6-A 2, HAD THERE WE WERE JUST DISCUSSING SUBSECTION J AN AS
JUSTICE FASH NOTED, UNDER THAT SUBSECTION THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE REFERS BACK
TO 39:1-1, CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS: THERE ARE MANY OTHER DEFINITIONS IN SECTION 6 A-2 THAT DO NOT REFER BACK
TO 31:1-1 THAT HAVE THE SAME EXACT WORDS AN DEFINITIONS IN BOTH STATUTES, SO, FOR
EXAMPLE, AUTOMOBILE IS DEFINED IN BOTH STATUTES, CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
CORRECT. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: ARE THOSE DEFINITIONS THE EXACT SAME?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: TO BE TOTALLY HONEST WITH YOU, I HAVEN'T LOOKED AT THOSE TWO
DEFINITIONS AND MATCHED THEM UP LINE BY LINE OR WORD BY WORD I WOULD ASSUME SO.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: SO IN 39:1-1, AUTOMOBILE IS DEAF NINED AS AUTOMOBILE INCLUDES ALL
MOTOR VEHICLE EXCEPT MOTORCYCLES; THAT'S THE DEFINITION, BUT IN 39:16 A CLOP 6 A-2, THIS
IS A PRETTY LONG DEFINITION THAT'S MUCH LONGER THAN WHAT WAS JUST STATED. PEDESTRIAN IS
ALSO DEFINED IN 39:1-1 AS PEDESTRIAN MEANS A PERSON A FOOT AND THAT'S IT. AND
IN 6 A-2, WE'VE ALREADY DISCUSSED SUBSECTION H HAS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT DEFINITION.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: AND
THERE IS NO REFERENCE BACK TO 39:1-1, SO, THE STATUTES ARE NOT THE SAME, CORRECT?
AND IN 39:1-1, THE DEFINITION SPECIFICALLY -- THE DEFINITION SECTION SPECIFICALLY BEGINS
AS USED IN THIS SUSH TITLE AND THAT IS SUBTITLE 1 WHICH IS NOT THE SAME SUBTITLE THAT
THE NO FAULT INSURANCE IS UNDERSTAND. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: RIGHT. IT
DOESN'T HAVE THE EXACT SAME LANGUAGE. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: HOW DO YOU RECONCILE
THAT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: HERE IS HOW. LET'S LOOK AT THIS
PARTICULAR STATUTE. THIS PARTICULAR STATUTE HAS DEFINITIONS OF WHAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC
SCOOTER IS AND IS NOT. ITS EEGS NOT A MOTORIZED SCOOTER. IT'S NOT A MOTOR
IZED BICYCLE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHEN YOU SAY LET'S LOOK AT THIS PARTICULAR
STAT TOOTH, WHERE ARE YOU LOOKING? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IN THE DEFINITIONAL
SECTION. I BELIEVE IELTS ITS E SECTION -- IT SAYS A THROUGH F, I BELIEVE. IT.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: TALKING AGAIN ABOUT 4-14 DOT 16 OR SOMETHING ELSE? THERE
ARE SO MANY STATUTORY PRIVILEGES HERE. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: 39:4-14.16
IS THE STATUTE. JUSTICE FASCIALE: SUBSECTION A REFERRED TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC
SCOOTERS REFERRING BAB TO 39:1-1. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. CORRECT.
SO ESSENTIALLY IT'S MARRYING OR GOING BACK TO THAT AND IT'S ALSO TAKING IT FURTHER FOR
WHICH YOUR HONOR JUST TALKED ABOUT IN THE BEGINNING BECAUSE IF YOU LOOKED AT ALL OF
THOSE DEFINITIONS, IT SAYS WHAT IT IS NOT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: SO TO THE
ACCIDENT WE NEED TO LOOK FOR A DEFINITION OUTSIDE OF 14.16 RGS DO WE LOOK TO THE SET OF
DEFINITIONS THAT APPEARS AT 39:1-1 OR THE ONESES THAT APPEAR AT 39:6 A-2.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: WELL, YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT BOTH AND YOU HAVE TO RECONCILE THEM BECAUSE
THIS COURT IN DREL, IN 1989 SAID A BICYCLIST IS A PEDESTRIAN AND A BICYCLIST IS A PEDESTRIAN
BECAUSE OF HOW A PEDESTRIAN IS DEFINED IN 39:6 A 2. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
SO THAT TAKES US TO 6 A 2. IF THERE IS NO CROSS REFERENCE FROM 6 A 2, DO WE ALSO CONSIDER
THE DEFINITIONS IN 39:1-1? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I WOULD SAY YES.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WHY? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: WHY?
BECAUSE IT SAYS -- IT SAYS -- IT SPECIFICALLY SAYS, THE STATUTE, 39:-- TITLE 39 SECTION
4 AND YOU TALK ABOUT, YOU KNOW, WHAT IS THE MOTOR VEHICLE AND WHAT IS THERE AND IN THE
DEFINITION. JUSTICE PATTERSON: I NEED YOU TO GO BACK. WHAT DID YOU
SAY IN RESPONSE TO WHY WE SHOULD CONSIDER 39:1-1 IF THERE IS NO CROSS REFERENCE?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: FIRST OF ALL, THERE IS NO DEFINITION OF A BICYCLE IN 39:1-1, WHICH IS
KIND OF FUNNY. I MEAN YOU ACTUALLY HAVE -- I THINK YOU HAVE AN AUTO SCOOTER. YOU HAVE
SOME THINGS THAT I'VE NEVER HEARD OF IN SECTION 39:1-1 BUT YOU DON'T HAVE A BICYCLE.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: AND THAT'S BECAUSE OF THE CASE THAT HELD THAT A
BICYCLIST IS A PEDESTRIAN? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THIS COURT IN 1989 UNDER
DUR REL HELD THAT A BICYCLIST IS A PEDESTRIAN. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THE
DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN IN 396 A 2 H DID THAT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE 1989 DEFINITION.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THE DEFINITION. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: IT SAID EVER SAYS PEDESTRIAN MEANS ANY PERSON WHO IS NOT OCCUPYING, ENTERING INTO
OR ALIGHTING FROM A VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MOTION TO SUPPRESS SUE LAR POWER AND
DESIGNED PROOIM MARLLY FOR USE ON HIGHWAYS RAILS AN TRACKS, CORRECTED? YOU
KEEP SAYING THIS COURT CREATED THE LAW AN NOT THE LEGISLATURE BUT IT SEEMS LIKE IT'S VERY
CLEAR A BICYCLE IS NOT PROPELLED BY -- I AM SORRY, A BICYCLE IS PROPELLED BY MUSCULAR
POWER NOT BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER, CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SO THE COURT WAS JUST INTERPRETING THE PLAIN
LAN OF 39:6 A 2 A. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I MISSPOKE. I DID NOT MEAN TO
SAY THAT THIS COURT WAS WRITING THE LAW. I MEANT TO SAY THAT THE COURT INTERPRETED THE
LAW. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: IN A WAY THAT WAS VERY SKINLTS WITH THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE BECAUSE EVERYONE WOULD AGREE THAT A BICYCLE IS PROPELLED BY MOTION TO SUPPRESS
SDU LAR POWER OR NOT PROPELLED BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. CHRISTIAN
C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: MR. LO PIANO, I WANT TO BRING YOU
BACK TO THE CHIEF'S QUESTION ABOUT THE DEFINITIONS IN 6 A 2, SECTION H, OF COURSE IS
PEDESTRIAN. SECTION H REFERS TO VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR
POWER. IF THE VEHICLE IS PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER IT HAS TO HAVE SOME KIND
OF MOTOR OR DEVICE ON IRT, CORRECT, A MOTOR VEHICLE? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
CORRECT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: SUCTION SECTION J DEFINES MOTOR VEHICLE. SUBSECTION
J DEFINES MOTOR VEHICLE BY BRINGING US BACK TO 39:1-1. WHEN YOU GO TO 39:1-1
TO READ THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE THAT'S PROVIDED, IT SAYS ALL VEHICLES DOT, DOT, DOT
EXCEPT LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: WHICH I THINK YOU'RE SUGGESTING TO US THAT THAT IS HOW
WE USE THE DEFINITION OF 6 A 2 AND 39:1-1 SIMULTANEOUSLY. CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: YES, YOUR HONOR. AND THERE IS AN AND. IN 6 A 2 AND THE END IS A BIG PART. THE
AND IS A BIG PART. AND DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR USE ON HIGHWAYINGS, RAILS AN TRACKS.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: BEFORE YOU GO THERE, THE LAW THAT YOU HAD STARTED OUT IN YOUR OPENING
ARGUE MANY WITH 39:4-1416 -- THAT'S WHERE I AM RIGHT NOW. CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: OKAY. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IT'S 39:4-14.16. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: THAT'S WHAT I MEANT TO SAY. IT BECAME EFFECTIVE ON MAY 13TH, 2019.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: AT THE SAME
TIME, THE LEGISLATURE AMENDED 39:1-1 TO REMOVE FROM THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE,
LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS, THE DEFINITION OF VEHICLE AN LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS,
THE DEFINITION OF MOTORCYCLE, AN LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS AND IT DEFINED LOW-SPEED
ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS NOT AS A VEHICLE, BUT AS A DEVICE. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
CORRECT. FAVSH FASH YOU ARE TELLING US THAT WE HAVE TO READ ALL OF THESE TOGETHER.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THEM IN CONTEXT.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: DID YOU EVER ARGUE BEFORE THIS MINUTE THAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC
VEHICLE IS NOT A VEHICLE IN 39:6 A 2 H? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: A LOW-SPEED
ELECTRONIC SCOOTER FSHGS AS JUSTICE FASH JUST POINTED OUT PREVIOUSLY IS A DEVICE.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: I AM ASKING IF YOU EVER ARGUED THAT BEFORE? DID YOU
ARGUE BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER IS NOT A VEHICLE AND
THEN THEREFORE I AUTOMATICALLY FIT WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN IN 396 A 2 BECAUSE
A PEDESTRIAN IS ANY PERSON WHO IS NOT OCCUPYING, ENTERING OR ALIGHTING FROM A VEHICLE
AND HERE I WAS NOT HAVING ANYTHING TO DO WITH A VEHICLE BECAUSE A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC
SCOOTER IS NOT A VEHICLE. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: JUST SO I AM CLEAR, THE
QUESTION IS HAVE I ARGUED THAT BEFORE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: CORRECT.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I WISH I HAD. JUSTICE FASCIALE: LET
ME ASK YOU THIS. THE APPELLATE DIVISION HELD, QUOTE, IT IS CLEAR THAT AN L S E S IS A
VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER AND THEN IT SAID A DETERMINATION IS GROUNDED
IN THE TEXT OF 39:1-1 BECAUSE IT DEFINES LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS IN PART AS
HAVING AN ELECTRIC MOTOR CAPABLE OF PROPELLING A DEVICE WITH OR WITHOUT HUMAN PROPULSION.
IT SEEMS LIKE THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE TRIAL JUDGE CONCLUDED THAT THESE
-- THIS LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER IS, IN FACT, A VEHICLE? CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: AS OPPOSED TO A DEVICE. JUSTICE FASCIALE: I KNOW THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE REFERRED TO MOTOR VEHICLE, NOT VEHICLED AND THAT'S PROBABLY IN PART BECAUSE UNDERSTAND
UNDERSTAND 39:6-A 2 J MOTOR VEHICLE REFERS BACK TO 39:1-1. CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: AN THE OTHER THING THAT THE A TRIAL COURT AND THE APPELLATE DIVISION BOTH FOCUSED
ON OR ONE OF THE THINGS THEY FOCUSED ON, ESPECIALLY THE TRIAL COURT WAS THAT THE WORD
BICYCLE DOESN'T APPEAR ANYWHERE IN THE STATUTE OR IS NEVER AMENDED SO SINCE 1989 WHEN
THIS COURT RULED THAT A BICYCLIST IS A PEDESTRIAN, THAT STATUTE WAS NEVER AMENDED
AND THERE IS ACTUALLY NO DEFINITION, I WILL REPEAT IN 1-1 OF A BICYCLE BUT WE ALL KNOW
THAT BICYCLISTS DO GET PIP. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: THE REASON THE COURT
WAS FOCUSING ON THAT WAS BECAUSE YOU PRESENTED THE ARGUMENT COUCHED IN 39:4-14-16 SUBSECTION
G IN ORDER TO EQUATE IT TO THE 1989 CASE ENTITLED BY SICK ALSO AN PEDESTRIANS, THAT'S.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IN PART. IN PART, AGAIN, THEY SAID, WELL, IF YOU'RE
ARGUING, YOU KNOW, THEY WERE TAKING THE SECTION, EXCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS AN, AGAIN, THE
WORD IS PROVISIONS, NOT STATUTES, NOT ACTS. JUSTICE PATTERSON: WHO IS THEY.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THE TRIAL COURT AND ALSO IS THE APPELLATE COURT,
THAT SECOND CLAUSE, EXCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS BY THEIR VERY NATURE WHICH WOULD NOT ALLY
TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC VEHICLES. I COULD GET ACCUSED OF PLAYING SEMANTICS, BUT THEY
DIDN'T SAY EXCEPT STATUTE -- JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHAT IS THE PROVISION?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IF THEY TAKE OUT THE WORD PROVISIONS AN YOU JUST
READ THAT STATUTE WITHOUT THE WORD PROGSZ, THEN YOU COULD SAY, OKAY, I THINK IT'S A STRONG
ER ARGUMENT FRANKLY FOR THE DEFENSE TO SAY THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE PIP STATUTE HERE.
WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE NO FAULT ACT. WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT A PROVISION.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHAT IS A PROVISION? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: A PROVISION
IS LESS THAN BLANK. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHY IS A PROVISION NOT JUST A
SECTION OF THE STATUTE. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IT COULD BE. JUSTICE
WAINER APTER: WHAT ELSE COULD IT BE? WHAT DUBT US TO SAY THAT IT IS.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IT COULD BE A SUBPART OF THE STATUTE, YES. JUSTICE
WAINER APTER: I AM CONFUSED AS TO WHY THAT HELPS YOU? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE STATUTE AND THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE,
OKAY, CLOP PAPERS SHUFRLG CLOP THEY USE STATUTES AN REGULATIONS AN THEN THEY USE THE CLAUSE.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: WHO IS THEY. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THE
LEGISLATURE. JUSTICE PATTERSON: USE WHAT, ALL STATUTES. CHRISTIAN C.
LO PIANO: THE LAW SAYS ALL STATUTES, RULES AN REGULATIONS THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO BY SICK
ALSO ARE APPLICABLE TO LOW SPREED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS SO BASICALLY THEY'RE DEFINING A
LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOT TER AND AGAIN, THERE IS ALL DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTRIC SKULT
ERs, ELECTRIC BICYCLES, BUT WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT ALL THOSE DIFFERENT TYPES. WE'RE
TALKING ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR TYPE, MEANING THIS SPECIFIC LAW. IF IT IS THIS SPECIFIC
LAW, THERE IS NO REGISTRATION, THERE IS NO INSURANCE THERE IS NO LICENSE PLATE. THERE
IS NO DRIVER'S LICENSE JUST LIKE A BICYCLIST. SO THEY ARE MARRYING BASICALLY A BICYCLE
AN LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER FOR THIS PURPOSE. JUSTICE SOLOMON: CAN YOU
CLARIFY ONE THING FOR ME AND IT INVOLVES REFERENCES TO VERY NARROW DISCRETE SECTIONS
OF THE TWO VERY CLEAR STATUTES. CLEARLY, 39:1-1 AS AMENDED IN 2023 APPLIES
TO THE TRAFFIC LAWS, CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 5, CORRECT? ON ITS FACE, IT DOES
NOT INCLUDE CHAPTER 6, WHICH IS THE NO FAULT STATUTE, CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C.
LO PIANO: OKAY. JUSTICE SOLOMON: IS THAT CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: I WILL ACCEPT THAT. JUSTICE SOLOMON: OKAY. CHAPTER 6 MAKES ONE
REFERENCE BACK TO 1.1, THE ONLY DEFINITION AND THAT'S -- CHAPT ONE DOESN'T LIMIT CHAPTER
6. IT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES ONLY ONE THROUGH 5 H AN 6 MAKES ONE REFERENCE TO 1:1-1, 39:1-1
AND THAT'S DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE. IT DOESN'T MAKE REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER
DEFINITION IN 39:1-1 CLOP BICYCLE CLOP. SO OTHER THAN THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR
VEHICLE, WHY DO WE CARE WHAT 39:1-1 SAYS WHEN IT DOESN'T APPLY TO CHAPTER 6.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: WELL, I THINK IT DOES APPLY. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
WE'RE LOOKING AT 39:1-1 AS JUSTICE SOLOMON JUST POINTED OUT IT HAS LANGUAGE THAT SAYS
AS USED IN THIS SUBTITLE COLON IT'S A WHOLE BUNCH OF DEFINITIONS BUT BEFORE IT SETS FORTH
ANY DEFINITIONS IT SAYS AS USED IN THIS SUBTITLE, COMMA. THIS SUBTITLE AS FAR AS
I CAN TELL IS CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 5 H AN THEN THERE IS SOMETHING ELSE CALLED SUBTITLE 2,
ALL TOGETHER WE'RE TALKING ABOUT TITLE 39. AS FAR AS I CAN TELL IT'S BROKEN
INTO TWO SUBTITLES. DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
YES. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THE NO FAULT LOT IS FOUND IN CHAPTER 6.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SO THAT WOULD NOT
BE THE AS USED IN THIS SUBTITLE THAT 39:1-1 IS REFERRING OR 1-1, I'M SORRY, STATUTORY
STATUTORY H. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THIS STATUTE SAYS ALL STATUTES INCLUDING
TITLE #39D THAT'S WHAT THIS STATUTE SAYS, WAIVEN WAYNE NOW WE'RE BACK AT 14 DOT 16, CORRECT?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHAT
IS THE MEANING OF THE EXCEPTION? WHERE IT SAYS EXCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS WHICH
BY THEIR VERY NATURE MAY HAVE NO APPLICATION TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BY SICK ALSO OR LOW-SPEED
ELECTRIC SCOOT TERSE WHAT ARE THOUGH PROVLGSZ. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THAT'S
OPEN TO INTERPRETATION. I THINK WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE AND YOU LOOK
AT THE PLAIN LANGUAGE, I THINK IT IS CLEAR. JUSTICE FASCIALE: CAN I BRING
YOU TO THAT POINT FOR A SECOND, AS JUSTICE WAINER APTER APTD POINTED OUT, 39:1-1 BEGINS
WITH AS USED IN THIS SUBTITLE, BUT THEN IT CONTINUES, UNLESS OTHER MEANING IS CLEARLY
APPARENT FROM THE LANGUAGE OR CONTEXT OR UNLESS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MANIFEST IJ INTENTION
OF THE LEGISLATURE. ARE YOU ARGUING IT IS APPARENT FROM THE LANGUAGE OR CONTEXT
BECAUSE AT THE TIME THE LEGISLATURE MADE THESE ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS ABLE TO BE PRAYED ON
HIGHWAYS AN REFERRED BACK TO #39D 11'S DEFINITION AN BY LOOKING AT THE PEDESTRIAN'S DEFINITION
AS PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER MEANING IT HAZ TO HAVE SOME MOTOR AN THEN SUBSECTION
J MOTOR VEHICLE OOIRTS SELF BRINGS YOU RIGHT BACK TO 39:1-1 SO THESE THINGS ARE NOT VEHICLES.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IT'S NOT A VEHICLE. JUSTICE FASCIALE:
THEY'RE DEVICES. JUSTICE PATTERSON: HAVE YOU EVER MADE THAT ARGUMENT BEFORE
THIS MOMENT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I WISH I HAD. CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER: LET'S FOCUS WITH CARE BECAUSE WE'RE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT A PEDESTRIAN IS
AND THE LANGUAGE IN THE DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN IN 39 A 6 A-2 IT SAYS ANY PERSON NOT
OCCUPYING, ENTERING INTO OR ALIGHTING FROM A VEHICLE. IT DOESN'T SAY MOTOR VEHICLE.
CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
SO WHY THEN DO WE JUMP DOWN TO J WHICH TELLS US HOW TO DEFINE MOREOVER AND SENDS US TO
39:1-1 WHEN PEDESTRIAN IS TALKING ABOUT VEHICLES? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
I DON'T HAVE A CLEAR ANSWER FOR THAT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: CAN I FOLLOW UP
ON THAT. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: YES. JUSTICE FASCIALE: CLEARLY
IT SAYS VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. OTHER THAN MOTION TO SUPPRESS
SUE LAR POWER MEANS IT HAS GOT TO HAVE SOME TYPE OF MOTOR SO IF WE WENT TO J, THAT'S MOTOR
VEHICLE AND IF J TAKES US TO 39:1-1, 39:1-1'S DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE SAYS, QUOTE,
INCLUDES ALL VEHICLES, CLOSE QUOTE, DOT, DOT, DOT EXCEPT LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS
IS THE. HOW ELSE DO WE DEFINE VEHICLES IF WE CANNOT READ 6 A 2 AND #39D 11
TOGETHER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LEGISLATURE PASSING A LAW SAYING THAT THESE DEVICES CAN
BE USED ON HIGHWAYS? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I AGREE. I AGREE WITH, YOUR HONOR
THAT'S WHAT IT SAYS. THE COURT: SO WHY THEN DID THE LEGISLATURE GIVE TWO
SEPARATE DEFINITIONS ONE FOR MOTOR VEHICLE AND ONE FOR VEHICLE IF THEY MEAN THE SAME THING.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I DON'T KNOW WHY THE LEGISLATURE DID THAT AT THE TIME
THAT THEY CREATED THAT DEFINITION. WHAT I DO KNOW IS THAT WHEN THEY PUT THIS
LAW INTO EFFECT, THEY HAD CLEAR DEFINITIONS AS TO WHAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER
IS AND IS NOT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: NONE OF THAT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH
6 A 2, CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IT'S NOT REFERENCED IN 6 A 2. 6
A 2 HASN'T BEEN CHANGED BUT IT HAS TO BE READ IN CONTEXT WHEN YOU LOOK AT THIS LAW AND
YOU SAY, WELL, OKAY, IS A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER A BICYCLIST, WHICH IS OUR POSITION.
IF THE OPERATOR OF A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER OR A BICYCLE MEETS THIS
SPECIFIC LAW FOR ALL INTENSE AND PURPOSES THEY ARE A BICYCLIST. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: I UNDERSTAND IN THE DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN HOW BICYCLE CLEARLY FITS WITHIN IT
BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. IT IS PROPELLED ONLY BY
MUSCULAR POWER. I AM JUST NOT SURE HOW YOU ARE FITTING A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC VEHICLE
WHICH EVERYONE IS ACKNOWLEDGING IS PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER INTO THE DEFINITION
OF A PEDESTRIAN IN THE SAME WAY AS A BICYCLE WHEN IT SEEMS TO BE PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE
OF THE BICYCLE IN THE WAY THE NO FAULT STATUTE KARGS WHICH IS JUST IS IT POUR WIRED BY
MUSCULAR POWER OR OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THE
LEGISLATURE WHEN IT CREATED THIS LAW AND THE LAW WAS PASSED, THEY ARE CHARGED WITH THE
KNOWLEDGE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION AND PRIOR STATUTORY.
THE COURT: WHICH STATUTE ARE YOU REFERRING TO? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
WELL, THE DUR REL CASE, WHICH IS THROUGH THIS COURT, SO, THEY KNOW THAT WHEN THEY CREATED
THIS LAW, OKAY, THAT BICYCLIST WOULD GET PICKED PIP. THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT. I DON'T THINK
THERE IS ANY QUESTION. AN THE LAW SAYS THEY ARE ACKNOWLEDGE ABDOMINAL OF THAT AND THEY
TAKE THAT INTO CONSIDERATION. WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE STATUTE, I COME BACK TO
THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE, ALL STATUTES RULES AN REGULATIONS THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO
BY, BICYCLE ARE APPLICABLE TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS PROVIDED YOU MEET THE SPECIFIC
DEFINITION. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: EXCEPT THAT THOSE THAT BY THEIR NATURE
ARE NOT. I AM ASKING WHY IS IT MUSCULAR POWER OR NONE MUSCULAR POWER AN BICYCLE ARE
VERY CLEARLY ONLY MUSCULAR POWER AN L S E Ss ARE VERY CLEARLY NOT ONLY MUSCULAR POWER.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I THINK THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE MEANS THAT
THEY'RE KWATING LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS WITH BY SICK ALSO. I UNDERSTAND IT DOESN'T
CHANGE EXCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS AN I UNDERSTAND, BUT IT ALSO SAYS IF YOU LOOK AT, YOU KNOW,
WHAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IS AND IS NOT AN WHAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THEM ARE AND
ARE NOT. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: AT THAT POINT, THEY ARE TRYING TO MAKE
IT EQUIVALENT FOR PURPOSES OF HELMETS, DRINKING ON THEM, HAVING THEM IN CERTAIN PLACES
IN THE COMMUNITY. IT'S NOT NECESSARILY TO CHANGE THEIR VERY NATURE WHICH HAS TO DO WITH
MUSCULAR POWER OR NOT WHICH IS WHY RELYING ON THAT SUBSECTION G WILL PUT YOU IN DIRECT
CONTRAVENTION WITH THE DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN AND THE MOTORIZED PORTION OF IT.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: WELL, AGAIN, THE MOTORIZED PORTION OF IT, OKAY, I CAN ONLY
ADDRESS THE MOTORIZED PORTION OF IT TO THE EXTENT THAT OF WHAT THIS NEW LAW SAYS IT IS.
IT IS SAYING IT IS A BY, BICYCLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT HAS A MOTOR. IF
IT ONLY HAS A MOTOR THAT IS 750 WATTS AND IF IT CAN ONLY GO UP TO 20 MILES AN HOUR, THAT'S
A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT AND THEY DID THAT TO ENCOURAGE THE USE OF THIS. SO
IF WE PUT THIS IN CONTEXT, SO THE LEGISLATURE KNOWS THE SOCIAL LEGISLATION IS SO IMPORTANT
ABOUT HAVING COVERAGE FOR MEDICAL BILLS FOR PEOPLE THAT ARE INJURED. THEY CREATE THIS
LAW IN 2019, KNOWING ABOUT KNEW NAD AND KNOWING ABOUT THE PRIOR CASE OF -- IEMGS, DUR
REL, OKAY, AND THEY WANT PEOPLE TO USE THESE VEHICLES, DEVICES, OKAY, CHILDREN USE THEM.
THEY CAN RIDE THEM ON TRAILS. THEY CAN RIDE THEM ON SIDEWALKS. THEY CAN RIDE THEM ON
THE STREETS. THEY DON'T HAVE INSURANCE. THEY DON'T HAVE DRIVER'S LICENSE. THEY DON'T
HAVE REGISTRATION. THEY WANT PEOPLE TO USE THESE. SO, IF YOU THINK ABOUT
IT IN CONTEXT OF WELL, WHAT WAS THE ORIGIN TEPT CHT SOCIAL LEGISLATION AN NOI THE LEGISLATURE
IS SAYING, DO YOU KNOW WHAT, WE WANT PEOPLE TO USE THESE DEVICE SESSION. CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER: IS THERE ANYPLACE IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDUSTRY THAT SPEAKINGS
TO THE QUESTION WE HAVE IN FRONT OF US TODAY WHETHER PIP BENEFITS EXTEND TO THOSE WHO USE
LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: I SUBMIT IN MY PAPERS
WE HAVE SEVERAL ARGUMENTS WHY IT DOES. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: IF YOU CAN
ANSWER MY QUESTION. IS THERE A SPECIFIC PART OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THAT
ADDRESSES THE MRIK ABILITY OF PIP BENEFITS. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THERE IS
NOTHING IN THIS SPECIFIC STATUTE THAT REFERENCES THE PIP BENEFITS. JUST LIKE THERE IS
NOTHING IN THE STATUTE THAT SAYS WE ARE EX SCLEEDING PEOPLE OR OPERATORS OF THIS FROM
RECEIVING PIP BENEFITS. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: COME BACK TO THE STATUTES
WITH ME FOR JUST A MINUTE AND FOLLOW WITH ME AND TELL ME WHERE I GOT THIS WRONG.
MY QUESTION AT THE END IS HOW CLEAR IS THE STATUTE, ARE THE SETS OF STATUTES WHEN READ
TOGETHER. WOOER OAE TALKING ABOUT WHETHER THIS INDIVIDUAL IS A PEDESTRIAN
WITHIN THE MEANING OF H, PEDESTRIAN THERE SPEAKS ABOUT A PERSON NOT OCCUPYING, ENTERING
OR ALIGHTING FROM A VEHICLE IF WE JUMP BACK TO 39:1-1, VEHICLE IS EVERY DEVICE THAT MAY
BE TRANSPORTED UPON A HIGHWAY BUT NOT LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS, CORRECT?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: NOW, LET'S GO BACK
TO 14.16 WHICH SAYS IN SECTION A, LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS MAY BE OPERATED ON
HIGHWAYS. I AM STRUGGLING TO SEE WITH THE CLARITY THAT THESE STATUTES PROVIDE
BECAUSE THEY DON'T APPEAR TO READ ENTIRELY IN SYNCH. IF THAT'S TRUE, THEN
WE LOOK TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY WHICH DOESN'T ANSWER THE QUESTION DIRECTLY EITHER.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH WHAT I'VE JUST LAID OUT? CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH WHAT YOU JUST LAID OUT BUT IF YOU LOOK AT IN IN CONTEXT
AN LOOK AT IT IN ITS ENTIRETY, AGAIN, I COME BACK TO THEY'RE DEFINING THESE LOW-SPEED
ELECTRIC SCOOTERS AS BICYCLE SAYING WHAT THEY ARE NOT AN WHAT THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO
DO JUST LIKE BICYCLE. WHEN YOU COME BACK AN YOU SAY ALL STATUTES, RULES AN REGULATIONS
APPLICABLE TO BY, BICYCLE ARE APPLICABLE TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER THAT'S HOW WE COME
BACK TO THIS. BICYCLE WAS NEVER THE DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN. IT WAS NEVER
AMENDED TO INCLUDE A BICYCLIST AN YET THE T LEGISLATURE WHEN THEY DID THIS LAW WERE
THINKING ABOUT INSURANCE, REGISTRATION, DRIVER'S LICENSE AN THEY SAID NO AND THEY SAID
WHAT IT IS NOT. THEY SAID ITEM EASE A BY, BICYCLE. JUSTICE PATTERSON:
THEY HAVE THIS CAVEAT EXCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS WHICH BY THEIR VERY NATURE HAVE NO
APPLICATION TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BICYCLES OR LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS. WHY
SHOULDN'T WE INTERPRET YOUR CASE TO BE WITHIN THAT CAVEAT? CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: BECAUSE I THINK IF YOU DO THAT YOU'RE DOING AN INJUSTICE TO THE PIP STATUTE ITSELF
AND THE WHOLE REASON FOR THE SOCIAL LEGISLATION THEY CREATED AN TO THE ENCOURAGEMENT FOR
THE LEGISLATURE TO WANT THE PUBLIC TO USE THESE VEHICLES. JUSTICE PATTERSON:
BUT THAT'S THE POLICY. IF WE HAVE STATUTORY LANGUAGE THAT SUGGESTS THAT THIS
MAY NOT BE TREATED THE SAME AS A BICYCLE FOR PURPOSES OF THE PEDESTRIAN DEFINITION, WHY
SHOULDN'T WE TAKE THAT AS SOME SORT OF LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE THAT THIS CASE MAY BE IN
THAT EXCEPT THOSE PROVISIONS PART OF THE STATUTE LOEP LOEP I THINK IT'S MORE OF A STRETCH
TO TRY TO DENY COVERAGE THAN TO FIND THAT THERE IS COVERAGE ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE
LANGUAGE IN DUR REL, FROM THIS COURT, IF I MAY. IT SAYS, IT SHALL BE LIBERALLY CON STRIEED
SO AS TO EFFECT THE PURPOSE OF THEREOF OF N.J.S.A. 23916, THE ACT OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION
AN PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE IS A SOCIAL NECESSITY WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN THE
BROADEST APPLICATION CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE. AND THEN IT
SAYS AM KNEE AN KNOW VERSUS OH HIRE OH CASUALTY, CASE CITED, WHEN A POPULAR OR COMMON
WORD IS USED IN THE STATUTE BUT IS NOT DEFINED, THE WORD SHOULD BE GIVEN ITS COMMON MEANING.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SO WHEN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT GIVING WORDS THEIR COMMON
MEANING, THAT WAS HELPFUL, THANK YOU, IF WE WERE TO DISAGREE THAT THE DEFINITION OF VEHICLE
IN 39:1-1 WERE TO GOVERN BECAUSE 39:1-1 SPECIFICALLY SAYS AS USED IN THIS SUBTITLE
AND THIS SUBTITLE IS ONLY SUBTITLE 1 NOT SUBTITLE 2, HERE OAE WE'RE TALKING ABOUT 396 A
2, HERE OAE WE ARE EACH WORD IT'S COMMON MEANING. WOULD YOU AGREE THAT THE COMMON MEANING
OF THE WORD VEHICLE, AGAIN, OR NOT BOUND BY THE DEFINITION SET FORTH IN 39:1-1 WOULD BE
SOMETHING MUCH BROADER SUCH AS FOR EXAMPLE THE BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY DEFINITION OF VEHICLE
WHICH IS ONE, AN INSTRUMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OR CONVEYANCE AND TWO, ANY CONVEYANCE USED
IN TRANSPORTING PASSENGERS OR THINGS BY LAND, WATER OR AIR. CHRISTIAN C. LO
PIANO: THAT'S A DEFINITION, BUT, AGAIN, WE COME BACK TO, YOU KNOW, IT'S A DEVICE. IT'S
NOT CLASSIFIED AS AN AUTOMOBILE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: REGARDLESS OF
AUTOMOBILE OR DEVICE, I AM JUST SAYING THE COMMON MEANING. YOU SAID THAT ALL STATUTES
HAVE TO BE INTERPRETED ACCORDING TO THE COMMON MEANING OF THE WORDS. THE COMMON MEANING
OF THE WORD VEHICLE IF WE ARE NOT BOUND BY 39:1-1, DO YOU AGREE THAT THE MONDAY MEANING
OF THE WORD VEHICLE WOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE THE INSTRUMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OR CONVEYANCE
OR ANY CONVEYANCE EYESED IN TRANSPORTING PASSENGERS OR THINGS BY LANDS, WATER OR AIR.
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: THAT COULD BE A COMMON MEANING, BUT, AGAIN, YOU HAVE
TO LOOK AT IT IN CONTEXT. JUSTICE SOLOMON: IS THERE NICK IN THE -- I THINK
THE CHIEF ALREADY ASKED THIS QUESTION BUT FORGIVE ME FOR REPEATING IT IS THERE ANYTHING
IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 39:1-1'S AMENDMENTS AND 22 THAT CLARIFY WHY THEY PUT THIS
PROVISION IN THERE WITH REGARD TO LOW-SPEED SCOOTERS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ONLY
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THAT I CAN FIND, THE STATEMENTS, LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS THAT
DISCUSS WHY THEY ARE GIVING THIS MEANING OR AMENDING THAT CHAPTER 1 THROUGH 5A WITH
RESPECT TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS WAS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS, NOT FOR THE REASONS
OF -- ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: IT'S ENVIRONMENTAL
AND TRAFFIC CONGESTION. THEY WANT TO USE THIS AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS, MOTORCYCLES, MOTOR
SCOOTERS, OTHER TYPES OF VEHICLES OR MOTOR VEHICLES AND THAT'S WHY THEY CREATED THIS
STALT TUT. THAT'S WHAT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SAYS. IT SAYS REDUCE TRAFFIC CONGESTION.
IT'S ENCOURAGING THE PUBLIC TO DO THIS AND IT'S 'GOING TO BENEFIT THE ENVIRONMENT SO
THAT COMES BACK TO MY OTHER ARGUMENT WHERE IF YOU LOOK AT IT IN TOTAL AN YOU MARRY THAT
WITH THE LANGUAGE FROM DUR REL AN THE NO FAULT STATUTE WELL THEN YOU'RE SAYING THE
LEGISLATURE WANTS EVERYBODY TO USE THIS TYPE OF VEHICLE WHICH IS A NEW MODE OF TRANSPORTATION
THAT PEOPLE ARE USING AND YET IF THEY GET HURT, WELL, I'M SORRY YOU'RE OUT BUT WE WANT
ALL STATUTES AS BICYCLE OR WHATEVER BENEFITS REQUIREMENTS THERE ARE FOR BICYCLE YOU'RE A BICYCLIST. THAT DOESN'T MAKE SENSE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
HAD AN INSURANCE POLICY WITH PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, CORRECT? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: NOT FOR THE L S E S, CORRECT? DID HE HAVE A CAR THAT HE OWNED THE
POLICY ON. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
SO HE WAS TRYING TO RECOVER UNDER HIS CAR INSURANCE POLICY EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NOT
DRIVING HIS CAR AT THE TIME. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CORRECT AS IF HE WERE
A PEDESTRIAN. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: UNDERSTOOD. WHY DID HE NOT
TRY TO RECOVER AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE ARE. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO:
IF IT WAS A PRIVATE PASSENGER. IF IT WAS A COMMERCIAL CARRIER AN HE DIDN'T HAVE
INSURANCE IT WOULD HAVE GONE TO THAT -- I'M SORRY. IF IT'S AN UNINSURED PRIVATE
THEN IT GOES TO MREEG GO, IF IT'S A COMMERCIAL VEHICLE THEN COMMERCIAL PIP, COMMERCIAL
INSURANCE IS GIVING HIM PIP. IF HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY COVERAGE OF HIS OWN. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: WAS THERE A POLICE REPORT. CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: YES.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: DOES THE REPORT IDENTIFY THE DRIVER OF THE OTHER VEHICLE, THE VEHICLE?
CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: YES, HE HAS A CLAIM AGAINST THE OTHER DRIVER. IT IS
A BODILY INJURY CLAIM. JUSTICE FASCIALE: IT IS SEPARATE, OF COURSE PIP
BENEFITS. THE COURT: COUNSEL, WE'VE KEPT YOU UP FOR A LONG TIME, OTHER ADDITIONAL
QUESTIONS, ANYONE HAS? CHRISTIAN C. LO PIANO: CAN I RESEARCHING ANY REBUTTAL
TIME. THE COURT: YOU WANT TO RESERVE AFTER 45 MINUTES? LET'S
SEE WHERE WE ENDS UP. MR. KARBASIAN. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: CHIEF JUSTICE
AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, YOU HAD MENTIONED THERE WAS A POLICE REPORT YOUR HONOR AND IT
SPECIFICALLY SAID PEDESTRIAN WAS RIDING SCOOTER ON THE SIDEWALK AND MR. GOYCO WAS NOT
GIVEN A SUMMONS FOR RIDING A MOTORIZED VEHICLE ON THE SIDEWALK, THE OTHER PERSON, THE TORT
-FEASOR WAS GIK, GIVEN THAT BECAUSE PEDESTRIANS ARE ALLOWED TO RIDE A SCOOTER ON THE
SIDEWALK. I BELIEVE THIS ACCIDENT HAPPENED IN ELIZABETH. YOU GO TO THE FACT
THAT THIS WAS JUST A DEVICE AN THEREFORE NOT A QUALIFYING VEHICLE OR YOU GO TO THE FACT
THAT IF YOU LOOK -- ONE OF THE THINGS IS YOU ARE ALAUD TO TAKE THIS ON A BIKE PATH. YOU
CAN'T TAKE A MOTORCYCLE OR A MOE PEDESTRIAN ON A BIKE PATH. THESE THINGS ARE SPECIFICALLY
ALLOWED TO DO THAT. I KNOW MY CHILDREN ARE IN THEIR TWENTIES BUT WHEN THEY ARE YOUNG
ER THEY GOT THE SCOOTER OS FOR CHRISTMAS AN THEY WOULD PUSH IT IF IT WAS THAN CHARGED UP
OR RIDE IT. I DIDN'T CONSIDER THAT A MOTORIZED DEVICE THAT I HAD TO GET INSURANCE AND
GET ALL THAT STUFF I CONSIDERED IT SIMPLY A DEVICE, A SCOOTER. I THINK THAT'S THE THING
YOU CAN TAKE IT ON BICYCLE PATHS, YOU CAN PARK IT ON SIDEWALKS. YOU CAN OPERATE IT ON
SIDEWALKS LIKE MR. GOYCO WAS DOING, YOU CAN'T TAKE A MOTORCYCLE, A MOE PEDESTRIAN OR
MINI BIKE ON BICYCLE PATHS OR TAKE IT ON SIDEWALKS. THIS YOU ARE ALLOWED TO SO IF YOU
FIND WITH REGARD TO THIS MATTER THAT IT WAS SIMPLY A DEVICE, THEREFORE, I.E., ENTITLED
TO PIP BENEFITS OR WHETHER YOU FIND IT AKIN TO A BICYCLE, I THINK EITHER OF THOSE ARGUMENTS
AN THOSE ANALOGIES CAN BE DRAWN TO FIND THAT THIS PARTICULAR PLAINTIFF, MR. GOYCO WAS
ENTITLED TO PIP. JUSTICE PATTERSON: IF WE FIND IF IT IS A VEHICLE THE OPPOSITE
RESULT HAPPENS? DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I DISAGREE WITH THAT YOUR HONOR BECAUSE
I THINK BASED ON WHAT IT IS POINTING TO FOR ALL INTENTS AN PURPOSES, THEY'RE TREATING
IT LIKE A BICYCLE. THIS ISN'T #134G THAT GOES 30 OR 40 MILES PER HOUR WHICH YOU CAN REQUIRE
A HELMET. YOU DON'T NEED A LICENSE. YOU DON'T NEED INSURANCE. YOU DON'T NEED A LICENSE
PLATE. YOU GO THE SAME SPEED WHETHER YOU'RE ON A BICYCLE OR NOT. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: YOU SAID THEY ARE TREATING IT YOU MEAN THE LEGISLATURE. DAVID J.
KARBASIAN: CORRECT. JUSTICE PATTERSON: EXCEPT THEY HAVE THIS CAVEAT THAT
TALKS ABOUT PROVISIONS WHICH BY THEIR VERY NATURE MAY HAVE NO APPLICATION TO LOW-SPEED
ELECTRIC BY SICK ALSO OR LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?
CAN YOU GIVE US AN EXAMPLE OF THAT. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK
WITH REGARD TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BIKES AN LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS, THIS IS WHERE
I THINK IT WOULD GET PROBLEMATIC. FOR EXAMPLE, I KNOW AN INDIVIDUAL THAT BECAUSE OF A
PHYSICAL DISABILITY HE RIDES HIS LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BICYCLE WITH HIS WIFE SO THEY'RE
PEDDLING ALONG AN STRAIGHT AWAY IS NO PROBLEM LEM BUT ON THE IN CLIENS HE HAS PROBLEMS
AND THEN HE USES THE ELECTRIC PART, THE MOTOR TO TAKE HIM UP THE INCLINE WHIELS EASE ON
AN INCLINE THE CAR PITS THEM BOTH SORRY 90 PERCENT OF THE TIME YOU ARE OPERATING IT
UNDER YOUR OWN POWER BUT THAT 10 PERCENT OR ONE TIME YU YOU'RE USING THAT ELECTRIC POWER
AN YOU'RE STRUCK -- JUSTICE PATTERSON: LET ME ASK THE QUESTION, WHAT DO
YOU THINK BECAUSE IT REFERS TO PROVISIONS, THE LEGISLATURE WAS ENVISIONING WHEN IT TALKED
ABOUT PROVISIONS THAT APPARENTLY EXIST, EXCEPT FOR THOSE PROVISIONS. DAVID J.
KARBASIAN: THAT I DON'T KNOW, YOUR HONOR, I AM NOT SURE WHAT THEY WERE REFERRING TO.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: WHEN YOU REFER TO THEY, I ASSUME THE LEGISLATURE WAS EQUATING
BICYCLE AND L S E S S AS WELL AS ELECTRIC BICYCLINGS, MOST OF THE TIME, YEAH, BUT NOT
ENTIRELY. SO IT'S A -- ISN'T IT OVER SIFRP MRIF FIEING IT TO SAY THE LEGISLATURE VIEWS
THIS AS A BICYCLE IT HAS THE SAME ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS, THEY'RE ENCOURAGING PEOPLE TO
RIDE BICYCLE AN ENCOURAGING PEOPLE TO RIDE THESE SCOOTERS. THE TWO CATEGORIES PART COMPANY
AT SOME POINT. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK WHAT -- I AGREE WITH WHAT COUNSEL
WAS ARGUING, THEY DO TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BUT YOU HAVE TO READ -- JUSTICE
FASCIALE: TO DO THAT AND TO THE POINT THAT JUSTICE PATTERSON IS MAKING PROVISIONS WHICH
BY THEIR VERY NATURE MAY HAVE NO APPLICATION TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS, WE MAY NOT
KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THAT MEANS AT THE MOMENT BUT WE DO KNOW THAT IN SUBSECTION A OF THE
SAME STATUTE IT TELLS US IF WE WANT TO KNOW WHAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER IS GO
TO 39:1-1 AND 39:1-1 SAYS A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER IS A DECEIVE VICE, NOT A VEHICLE.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: CORRECT. AND THAT'S WHAT HAS TO BE, YOU KNOW, THIS
COURT KNOWS THAT WITH REGARD TO WHAT THE LEGISLATURE HAD MEANT, THE FACT AND THE CASE
WITHIN THE STATUTES ARE ALL WHAT THEY ARE AND THAT INTERPRETATION HAS TO BE MADE AND IF
THE LEGISLATURE DISAGREES WITH YOUR INTERPRETATION, THEN LET THE LEGISLATURE
RECTIFY AN CORRECT THAT. JUSTICE PATTERSON: OUR INTERPRETATION HAS TO BE
BASED ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE THAT IS ALLOWED IF IT'S
AMBIGUOUS. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE STATUTES READ TOGETHER ARE AMBIGUOUS?
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK BASED ON WHAT JUSTICE JUST STATED BEFORE WITH
REGARD TO THIS BEING A DEVICE I BELIEVE YOU CAN MAKE THAT FINDING THAT BECAUSE OF THE AM
BIGUITY THAT IS WHAT SHOULD CONTROL AND THAT'S WHAT THIS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: LEAVING ASIDE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF IT BEING AMBIGUOUS YOU ARE
ARGUING THAT THE STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: IT IS READ TOGETHER,
IT REFERS YOU BACK TO 39:1-1 AND THAT IS GUIDANCE WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS A VEHICLE OR
WHETHER THIS IS A DEVICE; THAT'S ALL THAT WE HAVE TO LOOK TO, I BELIEVE. THE
COURT: SO LET'S LOOK THERE. DOES IT USE THE WORD DEVICE OR VEHICLE IN DEFINING
LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IN 39:1-1. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: IT DOESN'T USE
THE WORD DEVICE. JUSTICE FASCIALE: YOU MEAN THE DEFINITION OF LOW-SPEED
ELECTRONIC SCOOTER? SURE IT DOES, PROPELLING THE DEVICE. DAVID J.
KARBASIAN: CORRECT, PROPELLING THE DEVICE WITH OR WITHOUT HUMAN PROPULSION, CORRECT, AT
A MAXIMUM SPEED OF LESS THAN 19 MILES PER HOUR. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SO
ARE YOU ARGUING THAT WE ARE BOUND TO USE THE DEFINITION INCLUDED IN 39:1-1 A VEHICLE,
EVEN THOUGH IT EXPLICITLY SAYS AS USED IN THIS SUBTITLE AND THIS SUBTITLE DOES NOT INCLUDE
THE PIP STATUTE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK WITH REGARD TO THAT,
JUDGE, THAT'S THE ONLY PLACE YOU CAN LOOK FOR IT RESPECTFULLY WITH REGARD TO THE FINDING
OF WHAT THE LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER IS. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: I AM
NOT TALKING ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER I AM TALKING ABOUT THE
DEFINITION OF THE WORD VEHICLE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: YES.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHERE DOES IT REFER, I WHERE DOES IT SAY IN 389396 A 2 THAT THE
DEFINITION OF THE WORD VEHICLE IN SUBSECTION H MUST BE -- OR NOT EVEN MUST BE, BUT SHOULD
REFER BACK TO THE DEFINITION OF VEHICLE IN 39:1-1. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I
AGREE WITH, YOUR HONOR. I DON'T THINK IT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT, JUDGE, BUT I THINK
YOU HAVE TO LOOK TO -- JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: BIT THERE IS ANOTHER
SUBSECTION IN 6 A-2 WHICH DOES CROSS REFERENCE 39:1-1 AND THEN YOU HAVE MANY OTHER
DEFINITIONS OF SOME OF THE SAME OR SIMILAR WORDS THAT DON'T CROSS REFERENCE BACK.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: AND,
AGAIN, I NOTED THE DEFINITION OF AUTOMOBILE IN 39:1-1 AND THE DEFINITION OF AUTOMOBILE
UNDER NO FAULT AND THE DEFINITION IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT UNDER 6 A-2 BECAUSE
THE PURPOSE OF THAT DEFINITION IS DIFFERENT. IT'S WITH REGARD TO WHEN IS THIS INSURANCE
GOING TO BE APPLICABLE SO THERE IS, YOU KNOW, THERE IS STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO DELIVERY
VANS, PANEL TRUCKS, CAMPERS, A SIGNIFICANT MORE INFORMATION AND DETAIL WITH REGARD TO
THAT DEFINITION BECAUSE IT'S VERY SPECIFIC TO NO FAULT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
TLSZ ALSO AN ELEMENT OF JUST RANDOMNESS. HERE HE OWNS A CAR AND THAT'S WHY HE HAS THIS
CAR INSURANCE POLICY TO BEGIN WITH SO HE IS ARGUING HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECOVER FROM
HIS CAR INSURANCE POLICY FOR BEING A PEDESTRIAN BECAUSE HE IS RIDING THIS L S E S BUT
SOMEONE IS RIDING AN L S E S WHO DOES NOT OWN A CAR WON'T HAVE A CAR INSURANCE POLICY
THAT THEY CAN TRY TO RECOVER FROM, CORRECT? DAVID J. KARBASIAN: HE OR SHE
MIGHT BE ELIGIBLE AS A PEDESTRIAN AND MREET TA. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THAT
WOULD APPLY TO MR. GOYCO, REGARDLESS. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: WHETHER GOYCO
HAD HIS OWN POLICY, HE IS CONSIDERED A PEDESTRIAN TO GET HIS PIP BENEFITS. WE'RE JUST
HERE ABOUT GETTING AN INJURED PARTY MEDICAL BENEFITS AN TREATMENT. JUSTICE
WAINER APTER: I UNDERSTAND BUT THAT IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE IS RELATED ONLY TO THE
HAPPENSTANCE THAT HE OWNED A SEPARATE VEHICLE ASIDE FROM THE L S E S AND HAD INSURANCE
ON THAT VEHICLE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: CORRECT. JUSTICE FASCIALE:
UNDER 39 MENT VMENT 6 A-4 SETS FORTH THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE ELIGIBLE FOR PIP BENEFITS
INCLUDING THE NAMED INSURED AND MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY RESIDING IN HIS HOUSEHOLD WHO WOULD
SUSTAIN BLAH, BLAH, BLAH. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: THAT'S WHAT YOU LOOK TO FIRST
AND ALWAYS WHENEVER YOU'RE INVOLVED IN A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT YOU LOOK UN YOUR OWN POLICY
FIRST AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT MR. GOYCO IS LOOKING FOR HERE. THE COURT:
COUNSEL, I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. IS THE TERM DEVICE AS
USED IN 39:1-1 A TERM OF ART. IT'S NOT DEFINED SEPARATELY. DAVID J.
KARBASIAN: NO. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: DOES IT HAVE A SEPARATE DISTINCT MEANING?
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK A DEVICE WOULD BE AKIN TO SKATE BOARD. I'M
NOT SURE HOW YOU CAN GET AROUND THAT WITH REGARD TO THE LANGUAGE THAT IS UTILIZED.
THE COURT: IS A BICYCLE A VEHICLE? DAVID J. KARBASIAN: IT'S NOT DEFINED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: IT IS A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BICYCLE IS DEFINED AS
A VEHICLE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THOUGHT YOU MEANT UNDER THE PIP STATUTE.
I APOLOGIZE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: IN OUR CASES, HELD THAT A BICYCLE WAS
SOMEONE RIDING A BICYCLE IS A PEDESTRIAN FOR PURPOSES OF 396 A 2 YOUR COLLEAGUE SPOKE
ABOUT NOOU NAD AND I BELIEVE DUR REL, IN THOSE CASES NOOU NAD WAS ABOUT A MOE PEDESTRIAN
THOUGH IS DUR REL ABOUT THE BICYCLE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: CORRECT.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: IN THAT CASE DID THE COURT HOLD THAT THE REASON IT FALSE UN THE
DEFINITION IN SUBSECTION H IS BECAUSE A BICYCLE IS NOT A VEHICLE AT ALL OR IS IT BECAUSE
A BICYCLE IS A VEHICLE THAT IS PROPELLED NOT OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. A BICYCLE IS
A VEHICLE THAT IS PROPELLED ONLY BY MUSCULAR POWER. DAVID J. KARBASIAN:
WELL, WITH REGARD TO NOOU NAD IT STATES WHETHER THE VEHICLE AT THE INSTANT OF COLLISION
WAS BEING OPERATED. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT NOOU NAD
BECAUSE THAT WAS A MOEP PEDESTRIAN. I AM ONLY TALKING ABOUT THE REGULAR BICYCLE.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: CORRECT. THAT'S POWERED BY MUSCULAR POWER NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THE DECISION DISCUSSES THAT IT IS A VEHICLE PROPELLED,
NOT OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER, RIGHT? NOT THAT IT'S NOT A VEHICLE AT ALL.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: YES. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: HOW DO WE ALL
OF A SUDDEN SAY NOW, JUST PUTTING A BICYCLE,NONE OF THESE THINGS ARE VEHICLES AT ALL.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: WELL, WITH REGARD TO THAT, IT'S DEFINED IN N.J.S.A.
39:1-1 AS A DEVICE. JUSTICE PATTERSON: WHAT IS A LOW-SPEED SCOOTER?
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: YES. IT CLEARLY -- IT SAYS, JUDGE, ITS EEGS CAPABLE OF AN
ELECTRIC MOTOR THAT IS CAPABLE OF PROPELLING THE DEVICE WITH OR WITHOUT HUMAN PROCEED
PULL SHON OF MAXIMUM SPEED OF LESS THAN 19 MILES PER HOUR. THE COURT: THE
USE THERE SETS OUT A DIFFERENT CATEGORY OF THINGS? DAVID J. KARBASIAN:
IF YOU TAKE IN THE PLAIN MEANING, JUDGE, I WOULD HAVE TO SAY ABSOLUTELY. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: IF YOU DID A VEN DIAGRAM, THERE WOULD BE NO COMMONALITY BETWEEN VEHICLE WHICH IS
WHAT THE BICYCLE HAS AT TIMES BEEN REFERRED TO AND DEVICE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN:
CORRECT, JUDGE. JUSTICE PATTERSON: WE HAVE NO DEFINITION OF DEVICE.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: CORRECT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY A
LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BICYCLE IS A VEHICLE BUT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IS A DEVICE?
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK BECAUSE THEY WERE USING THE TERMINOLOGY IN
DUR REL THAT WAS MENTIONED THAT THE JUSTICE JUST MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING
THAT THIS BICYCLE WAS -- THAT THE BICYCLE WAS A VEHICLE BEING OPERATED WITH HUMAN POWER.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT WHETHER WE CAN EQUATE
VEHICLE WITH DEVICE. WE KNOW FROM 39:1-1 THAT VEHICLE MEANS EVERY DEVICE, DOT, DOT, DOT
EXCEPT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: RIGHT.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: SO THERE MAY BE THE ABILITY TO SAY, IN FACT THERE IS NOT ONLY THE ABILITY,
THE LEGISLATURE SAID IT, VEHICLE MEANS EVERY DEVICE, EXCEPT LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: AN DUR REL WAS ISSUED BY THIS COURT BACK IN 1989,
APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS AGO SO WHEN THE LEGISLATURE WAS DOING N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 THEY WERE
WELL AWARE OF DUR REL, THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THE COURT'S OPINION OF WHAT A BICYCLE WAS
THAT IT WAS CONSIDERED A VEHICLE SO THEY KNEW AT THE TIME THAT THEY ENACTED THAT WHAT
THEY WERE DOING OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN ANYWAY. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: THIS
AGAIN GOES TO THE CLARITY OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BY BICYCLE IS
A VEHICLE. A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER, LET'S SAY IS A DEVICE, BUT WHEN WE GET TO VEHICLE,
IT SAYS -- IT MEANS EVERY DEVICE, BUT NOT LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC BICYCLE OR SCOOTERS.
IS THAT CONSISTENT? DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I DON'T KNOW IF I COULD SAY
IT'S CONSISTENT, JUDGE. I THINK THEY WERE JUST TRYING TO SHOW YOU THAT IT IS NOT CONSIDERED
A VEHICLE; THAT'S ALL I CAN SURMISE. JUSTICE FASCIALE: JUST TO FOLLOW UP
ON THAT, IF YOU GO BACK TO THE DEFINITION OF LOEL SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTER IN #39D 11
WHICH THE LEGISLATURE DIRECTS US TO WHEN IT PASSED A LAW SAYING YOU CAN USE THESE DEVICES
ON HIGHWAYS, IT SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO LOW-SPEED ELECTRONIC SCOOTERS NOT AS VEHICLES BUT
AS DEVICES? JUSTICE SOLOMON: I HAVE TWO RELATIVELY SIMPLE QUESTIONS WITHOUT
SIMPLE ANSWERS. I ASKED A LONG TIME AGO IF 39:1-1 IS PART OF OR SAYS SPECIFICALLY
THE DEFINITIONS HERE DO NOT APPLY TO CHAPTER 6, THEY APPLY TO 1 THROUGH 5 H, CORRECT?
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I BELIEVE THAT'S WHAT IT STATES, YOUR HONOR, YES.
CORRECT. JUSTICE SOLOMON: IF WE RELY ON 39:1-1 FOR OUR DEFINITIONS ON THE
NO FAULT STATUTE, CHAPTER 6 AN THIS KIND OF BRINGS IT A LITTLE BIT INTO FOCUS, THEN
CLEARLY A BICYCLE WOULD NOT BE A PEDESTRIAN UNDERSTAND NO FAULT SO IF WE START IMPORTING
THE 39:1-1 DEFINITIONS INTO THE NO FAULT STATUTE, OTHER THAN WHEN IT IS SPECIFICALLY REFERRED
TO, ARE WE NOT GOING TO UPSET THE ENTIRE APPLE CART BECAUSE A PEDESTRIAN IS A PERSON ON
FOOT UNDER -- I THINK 39:1-1. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I AM SIMPLY SAYING, YOUR
HONOR, CORRECT ME IF I'M WRONG, YOU'RE SAYING BASED ON N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 BECAUSE OF THEIR
DEFINITION OF BICYCLE IT WOULD CONFLICT WITH DUR REL. JUSTICE SOLOMON: MY
PROBLEM IS THAT IT SPECIFICALLY -- THERE MAY BE AN ANSWER TO THIS I JUST CAN'T QUITE GET
MY HEAD AROUND IT. IT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES ONLY THE DEFINITION FOR USE IN CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 5 H PRESUMING, MAYBE WE SHOULDN'T PRESUME ANYMORE BUT THE LEGISLATURE KNEW WHAT
DEFINITIONS; THAT'S NOT PART OF THESE DEFINITIONS AND THE REASON MAY BE BECAUSE THESE
DEFINITIONS DON'T MAKE ANY SENSE IN THE NO FAULT STATUTE, ONE, EXAMPLE OF WHICH IS PEDESTRIAN.
WHICH IS SPECIFICALLY DEALT WITH A NO FAULT STATUTE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN:
BUT THE LEGISLATURE ALSO DIDN'T INCLUDE THE TERM BICYCLE. JUSTICE SOLOMON:
I AGREE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: AN THEY HAVE KNOWN ABOUT IT FOR 35 YEARS.
JUSTICE SOLOMON: THE COURTS HAVE TO EXTRAPOLATE AN FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS AN
WAS NOT INCLUDED BASED ON THE DEFINITIONAL TERMS USED IN THE NO FAULT STATUTE.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: MR. KARBASIAN, THERE HAS BEEN SOME MENTION THAT 39:1-1 IS EXPRESSLY
LIMITED TO THIS QUOTE, SUBTITLE, BUT THERE IS MORE LANGUAGE I WANT TO READ IT INTO THE
RECORD, UNLESS OTHER MEANING IS CLEARLY APPARENT FROM THE LANGUAGE OR CONTEXT AND THAT
'S THE WHOLE POINT THAT YOU AN YOUR COLLEAGUE ARE MAKING THAT THE CONTEXT OF PROVIDING
THIS COVERAGE NEEDS NOT TO BE LOST IN OUR ANALYSIS. DAVID J. KARBASIAN:
ABSOLUTELY CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. IF THE LEGISLATURE -- I THINK THIS COURT CAN
REASONABLY MAKE THAT FINDING OR DETERMINATION, I SHOULD SAY AND IF THE LEGISLATURE WANTS
TO COME ALONG AN CORRECT IT THEN THAT'S UP TO THEM BECAUSE THEY GAVE YOU WHAT THEY GAVE
YOU AN THAT'S WHY WE ARE HERE. JUSTICE SOLOMON: I GUESS WHAT I AM REALLY
GETTING AT AND I APPRECIATE WHAT JUST STIS FASH IS SAYING, DOVE TO DEPEND UPON 39:1-1
TO REACH THE RESULT THAT YOU'RE SEEKING? IF NOT, IF WE'RE ONLY LOOKING AT THE
BROAD SCOPE AN PURPOSE OF THE NO FAULT STATUTE TO PROVIDE THE MOST COVERAGE THAT WE CAN
FOR PEOPLE IN POSITIONS LIKE THE PLAINTIFF. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK
YOU HAVE TO, JUDGE BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONLY PLACE WHERE IT ACTUALLY GIVES YOU THE DEFINITION
OF A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER. THERE IS NO OTHER PLACE THAT GIFL YOU THAT DEFINITION
AS TO WHERE YOU LOOK AT AS TO WHAT YOU QUALIFY THIS DEVICE. JUSTICE FASCIALE:
WE'RE TOLD TO GO TO 39:1-1 UNDER THAT DEFINITION UN 14.16 A. DAVID J. KARBASIAN:
RIGHT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THAT IS NOT PART OF THE NO FAULT STATUTE.
14.16 IS NOT PART EVEN OF THE SAME SUBTITLE. IT'S NOT PART OF THE NO FAULT STATUTE.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: ABSOLUTELY CORRECT BUT THERE IS NO OTHER GUIDANCE AS
TO WHERE YOU'RE LOOKING. JUSTICE SOLOMON: THAT'S ONLY FOR MOTOR VEHICLE.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: I KNOW YOU'RE FOCUSED ON THIS ISSUE, BUT IF THIS COURT
-- I'M SORRY. JUSTICE SOLOMON: NO, I WAS SAYING THE DEFINITION 396 A 2 THAT
REFERS TO 39:1-1 IS ONLY THAT PLACE WHERE IT IS THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE. OTHERWISE
CHAPTER 6 DOES NOT EVER AS FAR AS I CAN TELL REFER TO 39:1-1. I WOULD LIKE HIM TO ANSWER
THE QUESTION. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: HE'S DOING BETTER. JUSTICE
SOLOMON: YOU'RE AN ADVOCATE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: WITH REGARD TO THAT, I
THINK THE JUDGE WAS GOING TO SAY IF YOU GO BACK TO 39 IT DOES REFER YOU TO N.J.S.A. 39:1-1
THERE IS A MENTION MADE OF IT. JUSTICE PATTERSON: IN MOTOR VEHICLE.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: YES. JUSTICE PATTERSON: LET ME ASKING YOU IN
REPRESENTING THE N J A J, YOUR MEMBERS ARE NOT ABOUT L S E S THE ALL KINDS OF CASES, IF WE
WERE TO START SAYING THAT WE THINK 39:1-1 DEFINITION SHOULD BE IMPORTED INTO THE NO
FAULT STATUTE OTHER THAN WHERE THE LEGISLATURE HAS SPECIFICALLY TOLD US TO DO THAT WHICH IS
THE DEFINITION, AS I UNDERSTAND IT WITH MOTOR VEHICLE, THERE COULD BE SOME UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES, COULDN'T THERE BE. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I THINK, JUDGE, IT
WOULD BE SPECIFICALLY RESERVED FOR LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: IF WE ARE SAYING WE ARE GOING TO THAT DEFINITION EVEN THOUGH THAT DEFINITION
BY ITS TERMS SEEMS TO BE LIMITED TO CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 5, WE'RE JUST GOING TO USE THAT
DEFINITION EVEN THOUGH IT'S NOT IN CHAPTER -- WE'RE DEALING WITH NO FAUMENT WHICH IS
NOT A CHAPTER 1 TO 5 AND THIS IS NOT ABOUT MOTOR VEHICLE, IT'S ABOUT DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS,
THAT CREATES A SUGGESTION THAT THOSE 39:1-1 DEFINITIONS COULD HAVE APPLICATION OUTSIDE
OF CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 5 DOESN'T IT. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: I DON'T THINK SO
YOUR HONOR BECAUSE WHEN YOU LOOK AT LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER TALKS ABOUT DEVICE.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: CAN I JUST ASK A SICH MR. QUESTION, UNDER H IT SAYS VEHICLE PROPELLED
BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. CAN THAT BE ANYTHING BUT A MOTOR VEHICLE?
VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. IT HAS TO BE PROPELLED BY SOMETHING, A
MOTOR. DAVID J. KARBASIAN: RIGHT. JUSTICE FASCIALE: N J SAYS
MOTOR VEHICLE MEANS GO BACK TO 39:1-1 AND THAT'S HOW WE GO TO THAT PART OF THE STATUTE.
DAVID J. KARBASIAN: CORRECT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: IS THERE
ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD TO YOUR PRESENTATION. DAVID J.
KARBASIAN: NO, THANK YOU YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME. THE COURT: MS.
ICHL PLEASE GO AHEAD. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: JUSTICE RABNER,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. I'VE LISTENED TO THIS NOW FOR WHAT,
ALMOST AN HOUR, AND IT COMPLETELY CHANGED THE OPENING REMARKS THAT I WANTED TO
MAKE THIS MORNING. IT'S GOING TO START IN A WHOLE DIFFERENT DIRECTION BUT
I THINK WE NEED TO START FROM WHERE THIS TARTED FROM. MR. GOYCO MADE AN APPLICATION
FOR PEDESTRIAN PIP UNDER THIS ORIGINAL POLICY AND THE ORIGINAL DENIAL WAS
BASED ON THE POLICY LANGUAGE AND THE POLICY LANGUAGE DEFINES A PEDESTRIAN BY
TRACKING THE LANGUAGE OF 39 A:-2, NOWHERE IN THE LANGUAGE IS THE WORD VEHICLE
DEFINED, IT'S NOT DEFINED IN THE POLICY, WHEN YOU INTERPRET A POLICY, WORDS THAT ARE
NOT DEFINED ARE GIVEN THEIR ORDINARY MEANING. VEHICLES COME IN ALL SIZES
AND SHAPES, A BOAT IS A VEHICLE, AN AIRPLANE IS A VEHICLE, A SHRED IS A VEHICLE,
ROLLER SKATES ARE A VEHICLE, HORSES ARE A VEHICLE. THINGS THAT MOVE PEOPLE
FORWARD ARE VEHICLES. SO HOW DO WE LIMIT WHO GETS PIP UNDER THIS POLICY IF WE'RE
LOOKING AT THE DEFINITION OF A VEHICLE. WE LIMIT IT BY THE WORDS IN THE POLICY
WHICH ARE OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER. BY SICK COALS, AND THIS WAS LOST BECAUSE
THE WHOLE ARGUMENT BELOW WAS VERY SHAKESPEARE TO BE A BIKE OR NOT TO BE A BIKE,
BIKES ARE PEDALED WITH YOUR FEET, SCOOTERS -- 68 BOARDS, ROLLER SKATES,
THEY'RE WITH YOUR FEET, SO IF IT HAS A MOTOR, YOU DON'T GET PIP, IT'S THAT SIMPLE,
THAT'S THE POLICY LANGUAGE. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ARGUED BELOW
AND ARGUED TODAY ABOUT THIS SOCIAL UTILITY OF PROVIDING PIP BENEFITS TO
PEOPLE MORE INJURED IN MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS BUT THERE ARE OTHER SOCIAL
UTILITIES INVOLVED AS WELL AND JUDGE HUE DAK POINTED THAT OUT WHEN HE SAID SO
WHEN YOU'RE LOOKING AT THIS STATUTE THE LEGISLATURE DECIDED TO CHANGE THIS
STATUTE WITHOUT GIVING ANY THOUGHT OR CONSIDERATION TO HOW THAT'S GOING TO IMPACT
INSURANCE PREMIUMS STLOUT THE STATE, BECAUSE ONE OF THE GOALS OF NO-FAULT
IS TO KEEP PREMIUMS LOW, AND WHEN YOU SUDDENLY START TO EXPAND THE DEFINITIONS
OF WHAT IS COVERED AND WHAT ISN'T COVERED, IT EXPO NENS SHAEL INCREASES
THE COST OF THOSE PREMIUMS TO THE -- SO YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THAT SOCIAL UTILITY
AS WELL AND THAT'S A COMPETING INTEREST, YOU'VE GOT 3 COMPETING INTERESTS THAT
WERE RAISED BY THIS CASE, YOU'VE GOT THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF PROVIDETH MEDICAL BENEFITS,
YOU'VE GOT THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF KEEPING COSTS LOW AND YOU'VE GOT THE SOCIAL
UTILITY OF ADDRESSING WHAT MANY PEOPLE WOULD ARGUE IS A GLOBAL CLIMATE CITES, BY
SAYING LET'S REDUCE POLLUTION, AND LET'S GIVE PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RIDE ON
LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS AND BIKES. YOU CAN GET HUNG UP ON ONE WORD ON 39:1-1,
DEVICE VERSUS VEHICLE, BUT IF YOU LOOK AT WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND I THINK THERE
WAS THIS QUESTION AMONGST YOUR HONORS, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF CALLING A MOTOR
VEHICLE A MOTOR VEHICLE IN THE NO-FAULT LAW, WHEN WELL THE PURPOSE IS THIS, WE
ACTUALLY DEFINE VEHICLES DIFFERENTLY FOR HOW WE INSURE THEM, AUTOMOBILES
ARE DEFINED ONE WAY AND THEY ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE CERTAIN KINDS OF COVERAGE INCLUDING
PIP, MOTOR VEHICLES ARE DEFINED ANOTHER WAY AND THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE
PIP. THAT IS 27.3, THOSE ARE MOTORCYCLES, MOW PEDESTRIANS, COMMERCIAL TRUCKS,
THEY ARE NOT AUTOMOBILES FOR PURPOSES OF THE NO-FAULT LAW, THAT'S WHY THERE'S
A DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE VERSUS AUTOMOBILE. IT'S NOT
MEANT FOR US TO LOOK AT THAT IN A MICROCOSM, AND I THINK THE OTHER ARGUMENT
THAT WAS RAISED BELOW IS THAT, OKAY, IT'S PROPELLED BY A MOTOR BUT IT'S NOT
MEANT FOR RIDING ON STREETS OR THE HIGHWAYS. WELL, THE STATUTE THEY'RE RELYING
ON SAID GUESS WHAT, YOU CAN USE THESE DEVICES OR VEHICLES, WHATEVER YOU
WANT TO CALL THEM, ON OUR HIGHWAYS, ON OUR STREETS, AND YOU'RE GOING TO FOLLOW
THE SAME RULES THAT BICYCLES FOLLOW WHICH IS DRIVE IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS
TRAFFIC, PARK AWAY FROM PEDESTRIAN THOROUGH FARES, WEAR YOUR HELMET, SIGNAL WHEN
YOU'RE TURNING, AND ALL OF THOSE THINGS THAT GUIDE OUR TRAFFIC LAWS, SO THERE'S
AN ORDERLY FLOW OF TRAFFIC, WE'RE GOING TO TREAT IT THE SAME WAY WE TREAT
A BIKE VERSUS THE WAY A PEDESTRIAN IS REQUIRED TO WALK ON THE STREET. PEDESTRIANS
WALK OPPOSITE TRAFFIC ACCORDING TO THE TRAFFIC LAW, NOT WITH IT, LIKE A
BIKE WOULD. SO IF YOU'RE LOOKING AT THE PURPOSE OF WHY THEY DID IT, IT'S TO OPEN
UP THAT AVENUE OF PUTTING THEM ON THE HIGHWAYS, ON THE ROADWAYS, AND NOW
THEY ARE. SEE THEY MEET BOTH QUALIFICATIONS, IT'S POWERED BY A MOTOR AND YOU'RE
ALLOWED TO DRIVE IT ON THE STREET, THEREFORE WHOEVER IS USING IT IS IN THE A
PEDESTRIAN, IT'S THAT SIMPLE. AND IF YOU LOOK AT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ALL
IT SAYS IS WE'RE TRYING TO BENEFIT THE ENVIRONMENT. THE ONLY THING IT SAYS ABOUT
WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO WITH THESE VEHICLES, WE'RE NOT GOING TO REGISTER
OR INSURE THEM, BUT IN RESPONSE TO THIS CASE PROBABLY THE LEGISLATURE IS TAKING
ACTION AND THEY REQUIRE THESE VEHICLES TO BE REGISTERED AND INSURED THE
SACHL WAY A MOPED OIR MOTORCYCLE WOULD BE AND I THINK THAT GOES TO SHOW WHAT THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT WAS HERE. AND WHEN YOU LOOK AT LANGUAGE WHILE ACCEPT THOSE
THINGS BY THEIR VERY NATURE ARE NOT MEANT TO APPLY, WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?
THAT MEANS IT ALWAYS HAS THAT KASHGSD IFK, YOU COULD SAY FOR EXAMPLE MOEK SMOKING
BY ITS VERY NATURE CAUSES CANCER, ALWAYS HAS THAT CHARACTERISTIC. PIP BY
ITS VERY NATURE IS PROVIDED TO PEOPLE WHO ARE IN THEIR AUTOMOBILE AND IN AN ACCIDENT OR
IF THEY'RE COVERED UNDER THE POLICY AS A PEDESTRIAN AND A PEDESTRIAN IS
DEFINED AS SOMEONE WHO IS NOT IN A VEHICLE POWERED BY A MOTOR AND DESIGNED FOR
USE ON THE ROAD. SO THEY'RE WALKING, THEY'RE RIDING THEIR BIKE, THEY'RE
RIDING THEIR 68 BOARDS BUT NOT USING SOMETHING THAT REQUIRES A MOTOR. AND NEW NAG
WAS THE CASE THAT INVOLVED THE MOPED, AND WHAT THE COURT WAS LOOKING AT WAS
HOW WAS IT BEING USED. IT WAS NOT BEING USED IN THE HYBRID FASHION, IT WAS NOT
BEING USED BY THE PEDESTRIAN DALG MOTION, IT WAS BEING USED BY ITS MOTOR AND THE
ONLY REASON TO PEDAL IT WAS TO START IT UP. YOU CAN'T USE THIS LOW-SPEED
ELECTRIC SCOOTER IN ANY OTHER WAY THEN WITH THE MOTOR SO IT'S NEVER GOING TO BE
A PEDESTRIAN BY THE DEFINITION THAT'S CURRENTLY IN THE STATUTE.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: UNDER THE NO-FAULT LAW, 6 A-2, IS A MOTOR VEHICLE THE SAME THING
AS A VEHICLE? PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: IT IS NOT, BUT I POSIT THAT'S
BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY ARE INSURED. JUSTICE FASCIALE: FORGET ABOUT
THE WAY THEY ARE INSURED, STATUTORILY, IS A MOTOR VEHICLE THE SAME THING
AS A VOOEK UNDER NO FAULT LAW, 6 A-2. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO, I THINK
VEHICLE PROBABLY IMPLIES SOMETHING BROADER. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: YOU'RE SAYING PROBABLY IMPLIES, I WANT TO GO TO THE LANGUAGE, IS A MOTOR
VEHICLE IN SECTION 6 A-2 THE SAME THING AS A VEHICLE. PATRICIA A.
HOLDEN: YES WACHLT I'M SORRY, YOU JUST CONCEDED THAT A VEHICLE IS ONLY A MOTOR
VEHICLE -- PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO, I'M SAYING A MOTOR
VEHICLE WOULD QUALIFY AS A VEHICLE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: BUT IS
BROADER THEN. JUSTICE FASCIALE: SO A MOTOR VEHICLE INCLUDES
ALL VEHICLES. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: I WOULD SAY THAT IS NOT
NECESSARILY TRUE DEPENDING ON HOW THEY'RE DEFINED WITHIN OTHER ASPECTS OF THE STATUTE.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: LET'S LOOK AT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE STATUTE,
6 A-2, MOTOR VEHICLE, TO DETERMINE WHETHER I'M CORRECT THAT MOTOR VEHICLE
INCLUDES ALL VEHICLES. 6 A-2 J TELLS US WHAT MOTOR VEHICLE IS, IT
TELLS US THAT A MOTOR VEHICLE IS DEFINED IN 3911 SO WE GO TO 3911 AND IN
3911 IT SAYS MOTOR VEHICLE INCLUDES ALL VEHICLES, SO AM I CORRECT THAT A MOTOR
VEHICLE UNDER 6 A, NO-FAULT, INCLUDES ALL VEHICLES. PATRICIA A.
HOLDEN: IF THAT'S HOW YOU'RE READING IT. JUSTICE FASCIALE:
THAT'S NOT HOW I'M READING IT, I'M ASKING IF YOU AGREE WITH ME. MOTOR VEHICLE
INCLUDES ALL VEHICLES, PROPELLED OTHERWISE THAN BY MUSCULAR POWER AND THEN IT GOES
DOT DOT DOT EXCEPT LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS. WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET TO
IS HOW DO I GET TO 3911 AND I'M SUGGESTING THAT SUBSECTION H OF THE NO-FAULT STATUTE
REQUIRES THAT WE INTERPRET "VEHICLES" PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR
POWER. A VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER HAS TO BE PROPELLED BY
SOMETHING OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER, I.E. A MOTOR, A DEVICE, SOME KIND OF ELECTRIC
MOTOR FOR INSTANCE. SO WE GO TO WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE
IN THE NO-FAULT STATUTE, AND IT TAKES US TO 3911 WHICH DEFINES MOTOR VEHICLE INCLUDING
ALL VEHICLES EXCEPT LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS. ARE -- AM I WRONG TO TRY
TO READ THESE TOGETHER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO PIP
UNDER YOUR POLICY? PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: I THINK IF I UNDERSTAND
THE QUESTION, YOU'RE SAYING BECAUSE 3911 SKEPTS LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER
FROM THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE IT CAN'T BE A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR PURPOSES OF
2 H? JUSTICE FASCIALE: CORRECT. PATRICIA A.
HOLDEN: I DISAGREE WITH THAT BECAUSE I THINK THAT THE REASON WHY THAT STATUTE REFERS
TO THAT IS SO MANY THAT STATUTE CAN MAKE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HOW
AUTOMOBILES ARE INSURED VERSUS HOW MOTOR VEHICLES ARE INSURED, IT'S NOT MEANT TO SAY
THAT THE LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IS NOT A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR PURPOSES
OF THE NO-FAULT LAW. AND -- JUSTICE PATTERSON: CAN YOU EXPLAIN
WHAT YOU MEAN BY THAT? PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: SO IF YOU LOOK
AT WHAT THE DIFFERENCE IS BETWEEN HOW WE INSURE MOTOR VEHICLES, BECAUSE
THAT HAS A SPECIFIC DEFINITION IN THE NO-FAULT AND INSURANCE LAWS VERSUS HOW WE
INSURE AUTOMOBILES, I THINK THAT IF YOU LOOK AT MOTOR VEHICLE IT'S MEANT TO
EXCEPT CERTAIN KINDS OF VEHICLES FROM THE NO-FAULT LAW, WE DO NOT GIVE PIP TO MOTOR
CYCLES, WE DO NOT GIVE PIP TO COMMERCIAL VEHICLES, THOSE ARE SPECIFICALLY DEFINED
AS MOTOR VEHICLES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT LAW, THAT'S WHY I DISAGREE WITH THAT.
AND IF YOU LOOK AT THE DEFINITION OF LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER, IT DOES SAY THEY
ARE VEHICLES FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE OPEN CARRY FEDERAL LAW, THAT'S
SPECIFICALLY REFERENCED IN THERE. SO TO GO BACK AND FORTH I THINK IT'S A SEMANTIC
ARGUMENT TO SAY IT'S A DEVICE VERSUS A VEHICLE, WE'RE GOING TO RECOGNIZE
IT AS A DEVICE IN ONE CONTEXT AND A VEHICLE IN ANOTHER. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: WHAT DOES DEVICE MEAN TO YOU, THIS WORD DEVICE SEEMS TO BE A RELATIVELY
SEMANTIC ADDITION TO THE DEBATE HERE. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN:
RIGHT, AND I THINK -- CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: IS IT A TERM OF ART?
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: I THINK IT IS A TERM OF ART, I DON'T THINK
IT WAS ARGUED BELOW AND I THINK MAYBE SOMEONE AT THE LEGISLATURE GOT THEIR THEY ARE
SORE RUS OUT, WHEN YOU SAY VEHICLE 27 TIMES IT SOUNDS A LITTLE FUNNY, BUT
I THINK A DEVICE COULD BE MORE THAN JUST A VEHICLE. A CELL PHONE IS A DEVICE.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: BUT THAT SUGGESTS BY YOUR ANSWER THAT
IT'S IN THE A TERM OF ART, IT DOESN'T HAVE A SPECIFIC DEFINITIONAL MEANING.
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: RIGHT, I THINK DEVICE USED IN THAT CONTEXT IS JUST
ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING THIS VEHICLE, I DON'T THINK IT'S REALLY THEM SAYING IT'S
NOT A VEHICLE FOR THE PURPOSES OF MOTOR VEHICLE LAW, IF IT WASN'T A VEHICLE
WHY WOULD YOU APPLY MOTOR VEHICLE LAW TO IT. JUSTICE NORIEGA:
SO ACCORDING TO YOUR READING OF IT, IT'S IN 6 A-2 J UNDER MOTOR VEHICLE
DEFINITION IN ORDER TO HELP DISTINGUISH WHEN AUTOMOBILES ARE INSURED VERSUS OTHER
TYPES OF MOTOR VEHICLE. IS THAT RIGHT? PATRICIA A. HOLDEN:
YES. JUSTICE NORIEGA: BUT IF YOU LOOK UNDER J, THE REST OF
THAT SENTENCE SAYS EXCLUSIVE OF AN AUTOMOBILE AS DEFINED IN SUBSECTION A. SO IT
CARVED OUT THE TERM AUTOMOBILE AS DEFINED IN THE NO-FAULT STATUTE, BUT LEAVES
THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEFINITION TO 391-1, SO DOESN'T THAT POINT US SPECIFICALLY TO
ADOPT THAT DEFINITION OF MEEK WHICH ENCOMPASSES ALL VEHICLES IN 391-1 INTO
THE NO-FAULT STATUTE. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO, BECAUSE NO -- IT
WOULD -- MY POINT IS THERE'S ALSO THE INSURANCE STATUTE THAT YOU HAVE TO READ
INTO THIS AS WELL CHLGS 17:STWIET-1.3. JUSTICE PATTERSON:
I'M SORRY, SAY THAT A LITTLE MORE SLOWLY. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN:
N.J.S.A. 17-28-1.3, WHICH IS THE STATUTE THAT SAYS HOW MOTOR VEHICLES ARE TO BE
INSURED, WHAT THE MINIMUM FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IS FOR THOSE VEHICLES.
JUSTICE NORIEGA: DOES THAT STATUTE HAVE ANY PROVISIONS THAT
HELP US DEFINE THE LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS AND IS IT MENTIONED ANYWHERE IN
THE RECORD OR YOUR BRIEFS. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO YOUR HONOR,
AND IT'S NOT MENTIONED BELOW AND IT'S SOMETHING THAT I IN LISTENING TO THE
ARGUMENTS TODAY IT CONCERNED ME THAT WE'RE READING SOME STATUTES TOGETHER BUT NOT
READING THE OTHER STATUTES TOGETHER. JUSTICE PATTERSON: SO
EXPLAIN WHAT THAT MEANS, IS THAT DO ALL MOTOR VEHICLES HAVE TO BE INSURED?
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO, MOTOR VEHICLES INCLUDE COMMERCIAL TRUCKS, MOTOR
CYCLES, MOW PEDESTRIANS. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN:
JUSTICE PATTERSON: I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT PIP, BUT YOU SAID YOU'D BE TALKING ABOUT
THE APRON INSURANCE PERIOD AND THEN SEPARATELY ABOUT THE PIP REQUIREMENTS,
AUTOMOBILES HAVE TO BE INSURED BY LAW IN NEW JERSEY. PATRICIA A.
HOLDEN: RIGHT. JUSTICE PATTERSON: DO ALL MOTOR VEHICLES HAVE
TO BE INSURED BY LAW. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: YES.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: SO IF WE WERE TO SAY THAT THE LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IS
A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR THE PURPOSES OF OUR ANALYSIS, ARE WE THEREFORE PERHAPS
UNINTENTIONALLY CHANGING THE INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THAT TYPE OF DEVICE, VEHICLE
-- PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO, BECAUSE THAT'S WHERE I THINK THIS
READING OF THE DEFINITIONS COMES TOGETHER WHICH IS MOTOR VEHICLES DEFINED THAT
WAY BECAUSE THERE ARE MOTOR VEHICLES THAT WE REQUIRE TO HAVE INSURANCE,
COMMERCIAL TRUCKS, MOTORCYCLES, MOW PEDESTRIANS, WHEN THEY SAY EXCEPT FOR THESE
LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER THEY'RE SAYING THAT'S NOT A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT
WE'RE REQUIRING INSURANCE ON RIGHT NOW. JUSTICE PATTERSON: THAT'S
A NONMOTOR VEHICLE THAT WE'RE REQUIRING INSURANCE ON. PATRICIA
A. HOLDEN: IT IS NOT A MEEK. BUT IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT IT IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR THE
PURPOSES OF THE PIP STATUTE AND THE PIP LANGUAGE IN THE POLICY.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: HAS ANY PARTY OR ANY COURT EVER HELD IN THE CONTEXT
OF YOUR CASE THAT THE LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IS NOT A VEHICLE AT ALL
BECAUSE THE DEFINITION IN 391-1 GOVERNS? PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO,
AND I THINK THIS IS A CASE -- EVERYONE AGREES THIS IS A CASE OF FIRST
IMPRESSION AND THAT THERE'S REALLY NO LAW IN NEW JERSEY THAT ADDRESSES WHETHER IT'S
A VEHICLE OR NOT A VEHICLE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: UNDERSTOOD, I'M
ASKING MORE WHETHER YOU EVER WOULD HAVE HAD THE CHANCE TO BRIEF AND ARGUE
FOR EXAMPLE THAT 39:1-1 DOES NOT APPLY OR DOES NOT MEAN THAT A LERSZ IS LSES IS
NOT A VEHICLE, YOU NEVER WOULD HAVE BRIEFED THAT BECAUSE NO PARTY WOULD
HAVE ARGUED THAT IT IS NOT A VEHICLE UNDER 3911. PATRICIA A.
HOLDEN: THAT IS CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: AND THE LOWER COURT
DID NOT HOLD THAT. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: THAT IS CORRECT.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: AND THE APPELLATE DIVISION DID NOT HOLD
THAT, SO YOU WOULD HAVE HAD NO INCENTIVE TO ARGUE THAT 3911 DOES NOT MEAN THAT
A LSES IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR PURPOSES OF THE WORD PEDESTRIAN IN THE NO-FAULT
ACT. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: CORRECT. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: LET ME JUST SAY THAT THE APPELLATE DIVISION DID CONCLUDE THAT A
LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IS A VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR
POWER, IT'S RIGHT IN THE RECORD, IT'S RIGHT IN THEIR OPINION.
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: YES. JUSTICE FASCIALE: AND THE FACT THAT THE
PARTIES MAY NOT HAVE BRIEFED THIS SUBJECT DOES NOT LIMIT OUR OBLIGATION
TO INTERPRET THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE OURSELVES, AM I CORRECT?
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: YES, YOU ARE, YOUR HONOR. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: IF THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT, WOULD THERE HAVE --
WOULD YOU HAVE -- IT'S HARD TO GO BACK AND RECONSTRUCT AN EVENT THAT DIDN'T
HAPPEN, BUT WOULD THERE BE CONCERNS THAT YOU HAD ABOUT THE POTENTIAL BROADER REACH
OF A RULING THAT IS NOW BEING URGED BY YOUR COLLEAGUES ON THIS SIDE OF THE
ROOM, ABOUT OTHER AS SUSPECTS OF INSURANCE LAW. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN:
ABSOLUTELY, YOUR HONOR, AND I THINK THAT WAS TOUCHED UPON BELOW AND THEY TALKED
ABOUT THE IMPACT TO WHAT IS BEING CALCULATED IN PREMIUM DOLLARS AND HOW
INSURED PEOPLE, I THINK PLAINTIFF ADDRESSED THAT IN THEIR BRIEF TO SOME EXTENT,
THE ISSUE BECOMES RIGHT NOW -- YES, 40 YEARS OF ARE NOT A VEHICLE WITHIN
THE MEANING OF -- SO IF YOU CALCULATE A PREMIUM KNOWING THAT PEOPLE RIDE BIKES.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: I UNDERSTAND THE ARGUMENT AND I THINK
THAT WAS AN ARGUMENT THAT WAS ALIVE EARLIER IN THIS CASE, WHAT I'M ASKING IS WHETHER
THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN -- IF THIS ARGUMENT ABOUT THE IMPORTING OF THE 3911
DEFINITION FOR PURPOSES OF THE ARGUMENT THAT'S BEING MADE HERE HAD BEEN MADE, WOULD
YOU HAVE HAD ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF AN INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE
ON OTHER ASPECTS OF INSURANCE LAW, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT PREMIUMS FOR SCOOTERS.
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: NO, PREMIUMS IN GENERAL, BECAUSE BIKES
AREN'T CONCERNED UNDER THE POLS, CARS ARE, BUT WHEN YOU CALCULATE THE RISK, WHAT IS
THE RISK, HOW A CAR IS GOING TO BE USED AND WHAT IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SOMEONE TO BE A PEDESTRIAN AND QUALIFY FOR PEDESTRIAN, THERE'S A WHOLE LOT OF FACTORS
PLACE WHEN SOMEONE COMES TO US IN THE FIRST PLACE AND THEN HOW DO YOU CALCULATE
THAT PREMIUM, AND STATEWIDE. JUSTICE PATTERSON: LET ME ASK
YOU, AGAIN, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT UVENTD WRITING, A SIDE UNDERWRITING, I
UNDERSTAND THAT'S AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION, WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT IS IF
3911 DEFINITIONS ARE IMPORTED INTO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF 391-1, COULD THAT
CHANGE OTHER STATUTES OF HOW THEY ARE APPLIED, DO YOU SEE WHAT I'M SAYING.
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: I DO, AND I THINK IT'S A BIT MIND BOGGLING THE
SCOPE OF IT BECAUSE OF THE AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC AND CARS AND VEHICLES ON THE ROAD
AND HOW THEY'RE USED AND REGULATED AND HOW WE INSURE THEM. I THINK IT'S
ALMOST HARD TO WRAP YOUR MIND AROUND SOMETHING LIKE THAT, THE IMPACT THAT IT COULD
POSSIBLY HAVE STATEWIDE ON VARIOUS DIFFERENT TYPES OF INSURANCE AND
TRAFFIC LAWS. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: SO WHETHER A LOW-SPEED
ELECTRIC SCOOTER QUALIFIES FOR PIP BENEFITS IS NOT ONLY AN IMPORTANT QUESTION, BUT
IT'S A POLICY QUESTION. IF WE DO NOT FIND THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES
IS CLEAR AND THAT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOESN'T ADDRESS THE QUESTION DIRECTLY,
SHOULD THE MATTER BE LEFT FOR THE LEGISLATURE TO DECIDE IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: YES, AND THEY'RE WORKING ON THAT.
THEY'VE PROPOSED LEGISLATION AS OF NOVEMBER TO AMEND THE VERY STATUTE ON WHICH
PLAINTIFF RELIES TO REQUIRE THAT THESE VEHICLES BE LICENSED AND INSURED,
I THINK I SAW ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THAT 8 DOLLARS FOR THE RECHT REGISTRATION
AND REQUIRING THEM TO BE INSURED AS YOU WOULD A MOPED. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: MEANING THEY WOULD GET PIP. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN:
YES. JUSTICE FASCIALE: BY THE WAY, I THINK THE TRIAL COURT
DID CONCLUDE THAT A LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTER IS NOT A MOTOR VEHICLE.
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: RIGHT, I THINK HE WAS MAKING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
MOTOR VEHICLE AND THE BAR TERM VEHICLE. JUSTICE PATTERSON:
SO YOUR POSITION WOULD BE IF THE COURT WERE TO CONCLUDE AS THE CHIEF WAS JUST
MENTIONING THAT THIS IS NOT THE MOST T CLEAR SITUATION THAT THE LEGISLATURE
HAS EVER GIVEN US TO RESOLVE AND THERE IS NOTHING IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THAT
WHICH I THINK NOTHING HAS BEEN MENTIONED HERE WHICH WOULD HELP US WITH AN A
MBIGUOUS STATUTE, THEN WE SHOULD LOOK TO YOUR POLICY. PATRICIA A.
HOLDEN: YES. AND THE LEGISLATURE ACTUALLY COULD HAVE ADDRESSED THIS IN THE LAST
40 YEARS, AND THEY HAVEN'T, THEY HAVE NOT CHANGED THE DEFINITION OF PEDESTRIAN.
JUSTICE FASCIALE: BUT THEY DID THAT, BUT -- PATRICIA
A. HOLDEN: I'M SAYING WITHOUT ADDING A BICYCLE. JUSTICE
FASCIALE: MAY 132019 IS THE DATE THAT THEY AMENDED 391-JUAN TO EXCEPT FROM MULTIPLE
DEFINITIONS LOW-SPEED ELECTRIC SCOOTERS. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN:
YES, BUT NOT FROM CHANGING THE DEFINITION OF A PEDESTRIAN.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: CORRECT, SO IF WE'RE GOING TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY
THAT GOFRNGS HERE, LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY TRACKS THE LANGUAGE OF THE NO-FAULT
STATUTE, CORRECT? BUT IT DOESN'T TRACK THE LANGUAGE OF 3911 BECAUSE IT HAS NO
REASON TO. CORRECT SKWLOO CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
SO THE WORD PEDESTRIAN IN THE POLICY SAYS PEDESTRIAN MEANS ANY PERSON WHO IS
NOT OCCUPYING A VEHICLE PROPELLED BY OTHER THAN MUSCULAR POWER AND SDIEVEND PRIMARILY
FOR USE ON HIGHWAYS, ROADS AND TRACKS, THERE'S NO INDICATION IN THE POLICY
WOULD BE DEFINED BY 391-1. PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: POLICY INTERPRETATION,
RULES OF POLICY INTERPRETATION KWOOIR THAT YOU GIVE VEHICLE ITS ORDINARY
MEANING BECAUSE IT'S NOT DEFINED IN THE POLICY. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: AND DO YOU AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE WHAT I READ FROM BLACK'S
LAW DIVISION, WHICH IS. (READING THE DEFINITION.
PATRICIA A. HOLDEN: YES. MENT.