(APPEARANCES TENDERED.) THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, AND WELCOME EVERYONE.
PLEASE BE SEATED. AS YOU MAY KNOW FROM LOOKING AT OUR ROSTER NOT JUST THIS
CASE WE HAVE MANY ATTORNEYS THAT WE ARE LUCKY TO BE ABLE TO HEAR FROM TODAY, ROUGHLY 20
IN ALL AND I TELL YOU THAT BECAUSE IT'S GOING TO AFFECT HOW MUCH TIME. WE ARE USUALLY
QUITE GENEROUS, AMICI SHOULD NOT TRY TO GO MORE THAN 10 MINUTES AND TRY TO PREPARE YOURSELF
FOR THAT AND WE HAVE SIMILAR ARGUMENTS, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER HAS RESERVED AN HOUR FOR ITS
COMBINED PRESENTATIONS, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD THAT MUCH TIME AND I WOULD URGE
YOU TO ADOPT PROOIF OTHER ARGUE LETTERS AN NOT REPEAT AND ADDRESS THE BRIEFS WHERE
APPROPRIATE. LET'S BEGIN, MR. INGRAM. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM:
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. THE STATE SAYS THAT MEGAN'S LAW REQUIRES THAT MY CLIENT,
T.L. WHO WAS A CHILD WHEN HE WAS ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT THAT HE MUST REGISTER AS A SEX
OFFENDER FOR THE REST OF HIS LIFE. IT SAYS THIS BECAUSE FOLLOWING HIS ADJUDICATION HE
COMMITTED A PETTY DISORDERLY PERSONS OF OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE. WE KNOW THAT THE
VAST MAJORITY OF PEOPLE LIKE T.L. WILL NEVER COMMIT A NEW SEX OFFENSE. THIS AT THE VERY
LEAST PRESENTS A SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION, BUT THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY QUESTION ARISES
ONLY IF THE 15-YEAR BAR OF SUBSECTION F APPLIES TO CHIN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT. UNDER
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE IT DOES NOT HERE ARE THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF SUBSECTION F, A PERSON
REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THIS ACT MAY TERMINATE MEGAN'S LAW UPON PROOF THAT THE PERSON
HAS NOT XHID AN OFFENSE WITHIN 15 YEARS FOLLOWING CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY AND IS NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. WE AGREE
WITH THE STATE THAT SUBSECTION F APPLIES TO CHILDREN BY ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE IT APPLIES
TO PERSONS REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THE ACT. WE FWRAE THAT ALL REGISTRANT'S
TO TERMINATE MEGAN'S LAW MUST PROVE THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY
OF OTHERS AND THEY MUST PROVE THAT TO THE A LAW DIVISION JUDGE AND THAT IS ALWAYS A FACT
INTENSIVE INQUIRY. THE SOLE QUESTION IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER THE 15-YEAR OFFENSE
FREE BAR WHICH IS TRIG FWERD BY A CONVICTION FOR A SEX OFFENSE, WHETHER THAT BAR APPLIES
TO CHERN WHO WERE NEVER CONVICTED OF A SEX OFFENSE. TO RULE IN THE STATE'S
FAVOR, THIS COURT WILL NEED TO HOLD FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE TERM CONVICTION CAN E
NCOMPASS JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS. THIS CONFLICTS WITH HOW THE TERM CONVICTION
IS USED IN THE CRIMINAL CODE, THE JUVENILE CODE, THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISIONS, AS WELL AS
THE MEGAN'S LAW STATUTE ITSELF. THE STATE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A SINGLE
EXAMPLE IN NEW JERSEY LAW WHERE THE TERM CONVICTION EXTEND TO ADD JUD INDICATIONS OF
THE DELINQUENCY, BUT THEY ARE ASKING YOU TO MAKE THAT CONNECTION HERE AND INJECT THE TERM
ADJUDICATION OF DECLINE INTO THE MEGAN'S LAW STATUTE. IF THE STATE IS RIGHT,
THE CONVICTION ENCOMPASSES JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS, THEN SUBSECTION F RAISES A
SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION, BUT THAT INTERPRETATION IS WRONG.
CONVICTIONS AN ADJUDICATIONS OF DELINQUENCY, ARE DISTINCT DISPOSITIONS IN THE CRIMINAL
CODE AND IN MEGAN'S LAW. MEGAN'S LAW BY ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE IMPOSES LIFETIME
REGISTRATION ON CHILDREN, BUT SUBSECTION F ALLOWS THEM TO TERMINATE THEIR STATUS UPON
PROOF TO A LAW DIVISION JUDGE THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF
OTHERS. THAT IS A REASONABLE STANDARD. IT IS WELL WITHIN THE MAINSTREAM
OF JURISDICTIONS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES AND, IT, ALSO, HAPPENS TO BE THE STANDARD
ESTABLISHED BY OUR LEGISLATURE. THANK YOU. THAT'S MY OPENING,
YOUR HONORS. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: YOUR POSITION IS PRONG 2 APPLIES TO
JUVENILES. DOES PRONG 1 APPLY IN ANY WAY TO JUVENILES. JONATHAN
EDWARD INGRAM: IF A PERSON IS AN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT, IT WOULD NOT APPLY TO THEM.
THE COURT: IF YOU'RE CORRECT AND A JUVENILE APPLIED FOR EARLY TERMINATION
ONE MONTH OR PERHAPS EVEN ONE WEEK AFTER, IF THEY ARE ABLE TO COME FORWARD AND DEMONSTRATE
THAT THEY ARE NOT A THREAT TO SAFETY. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: WELL, LOOK,
REALISTICALLY, THAT'S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN, YES, UNDER OUR INTERPRETATION, THAT THEORETICALLY
COULD HAPPEN, BUT, YOU KNOW, IN MY EXPERIENCE, LAW DIVISION JUDGES TAKE THEIR JOB VERY
SERIOUSLY WHEN THEY'RE FACED WITH THESE TYPES OF APPLICATIONS. ROUTINELY,
IN FACT IN EVERY SINGLE CASE FROM THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND I BELIEVE COUNSEL
FOR J A WILL SAY THE SAME THING, WE SUPPORT THESE APPLICATIONS WITH A PSYCHOSEXUAL EVAL
UATION. THIS MEANS WE HAVE THE REGISTRANT GO AND MEET WITH A PSYCHOLOGIST. THAT PSYCHOLOGIST
INTERVIEWS THEM OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THEY REVIEW THE POLICE REPORTS, THE DISCOVERY ON
THE CASE AN THEY SCORE THEM ON MODERN ACTUARIAL INTERESTS AND THEY WILL TELL US WHETHER
THEY FEEL THIS PERSON PRESENTS TO AS A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS: SO YOUR ANSWER IS AN INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE ABLE TO SEEK TERMINATION A WEEK,
A MONTH, SIX WEEKS AFTER BECOMING A MEGAN'S LAW REGISTRANT. JONATHAN EDWARD
INGRAM: THEY COULD, IN THEORY, BUT THAT WOULD BE THE RARE CASE. WORKING WITH LAW DIVISION
JUDGES WHO HANDLE THESE APPLICATIONS ALL THE TIME, THEY WANT TO SEE THAT THAT PERSON HAS
SOME PERIOD OF TIME IN THE COMMUNITY WHERE THEY HAVE MADE POSITIVE CHANGES.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: THE 15-YEAR BAR APPLIES, THEN THEY'VE HAD 15 YEARS TO DO THAT SO IN
MOST CASES YOU'RE SIMPLY NOT GOING TO HAVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A MONTH IS -- A SUPERIOR
COURT JUDGE CONSIDERS A MONTH TO BE TOO QUICKLY TO MAKE THAT DETERMINES BECAUSE A 15-YEAR
BAR APPLIES ANDED THAT'S NEVER GOING TO BE AN ISSUE. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM:
I UNDERSTAND, BUT I THINK WHAT YOU'RE GOING TO HEAR TODAY FROM COUNSEL ARGUING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IS THAT THE DATA THAT WE NOW HAVE SHOWS THAT CHILDREN PRESENT A
VERY LOW RISK OF SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM THAN 15 YEARS. WE ARE HERE ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE.
IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT LANGUAGE DID THE LEGISLATURE CHOOSE. CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER: IS THE TENSION IN YOUR ARGUMENT BETWEEN WHAT YOU'RE SUGGESTING AND WHAT
THE COURT HELD IN J.G. IN J.G., THE COURT SAID MEGAN'S LAW OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGE
OF 14 TERMINATE AT AGE 18. DO OLDER JUVENILES GET MORE LENIENT TREATMENT THAN
WHAT THE COURT PRESCRIBED FOR THOSE UNDER 14 IN J.G. UNDER YOUR PROPOSAL.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: NO THEY DON'T. OUR PERSON IS UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE ANY PERSON
WHO IS AN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT WILL BE ABLE TO FILE FOR, ONCE THEY FILE. CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER: JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: SO YOUR INITIAL QUESTION WAS ABOUT
TENSION WITH J.G. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: ARE YOU ASKING US TO OVER TURN J.G.
TO THE EXTENT IT DIFFERS FROM WHAT YOU JUST DESCRIBED. JONATHAN EDWARD
INGRAM: OUR POSITION IS NOT IN TENSION WITH J.G. AND HERE IS WHY, YOU HAVE TO GO BACK
TO THE PRIMARY ISSUE IN J.G. THE QUESTION IN THAT CASE WAS IS MEGAN'S LAW CONSTITUTIONAL
AS APPLIED TO CHILDREN AND THIS COURT DETERMINED THAT IT WAS. HOWEVER, THIS
COURT WENT BEYOND THAT DECISION AND IT ESTABLISHED EFFECTIVELY A CONSTITUTIONAL
BASELINE. IN OTHER WORDS, FOR CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF WAIVER, THIS COURT
SAID, WERE IT UP TO THE COURT, THEY WOULDN'T EVEN APPLY MEGAN'S LAW TO THAT GROUP OF
PEOPLE AT ALL, BUT IT NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A BASELINE. IN OTHER WORDS, IF A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF WAIVER IS SUBJECT TO MEGAN'S LAW, THEY MUST HAVE THE ABILITY TO
TERMINATE AT THE AGE OF 18. JUSTICE PATTERSON: J.G. IS FULL OF ANALYSIS
WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT APPLY TO CHILDREN 7 TO 14 AND SAID NOTHING
ABOUT THIS OLDER GROUP THAT WE'RE DEALING WITH TODAY, AN JUST GOING BACK TO THE CHIEF
EASE QUESTION, CHIEF EASE QUESTION CHIEF'S QUESTION IF EVERYBODY COULD APPLY IMMEDIATELY
IN THAT 15 TO 17 YEAR AGE GROUP, THEN THEY ARE DOING BETTER UNDER THE LAW THAN A COMBRUP
OF CHERN WHO ARE UNG YOUNGER THAN THEM. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: I NEED
TO BE CLEAR HERE. WE ARE ARE NOT SAYING THERE IS A DIFFERENT STANDARD FOR PERSONS UNDER
THE AGE OF 14. WE ARE NOT SAYING THERE IS A DIFFERENT STANDARD FOR THEM. WE ARE SAYING
THAT UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE, THERE IS A UN NIED STANDARD FOR PERSONS WHO ARE ADJUDICATED
DELINQUENT. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: WHAT DO YOU WANT US TO DO WITH J.G., BECAUSE
IN J.G., IT STATED THAT JUVENILES WHO ARE UNDER 14 CAN PROCEED WITH SEEKING TERMINATION
AT THE AGE OF 18; THAT'S WHAT J.G. STATED. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: RIGHT.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: WHAT DO YOU WANT US TO DO WITH J.G. YOU SAY THERE IS
NO TENSION BUT I AM HAVING TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING HOW THAT CAN'T BE. THE STATE
IS MAKING THE ARGUMENT THAT IF WE AGREE WITH YOUR POSITION, THEN EXACTLY WHAT THE SCENARIO
THAT JUSTICE PATTERSON, EXPLAINED WOULD BE A REALITY, JUVENILES THAT ARE JUVENILE
DELINQUENT AND ARE 14 AND UNDER WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL 18, WHEREAS JUVENILES 15 TO 17
COULD DO IT A WEEK LATER. WHAT DO YOU WANT US TO DO WITH J.G.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: J.G. IS STILL COULD GOOD LAW IN THE SENSE THAT THE ANALYSIS IN
WHICH THE COURT ENGAGED IN IS STILL SETS A CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINE. IF THE
LEGISLATURE EVER WENT FORWARD IN THE FUTURE TO CRAFT OTHER TERMINATION MECHANISMS FOR
PERSONS UNDERSTAND THE AGE OF 18 FOR CHILDREN, THEN J.G. WOULD STILL GUIDE HOW THEY CAN
ACTUALLY CRAFT THAT TERMINATION STANDARD. WHAT I AM SUGGESTING TO THE COURT
IS J.G. SAID THERE MUST BE A BASELINE FOR CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF WAIVER, THERE MUST
BE AN EARLY TERMINATION MECHANISM FOR THEM. IT TURNS OUT THAT THE LEGISLATURE
ACTUALLY CRAFTED AN EARLY TERMINATION STANDARD AND ADMITTEDLY, IT'S ONE THAT MOST CHILDREN
ARE GOING TO FILE UNDER. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: DOES J.G. SAY THAT SOMEONE
UNDER THE AGE OF 14 CAN HAVE THEIR MEGAN'S LAW OBLIGATIONS TERMINATED BEFORE AGE 18.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: IT DOES NOT SAY THAT, NO. THE COURT:
ISN'T THAT AN ISSUE THEN THAT WOULD NEED TO BE DEALT WITH? JONATHAN EDWARD
INGRAM: WELL, THIS COURT DIDN'T SAY THAT CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF WAIVER, THAT IT WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY FOR THEM TO WAIT UNTIL THE AGE OF 18. THIS COURT JUST SAID
IT WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO APPLY THE STANDARD TERMINATION MECHANISM AS IT SAW TO
CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF WAIVER. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: I READ J.G. AND
I DON'T SEE IT SAYING THAT SPECIFICALLY QUOTING FROM THE COURT'S OPINION WHERE IT SAYS,
BEFORE ADDRESSING J.G.'S CHALLENGE TO THE KONS NALT OF THE REGISTRATION AN NOTIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF MEGAN'S LAW WE FIRST CONSIDER WHETHER THE LIFETIME REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENT, ETC., ETC., IS RECONCILED OR WITH THE JUVENILE CODE'S PROHIBITION, AND THEN
J.G. THEN GOES ON TO STATE IT IS NOT CITING ANYTHING UNDERSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
AND INSTEAD, IT IS WHAT IT CALLS, HARMONIZING OR INTERPRETING PROVISIONS HARMONIOUSLY,
THE JUVENILE CODE AND MEGAN'S LAW. SO, WHERE IN THE DECISION DO YOU SEE THAT
THE COURT STRUCK DOWN A PART OF MEGAN'S LAW AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL RATHER THAN SIMPLY
INTERPRETING MEGAN'S LAW AS IT SAID, QUOTE, HARMONIOUSLY WITH THE JUVENILE CODE?
THAT'S SPECIFICALLY AT PAGE 334. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: I APOLOGIZE.
I DON'T HAVE THE FULL OPINION IN FRONT OF ME SO I CAN'T POINT TO THE PLACE THAT YOUR HONOR
IS ASKING FOR. OF COURSE THE COURT NEEDED TO DECIDE AS A THRESHOLD ISSUE WHETHER
OR NOT MEGAN'S LAW COULD BE APPLIED TO PERSONS ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT IN ORDER TO CRAFT
A STANDARD FOR CHILDREN. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: I AM SAYING IT IS BASED ON
ITS DESIRE TO HARMONIZE THE JUVENILE CODE WITH MEGAN'S LAW. IT DID NOT DECIDE IT ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS SO IT DIDN'T CREATE A CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINE IT ENGAGED IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION WHERE IT LOOKED AT THE STATUTORY CODE, MEGAN'S LAW AND SAID THIS IS
HOW WE INTERPRET THESE TWO DIFFERENT STATUTES HARMONIOUSLY. JONATHAN EDWARD
INGRAM: RIGHT, BUT I WOULD SAY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION THOSE
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS WERE AT PLAY IN THAT DECISION. YES, I AGREE.
ULTIMATELY WHAT THEY WERE DOING WAS TRYING TO RESOLVE THE TENSION THEY SAW A WITHIN THE
JUVENILE CODE AND THE MEGAN'S LAW FRAMEWORK. JUSTICE PATTERSON: IF IT'S
SO OBVIOUS THAT JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS ARE NOT COUNTED IN SUBSECTION F, WHY WASN'T THAT
ARGUMENT MADE IN J.G. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: THAT'S A VERY GOOD, QUESTION.
MEGAN'S LAW HAS BEEN AROUND FOR 30 YEARS WHY IS THE FIRST TIME WE'RE BRINGING
IT UP NOW. PATD PATH IT'S THE A TEXTUAL ARGUMENT AND IT SEEMS TO ME WITH 30 YEARS OF
VERY ACTIVE AND VERY COMPETENT SKILLED LITIGATORS ON BEHALF OF REGISTRANT'S AND JUVENILE
REGISTRANT'S. IT SEEMS STRANGE THAT IT HAS BEEN MISSED IN ALL THESE VERY SUBSTANTIVE
CASES THAT HAVE COME FORWARD IF IT'S THAT OBVIOUS. JONATHAN EDWARD
INGRAM: YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF MEGAN'S LAW TO GET A SENSE FOR WHY IT IS
COMING UP FOR THE FIRST TIME NOW. UNDERSTAND THE J.G. DECISION, THIS WAS THE
FIRST TIME THAT MEGAN'S LAW COULD BE APPLIED TO PERSONS ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AND IT
WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THE TERMINATION STANDARD IS THAT THE PERSON NEEDED NOT TO COMMIT A
NEW SEX OFFENSE WITHIN 15 YEARS. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT WAS A LONG TIME THAT THAT WAS
THE STANDARD BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT THE COURT SAID. IT WAS ACROSS THE BOARD, THE SUBSECTION
F STANDARD THAT APPLIED TO BOTH CHILDREN AND ADULTS. THAT WAS IN EXISTENCE FOR CLOSE
TO 15 YEARS UNTIL THE AD DECISION AND THAT'S WHEN THE APPELLATE DIVISION INTERPRETED THE
WORD OFFENSE TO NOT MEAN A NEW SEX OFFENSE, BUT ANY OFFENSE AS DEFINED BY THE CRIMINAL
CODE. IT WAS STILL UNDERSTOOD AFTER THAT AND I THINK THIS IS REFLECTED IN
THE COURT'S DECISION IN C.K., THAT THE 15 YEAR BAR WAS EFFECTIVELY A 15-YEAR LOOK BACK
FOR ALL PERSONS AND THAT'S THE LANGUAGE THIS COURT USED IN C.K. IN OTHER
WORDS, IT OPERATED SIMILAR TO THE C S L AND PS L TERMINATION STATUTE UNDERSTAND 43-6.4
WHICH IS THAT YOU CAN'T HAVE AN OFFENSE WITHIN THE PRIOR 15 YEARS BEFORE MAKING THE
APPLICATION. IT WASN'T UNTIL -- AND I CAN REPRESENT TO THIS COURT BECAUSE THE
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER REPRESENTED PEOPLE IN COUNTIES THROUGHOUT NEW JERSEY THAT
THAT WAS LARGELY THE INTERPRETATION THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY THAT IT WAS A 15
YEAR LOOK BACK IT WASN'T UNTIL HD THAT ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR RELIEF WERE FORECLOSED IF
WE GO WITH THE INTERPRETATION THAT CONVICTION IS A BROAD TERM THAT ENCOMPASSES ADJUDICATIONS
OF DELINQUENCY. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: GOING BACK TO THE TENSION WITH
E WE'VE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH J.G. AND YOUR POSITION, I AM GOING TO READ FROM J.G., THIS
IS AT 37, WE HOLD THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE JUVENILE, THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT FOR SEXUAL
OFFENSES COMMITTED WHEN THEY WERE UNDER AGE 14, MEGAN'S LAW REGISTRATION AN COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION ORDER SHALL TERMINATE AT AGE 18. IN THE LAW DIVISION AFTER A
HEARING FINDS THAT THE DELINQUENT IS NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS.
SO, THE COURT HELD THAT TERMINATION WOULD OCCUR AT AGE 18, PROVIDED THAT SHOWING
IS MADE. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: UH-HUH PAB. JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS: SO, AGAIN YOUR POSITION IS, IF WE AGREE WITH YOUR POSITION THEN ALL JUVENILES
ARE ABLE TO SEEK TERMINATION OF THEIR MEGAN'S LAW REQUIREMENTS ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
HOW DO YOU SQUARE THAT WITH THIS LANGUAGE IN J.G. AND THE HOLDING OF J.G.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: WELL, LOOK, I MEAN, AT THE END OF THE DAY, THIS IS A PLAIN LANGUAGE
CASE. WHAT WE'RE ARGUING WHAT T.L. AND R.H. ARE ARGUING IS THAT THE CONVICTION
IS NOW, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE AD DECISION A WELL UNDERSTOOD TERM IN THE MEGAN'S LAW
FRAMEWORK. I WOULD SUGGEST TO YOUR HONOR THAT -- JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS: FORGET AGRICULTURE ENGLISH INC. EMORY I AM NOT SAYING THAT. I TRULY BELIEVE
WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT THE COURT WAS SETTING A BASELINE. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
COUNSEL WHY YOU ARE NOT SAYING ADDRESS J.G. AND HARMONIZE IT YET AGAIN. WHY
ARE YOU SHYING AWAY FROM WHAT APPEARS TO BE A REAL PROBLEM. JONATHAN EDWARD
INGRAM: I THINK THAT REQUIRES YOU TO GET TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE AND WE ARE HERE ON
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE CASE. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: IT SEEMED TO PLEA IN YOUR
OPENING THAT F APPLIES TO JUVENILES; IS THAT TRUE. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM:
F DOES APPLY TO JUVENILES. THAT'S CORRECT. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: WHAT
IN THE PLAIN LANGUAGE TELLS US THAT IT CAN BE APPLIED TO JUVENILES. JONATHAN
EDWARD INGRAM: THE OPENING PHRASE. IT HAS THIS PREAMBLE THAT SAYS EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
IN SUBSECTION G BUT THEN IT SAYS A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THIS ACT. THAT IS
A PHRASE USED THROUGHOUT MEGAN'S LAW TO REFER TO THE BODY OF PERSONS WHO ARE REQUIRED
TO REGISTER UNDERSTAND MEGAN'S LAW. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: THAT LANGUAGE
IS SEEN IN A, FOLLOWED BY A PERSON WHO IS -- A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CONVICTED, ADJUDICATED
DELINQUENT OR FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY. WE SEE THAT LANGUAGE
IN G WHICH REPEATS THAT LANGUAGE, A PERSON WHO IS CONVICTED ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT OR
FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY. THAT LANGUAGE IS NOT IN F. IS
THERE A DISTINCTION WE CAN DRAW THERE OR DO YOU SEE THAT IT APPLIES TO JUVENILES AS A
MATTER OF COURSE. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: THERE ARE TIMES IN MEGAN'S LAW
WHERE IT SAYS A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THIS ACT, WHICH INCLUDES ALL PERSONS
WHO ARE SUBJECT TO REGISTRATION UNDERSTAND MEGAN'S LAW. JUSTICE MICHAEL
NORIEGA: TWO LINES LATER YOU'RE ASKING US TO DRAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WORDS CONVICTION
AND ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT BECAUSE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT DOES NOT APPEAR THERE.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: THAT'S RIGHT BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE TIES THAT 15-YEAR TIME BAR
DIRECTLY TO A CONVICTION OR IT'S TRIGGERED ONLY FOLLOWING A CONVICTION. OUR PART, THE
THAT TERM, TO REFER ONLY TO AN ADULT CONVICTION AND NOT AN ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY.
JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: BUT IF WE TAKE THE ANALYSIS A STEP FURTHER AND
AS THE COURT ATTEMPTED TO GET TO IN J.G. AND AS THE APPELLANT DIVISION DID IN BIOGRAPHICAL,
IS IT POSSIBLE THAT LOOKING AT WHAT THE JUVENILE CODE PROPOSES THAT ALL PUNISHMENT OF
A JUVENILE MUST TERMINATE AT AGE 18 AND THE FACT THAT F DOES NOT INCLUDE ADJUDICATED
DELINQUENT SEE OR ANY TERMS LIKE IT THAT THE TERMINATION PERIOD WOULD JUST EXPIRE AT 18
FOR JUVENILES BECAUSE YOU AGREE THAT MEGAN'S LAW APPLIES TO JUVENILES, THAT JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS MUST REGISTER AND THEN J.G. ALLOWED THERE TO BE A TERMINATION PERIOD FOR THOSE
UNDER 14. COULDN'T WE ARM NIEZ IT BY ALLOWING THE EXPIRATION TO ALL END AT 18 FOR JUVENILES
BASED ON THE LACK OF ANY LANGUAGE TO. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: I THINK THAT
WOULD COME AVENUE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE ANALYSIS. I THINK YOU ONLY GET THERE IF YOU GET
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE. YOU HAVE TO FIRST FIND THE CONVICTION IS A GENERIC TERM
THAT APPLIES TO PERSONS WHO ARE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AND THEN YOU NEED TO -- YOU NEED
TO SKIP OVER THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE SO IF YOU DETERMINE THAT THE TERM
IS AMBIGUOUS OR COULD BE AMBIGUOUS THEN YOU'RE RESOLVING IN FAVOR OF THE STATE. I BELIEVE
THE ONLY WAY TO GET THERE IS IF YOU GET TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IN THE NEXT CASE.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: DOESN'T THE WORD RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
FROM ANY TERM OF IMPRISONMENT, BECAUSE THOSE WHO ARE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT ARE NEVER
RELEASED FROM CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES FOR TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: THAT'S CORRECT. THESE TERMS AGAIN ARE ALL WELL DEFINED IN THE
MEGAN'S LAW FRAMEWORK OR AT LEAST THEY ARE DISTINCT TERMS SO CONVICTION AND
ADJUDICATIONS OF DELINQUENCY ARE USED AS DISTINCT DISPOSITIONS, CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES,
AND THOSE TWO PHRASES OR ONLY THOSE TWO TERMS BEING USED TOGETHER IN RELATION TO TO THE
15-YEAR TIME BAR SHOWS THAT THE LEGISLATURE WAS CONCERNED WITH PERSONS CONVICTED AND NOD
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT. THE COURT: IF A JUVENILE COMMITS A SERIOUS CRIMINAL
OFFENSE AND IS WAIVED UP TO ADULT COURT AND THERE IS A FINDING THAT THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR IT, DO THEY END UP WITH A CONVICTION, QUOTE UNQUOTE ON THEIR RECORD.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: WE ARE HERE ON A PLAIN LANGUAGE CASE. I THINK THAT
PERSON WOULD HAVE A HARD TIME SAYING THAT UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE THE 15-YEAR TIME BAR
WOULDN'T APPLY TO THEM. THE COURT: THEY WOULD HAVE TO SATISFY PRONG ONE
AS WELL AS PRONG 2. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE I THINK
THEY WOULD HAVE A TOUGH TIME ARGUING THAT PRONG ONE DOESN'T AN I APPLY TO THEM.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: DOES SUBSECTION F APPLIES TO INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE FOUND NOT GUILTY
BY REASON OF INSANITY. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: THAT'S NOT THIS CASE.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: I'M ASKING BECAUSE THE TERM CONVICTION I AM SURE YOU WOULD
ARGUE DOESN'T APPLY TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS AS WELL SO AN INDIVIDUAL FOUND NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY SUBJECT TO MEGAN'S LAW REGISTRATION, ONCE THEY ARE RELEASED FROM A
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITY, NOT A CORRECTIONAL FA SILT, WOULD THEY, IF WE AGREE WITH YOUR POSITION
BE ABLE TO SEEK TERMINATION OF THEIR MEGAN'S LAW REQUIREMENTS IMMEDIATELY.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: RIGHT. AN ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY IS NOT A CONVICTION, AN
ACQUITTAL IS CERTAINLY NOT A CONVICTION EITHER. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: BUT
THEY ARE PERSONS REQUIRED TO REGISTER. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: BUT THEY ARE
PERSONS REQUIRED TO REGISTER. I SUPPOSE ULTIMATELY THAT WOULD BE OUR POSITION IN THAT
CASE. IT IS NOT THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT. I WOULD SAY THIS FOR PERSONS WHO ARE FOUND
NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY, THEY ARE OFTEN SUBJECT TO CONTROL SUPERVISION FOR A
VERY LONG PERIOD OF TIME. IT'S A PERIOD OF TIME THAT IS MAXIMUM TO THE PERIOD OF TIME
THEY COULD HAVE RECEIVED ON THE CHARGES. SO YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE A JUDGE WHO IS
MONITORING THIS PERSON WHO IS POTENTIAL TENTLY, THEY ARE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED. THEY ARE
REQUIRED TO HAVE ALL KINDS OF TREATMENT, ALL KINDS OF CONDITIONS, COMPLIANCE WITH
MEDICATION AND THAT'S GOING TO BE A CAREFUL KIND OF MONITORING PROCESS. ALSO,
FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, YOU KNOW, SO I WORK IN THIS AREA IN THE LOWER SIX COUNTIES IN THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY. I DON'T BELIEVE I HAVE EVER BEEN SUCCESSFUL ON A TERMINATION APPLICATION
FOR SOMEBODY WHO WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY. JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS: YOU WERE STILL ABLE TO MAKE THAT APPLICATION. JONATHAN EDWARD
INGRAM: YOU CAN MAKE THAT APPLICATION, THAT'S RIGHT, BUT I AM GOING TO TELL YOU LAW
DIVISION JUDGES TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THOSE CASES WHEN A PERSON IS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON
MUCH INSANITY. THAT PERSON IS GOING TO HAVE A VERY TOUGH TIME ON THAT FINAL PRONG OF
SUBSECTION F. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: GOING BACK TO SUBSECTION 2. I HAVE
A QUESTION WITH REGARD TO 7-2 E BECAUSE SECTION E WHICH ADDRESSES, WHICH DISCUSSES THE
ADDRESS NOTIFICATION FOR MEGAN'S LAW REGISTRANT'S, THAT SUBSECTION, ALSO, BEGINS,
WITH THE PHRASE A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER AND THE SECOND SENTENCE STATES, A PERSON
REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF SUBSECTION B, WHICH THAT CROSS REFERENCES.
JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: TO B 3 FAB NAB THAT DISCUSSES ON VIKS AND ADJUDICATION
OF DELINQUENCY OR, A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SUBSECTION B OR UNDER
PARAGRAPH 3 OF SUBSECTION B ON THE BASIS OF A CONVICTION OR AN OFFENSE SIMILAR TO AN
OFFENSE ENUMERATED IN THAT HAD PARAGRAPH SHALL VERIFY HIS ADDRESS, DOES THAT SECTION WHICH
USES THE PHRASE A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER BUT THEN ALSO USES THE TERM CONVICTION,
DOES THAT APPLY TO JUVENILES? JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: INITIALLY, IT DID
NOT APPLY TO PERSONS ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT. YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT A VERY SMALL SLIVER
OF PEOPLE. THESE WOULD BE PEOPLE WHO WERE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT OUT OF STATE THEN
MOVED TO NEW JERSEY AN THEN PROPERLY REGISTERED THEIR ADDRESS BUT THEN WERE CHARGED, I
SUPPOSE WITH A FAILURE TO REGISTER THAT ADDRESS THAT'S THE ONLY GROUP. NO,
UNDER THE ORIGINAL STATUTE, THEY DID NOT NEED TO DO THAT. HOWEVER IF YOU GO DOWN FURTHER
IN THE STATUTE, FURTHER IN SUBSECTION E IT GAVE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE THE ABILITY
TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULE. UNDERSTAND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, ALL PERSONS
WHO DO NOT HAVE A 90-DAY VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT HAVE AN ANNUAL VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: OTHER QUESTIONS, ANYONE? ANYTHING YOU
WOULD LIKE TO ADD COUNSEL. JONATHAN EDWARD INGRAM: NO, URNGS. CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER: THANK YOU KS JESSE M. DE BROSSE: GOOD MORNING IRNS
I KWO LEAK T KWAF MY OEJS STATEMENT AND I WOULD JUST ASK IF I CAN HAVE A
FEW MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: YES.
JESSE M. DE BROSSE: THANK YOU. TO GET FWAK TO THE ISSUE OF J
G. THERE IS A QUESTION OF WHAT THE COURT NEEDS TO DO WITH THAT DECISION
BECAUSE THE COURT FEELS THERE IS PROBABLY SOME TENSION THERE. TO BE CLEAR, IF
THE COURT RULES AS WE ARE URGING IT TO DO IT WOULD SUPERSEDE THE STANDARD IN J
G. BECAUSE ALL INDIVIDUALS ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT OF SEX OFFENSES KWOB
ELIGIBLE TO FILE IF THEY KWO PROVE THEY WERE NOT LIKE TOE TO POSE A TLETD TO THE
SAY THE EVER OERSZ IMD #K50E78 YOUR VOIP UP A LITTLE BIT PLEASE.
JESSE M. DE BROSSE: APOLOGIZE YOUR HONOR. AND SO UNION COUNTY
WHETHER YOU CALL THAT OVERRULING J G OR SUM SEEDING J G IT WOULD HAVE THE
EFFECT THAT ALL JUVENILES WOULD APPLY UNDER WHAT WE SEE TO BE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
STANDARD. I WILL POINT OUT THAT THE J G COURT WAS RESOLVING
THE ISSUE THAT WAS PRESENTED TO IT. NO ONE EVER PRESENTED TO THE J G COURT THAT
THE 15-YEAR PROVISION OF SUBSECTION F- MITS JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS. NO
ONE EVER MADE THAT ARGUMENT. THERE WAS A QUESTION ABOUT WHY, WHY HAS NO ONE
EVER MADE THAT ARGUMENT. THE TRUTH IS, PROBABLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO MANDATORY
LIFETIME REGISTRATION UNTIL THE COURT'S DECISION H D IN 2020. BUT MAYBE
IT'S JUST BECAUSE WE MISSED IT. BUT THIS COURT SIGNALLED IN A D THAT IT WAS GOING
TO PRY OR ADVERTISE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THIS STATUTE OVER PRIOR JUDICIAL
STATEMENTS. IN THE J G DECISION, THE COURT SAID ABOUT SUBSECTION F, THAT A PERSON
OVER THE AGE OF 14 COULD BE RELIEVED FROM REGISTRATION BUT THEY DID NOT XHITD
A SEX OFFENSE WITHIN 15 YEARS OF CONVICTION. AND WE KNOW THAT THAT'S NOT TRUE.
WE KNOW THAT SUBSECTION F SAYS THAT THE PERSON SHALL NOT COMMIT AN OFFENSE.
THE COURT IN AFRMENT D FOUND THAT BASICALLY THAT STATEMENT IN J G WAS NOT CONTROLLING
BECAUSE IT WAS GOING -- IT COULD NOT OVERRULE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTE. AND SO THERE IS A PRECEDENT FOR LOOKING AT THE J G DECISION AND REALIZING
THAT FOR ISSUES THAT WERE NOT PRESENTED TO THE COURT IN A CONCRETE WAY FOR
RESOLUTION, IT WAS NOT GOING TO CONTROL. SO I THINK THAT THIS COURT CERTAINLY HAS
REASONS TO RULE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE IN A WAY THAT WASN'T PREVIOUSLY
CONSIDERED EVEN IF THAT WOULD MEAN THAT IT WAS INTENTION WITH SOME OF THE
THIS COURT'S PREVIOUS STATEMENTS.) IN TENSION ^ ( ^ ).
DOES THE COURT HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE J G CASE.
JUSTICE NORIEGA: AS A RESULT OF THE STANDARD THAT YOU ARE SUGGESTING WHAT WOULD
THE TEST BOO E GOING FORWARD? JESSE M. DE BROSSE: SO WE
WOULD SUBMIT THAT ANYONE REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER MEGAN'S LAW WOULD HAVE
TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SUBSECTION F THAT APPLY TO THEM. SO FOR THOSE
WITH CONVICTIONS THEY WOULD HAVE TO SHOW THAT THEY HAVE NOT COMMITTED AN
OFFENSE WITHIN 15 YEARS FOLLOWING CONVICTION OR RELEASE AND ARE NOT LIKELY TO POSE
A THREAT TOTD SAFETY OF OTHERS. FOR THOSE WITHOUT CONVICTIONS, THEY KWO HAVE
TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS.
YOU CAN UNDERSTAND THIS PHRASE, THIS 15-YEAR PROVISION AS SOME COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION FOR LIFE CONDITIONAL REQUIREMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S
TRIGGERED UPON CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY. THERE IS NO
CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, THAT REQUIREMENT DOESN'T
FOLLOW. THAT'S LITERALLY WHAT THE STATUTE SAYS WE THINK. AND
SO AND SO UNION COUNTY, I THINK IT WAS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT ANOTHER RESOLUTION
IS COULD LOOK AT J G AND SAY THE COURT DIDN'T CONSIDER THE PRECISE QUESTION
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION PRESENTED IN THIS CASE NUMBER ONE, AND NUMBER TWO, SINCE
J G THERE HAS BEEN DECADES OF IMPERICAL RESEARCH THAT SUGGESTS VERY STRONGLY
THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF JUVENILE SEX IF HE UNDERERS WILL NEVER COMMIT ANOTHER
SEX OFFENSE AND THOSE THAT DO THE VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE PERHAPS IT'S 3 OR
5 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT SYSTEM WILL DO SO WITHIN THE FIRST 3 YEARS.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: HOW DOES THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE HELP US ON A QUESTION OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION? I UNDERSTAND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENT HOW DOES IT HELP US HERE. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: I THINK THAT
EVIDENCE WAS PART OF THE U.S. SPROEM COURT'S DECISIONS AND THIS COURT'S
PREEFRGS DECISIONS IN WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY APPROPRIATE WHEN APPLYING TO CHILDREN
WHO ARE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: BUT
YOU ARE MAKING A STATUTORY ARGUMENT. JESSE M. DE BROSSE:
I AM MAKING A 12589 TRI ARGUMENT BUT IF THIS COURT WERE TO FIND THAT
SUBSECTION F IS AMBIGUOUS IT WOULD HAVE TO KRT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE. AS PART OF
THE CANNONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
DOESN'T IT LOOK TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY NOT ASK ITSELF A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
THAT IS NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: UNFORTUNATELY,
YOUR HONOR, I DON'T KNOW THAT THERE IS ANY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ON THIS ISSUE
THAT'S GOING TO I WILL LUM #2345I9 WHAT THE INTENT WAS. JESSE M.
DE BROSSE: YOUR UNDERSTANDING THOSE IS IF THERE IS NO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
IT IS A STATUTORY CHALLENGE. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: THE COURT
NEN NEEDS TO LOOK AT CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. JESSE M. DE
BROSSE: SO MY UNDERSTANDING, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT IF TS STATUTE IS NOT AMBIGUOUS,
THEN THAT ENDS THE INQUIRY. THE COURT INTERPRETS WHAT THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
SAYS AND HERE UNION COUNTY THE 15-YEAR PROVISION FOLLOWS CONVICTION OR RELEASE
FROM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, WE HAVE NO CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM KRIKS
AL FACILITY, THEREFORE IT DOESN'T APPLY. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: I
THINK YOU NEED TO ARGIROPOULOS THE STATUTE AND LOOK LEAVE TO YOUR FRIEND WHO
HAVE THE NEXT CASE WHO HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION. JESSE
M. DE BROSSE: I UNDERSTAND YOUR HONOR I GOT A LITTLE OFF TRACK. BUT THE OTHER
POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO SAY THAT TO RE#45R78 NICE THIS WITH THE JUVENILE
CODE IN LIGHT OF THE NEW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ISSUE THAT'S BEEN PRESENTED TO
THE COURT WE ARE GOING TO SAY THAT ALL DISPOSITIONS TERMINATE OR ALL MEGAN'S
LAW TERMINATES FOR CHILDREN A JUD INDICATED DELINQUENT AT AGE 18 REGARDLESS. IF
THEY CAN PROVE THAT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF
OTHERS. THAT WOULD BE ANOTHER OPTION BEFORE THE COURT MAIN WAYNE KWAN WHAT WOULD
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE SUPPORT FOR THAT BE. JESSE M. DE BROSSE:
I DON'T THINK THERE WOULD BE PLAIN LANGUAGE SUPPORT FOR THAT I THINK THAT
WOULD BE WELL, LET ME BACK UP. YOU COULD SAY THAT IT APPEARS THAT THE 15-YEAR PROVISION
DOESN'T APPLY TO JUVENILES BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE. ARN BY HARM NICEING THIS
WITH THE JUVENILE CODE, THAT ALLOWS FOR DISPOSITIONS TO TERMINATE AT 18 AND MAKES
SENSE OF THE PROVISION. THE COURT COULD I THINK READ THE JUVENILE CODE
AND THE MEGAN'S LAW STATUTE AGAIN TO TRY TO HARM NICE THEM. TO RETURN TO THE ISSUE
OF IMMEDIATE TERMINATION. SO AS MY COLLEAGUE INDICATED, THERE ARE
NUMEROUS JURISDICTIONS THAT EITHER MAKE MEGAN'S LAW DISCRETIONARY FOR JUVENILES
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT, MAKE IT A SET TERM OF YEARS FOR REGISTRATION, OR JUST
SIMPLY DO NOT APPLY MEGAN'S LAW TO CHILDREN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AT ALL
PATS PAT THAT'S BY STATUTE. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: BY STATUTE.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: AND OUR STATUTE DOESN'T DO ANY OF THAT.
JESSE M. DE BROSSE: RIGHT THAT'S TRUE YOUR HONOR. IN FACT, EVEN IF THE COURT
ACCEPTS OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE, IT WOULD STILL BE RELATIVELY
RIFRNG A VOICE AMONG THE JURISDICTIONS THAT APPLY MEGAN'S LAW TO JUVENILES BECAUSE
IF IT BECAUSE THE WAY THAT WE ARE READING THERE SUBSTITUTE, IT IS AUTOMATICALLY
APPLIED TO JUVENILES A JUD INDICATED DELINQUENT AND PRESUME TIFL LIFETIME. AND
ONLY IF THEY CAN AFFIRMATIVELY PROVE THE BUSHD EVEN IS ON TS REGISTRANT
TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO PROVE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS CAN
THEY BE BE LEEFRD. JUSTICE PATTERSON: WHAT IS THE RELEVANCE OF
THE OTHER STATES IF THEIR LEGISLATE ^ YOURS ^ YOURSELF HAVE MADE JUDGMENTS POLICY
JUDGMENTS THAT ARE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT OUR LEGISLATURE DID? JESSE
M. DE BROSSE: BECAUSE THERE IS AN ARGUMENT THAT IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO
ALLOW FOR JUVENILES TO FILE WHENEVER THEY CAN SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY
TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. THERE IS AN ARGUMENT THAT WOULD BE
UNREASONABLE. AND OUR POINT IS THAT IT CAN'T BE UNREASONABLE IF 25 OTHER
JURISDICTIONS ARE EVEN MORE LENIENT THAN THAT. THAT'S THE REBUTTAL.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: THAT IS THE LEGISLATIVE JJT THAT IS NAD BY THOSE AS THEIR
STATE CONSTITUTIONS WOULD AUTHORIZE THEM TO DO TO MAKE A POLICY JUDGMENT.
NEW JERSEY HAS MADE A POLICY JUDGMENT ABOUT THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN MEGAN'S
LAW THAT WE SEE IN THE STATUTE. I JUST DON'T -- I DON'T TWANT TO BHEE LABOR
IT BUT IT SEEMS LIKE THOSE OTHER STATES DIFFERENT JUDGMENT REALLY DOESN'T HAVE
A RELEVANCE TO NEW JERSEY. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: OKAY. I MEAN
I THINK THAT THE JUDGMENT THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS MADE DEPENDS ON THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE THAT THEY HAVE SELECTED FOR THE STATUTE. JUSTICE
SOLOMON: CAN I ASK YOU KWI A QUESTION BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN BOTHERING KNEE A LITTLE
BUILT SINCE YOUR CO-COUNSEL SPOKE. DIDN'T J G SPIFRL EQUATE
FOR PURPOSES OF MEGAN'S LAW CONVICTION WITH JUVENILE A JUST INDICATION? I
DON'T SPECIFICALLY SAY ESSENTIALLY THE SAME OR INTERCHANGE ABL.
JESSE M. DE BROSSE: I DON'T THINK THAT THE J G COURT EVER SAYS THAT. I THERE
I THAT THE JUDGE G COURT. JUSTICE SOLOMON: LET ME JUST READ
YOU SOMETHING. KNOW WITHSTANDING THE CLARITY OF THE LEGISLATE URLGS GENERAL
LIGHTED TO APPLY MRL TO JUVENILES ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT BASED ON CONVICTIONS
OF SEX OFFENSES, DOESN'T THAT COMPLETELY BELOW YOUR ARLTH OUT OF THE WATER?
JESSE M. DE BROSSE: SO, THE COURT IN J G CLEARLY BELIEVES
THAT THE 15-YEAR PROVISION APPLIED TO JUVENILES. THAT'S.
JUSTICE SOLOMON: THAT IS NOT WHAT I AM SAYING. YOUR WHOLE PREMISE IS THAT BECAUSE
THEY DON'T SAY CONVICTIONS OR ADJUDICATIONS IN F, THE 15-YEAR BAR
DOESN'T THE 15-YEAR PERIOD DOESN'T APPLY TO JUVENILES. BUT J G DOESN'T SAY THAT
IN FACT J G ESSENTIALLY SAYS A JUVENILE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT FOR A CONVICTION
ON A SEX OFFENSE. ILTS' PRETTY MUCH SAYING THEY ARE THE SAME THING FOR THE
PURPOSE OF MEGAN'S LAW NOIFGS AND REQUIREMENTS. ISN'T THAT EXACT PRETTY MUCH
SAYING ISN'T THAT EXACTLY WHAT THEY ARE SAYING. JESSE M. DE
BROSSE: THE COURT NEVER WAS PRESENTED WITH THE ISSUE OF HOW THE WORD CONVICTION
CAN BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS. JUSTICE
SOLOMON: #I9 SAID IT DOES IT SAID IT IS IT SAYS FOR MEGAN'S LAW PURPOSES THEY'RE
INTERCHANGE ABL AND THE VERY CAREFULLY CHOSEN WORDS OF THIS WELL REEND AND
THOUGHT OUT OPINION IN J G WRITTEN BY JUSTICE ALBIN SAYS THAT. DOESN'T THAT UNDER
NINE YOUR ARGUMENT. Q. THAT'S AUM I'M SAYING. JUSTICE STEIN I AM
SORRY. I WAS CLOSE. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: IT IS IN TENSION
DW OUR ARGUMENT YOUR HONOR BUT OUR POINT IS THAT WHEN THE COURT HAS NEVER
HAD THE CLARNS TO ACTUALLY ANALYZE THE ISSUE, IT IS MAKING THIS STATEMENT BUT IT'S
ALMOST IT IS JUST A CONCLUSION WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF THE ARGUMENT. NO
ONE EVER MADE THE CHALLENGE AND EVERYONE ASSUMED THAT THE 15-YEAR PROVISION APPLIED
AND SO DID THE COURT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: ARE YOU POINT
TO GO OTHER CASES WHERE THE COURT HAS MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A CONVICTION
AND AN ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY? JESSE M. DE BROSSE:
YES, I BRIEF THERE WAS AN EKS PUNG MENT CASE IN 2014, THE NAME IS ESCAPING ME,
WHERE THERE WAS A DISTINCTION 2009 ADJUDICATIONS OF DELINQUENCY AND CONVICTION.
JUSTICE SOLOMON: NOT A MEGAN'S LAW CASE. JESSE
M. DE BROSSE: NOT A MEGAN'S LAW CASE BUT I THINK YOU HAVE TO READ THE PROVISIONS
OF MEGAN'S LAW TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE WAY THE TERMS ARE USED THROUGHOUT
THE CRIMINAL CODE AND THE JUVENILE CODE FASH FAIR IN C THAT WAS WRITTEN BY JUSTICE
ALBIN I THINK. JUSTICE SOLOMON: THAT'S WHAT I MEANT.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: IN C K IN RULING THAT SUBSECTION G WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS APPLIED TO JUVENILES, THE COURT WAS PRETTY DIRECT IN STATING THAT UNDER
F THAT DEFENDANT HAD THE ABILITY TO SEEK A TERMINATION 15 YEARS AFTER THE JUVENILE
ADJUDICATION PROVIDED THAT HE WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS NOT A RISK.
SO WHAT IS YOUR ARGUMENT WITH REGARD TO WHAT THE COURT HAD TO SAY IN C K IN RELATION
TO THE APPLICABILITY OF SUBSECTION F TO JUVENILES? JESSE M. DE
BROSSE: THE COURT REFERRED TO IT AS A LOOK BACK ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND THAT
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR LIFE IMPLIES THAT YOU LOOK BACK 15 YEARS FROM
THE DATE OF THE APPLICATION TO SEE WHETHER THE PERSON QUALIFICATIONS. BUT IT'S
NOT A LOOK BACK BECAUSE IN H D THE COURT SAID IF YOU COMMIT THAT OFFENSE
WITHIN THE FIRST 15 YEARS, THAT'S IT, THERE IS NO IN OTHER RELIEF. AND IT BEARS
REPEATING THAT NO ONE EVER PRESENTED THIS ISSUE TO THE COURT IN C K. NOW, ASIDE
FROM THAT, IT IS ONLY ONE OF. JUSTICE PATTERSON: I WILL STOP YOU
THERE AND ASK YOU THE SAME QUESTION I ASKED YOUR COLLEAGUE. IF THE TWO
PRONOUNCE NLTS HERE WE'RE TALKING ABOUT J G AND C K WHICH SUGGEST THAT JUVENILE
ADJUDICATIONS IS NOT DISTINCT FROM CONVICTIONS FOR THIS PURPOSE, WHY
DIDN'T ANYBODY FLAG THIS EVER IF THIS IS SUCH AN OBVIOUS EXPRESSION OF LEGISLATIVE
INTENT? JESSE M. DE BROSSE: I WISH PAT PALLET I SAY THIS
WITH GREAT RESPECT I HAVE BEEN ON THE COURT 13 YEARS FOR THE LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN
ADVOCATING FOR LIMITATIONS ON MEGAN'S LAW FOR JUVENILES IN MANY CASES AND
HAVE RAISED A BROAD VARIETY OF ARGUMENTS AND VERY CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT ARGUMENTS
BUT FLOB EVER SAID YOUR HONORS WHAT ARE YOU EVEN TALKING ABOUT? JUVENILE A
JUST INDICATIONS DOESN'T APPEAR IN THAT PART OF THE STATUTE THIS IS JUST NOBODY
EVER MENTIONED THAT BEFORE. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: I WISH THAT THEY
DID BUT IT APPEARS THAT IT WAS HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT PLAIN LANGUAGE SHOULD IT FWEE HIDING IN PLAIN
SIGHT? JESSE M. DE BROSSE: I MEAN WHEN YOU PUT A MAG
FILINGS GLASS ON IT IT IS RIGHT THERE FOR EVERYONE TO SEE FRM AGAIN I THINK IT
BEST EXPLANATION, THE HIS DOSHGAL EXPLANATION OF WHY NO THAN EVER RAISED IT WAS
BECAUSE NO ONE EVER SUGGESTED THAT SUBSECTION F WOULD IMPOSE MANDATORY
LIFETIME REGISTRATION ON ANYONE UNTIL THE COURT'S DECISION IN H D IN 2020 FLOR NOR
CAN I JUST ASK THE QUESTION IN C K THE GOAL WAS TO ATTACK THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUBSECTION G, CORRECT? F WASN'T RAISED BUT YOU WERE ALSO
SUCCESSFUL IN CHALLENGEING G. SO REALLY THERE WAS NO REASON AT THAT POINT TO BRING
UP F BECAUSE IT WASN'T AT ISSUE. IS THAT FAIR THO SAY. JESSE M. DE
BROSSE: I WOULD SAY THAT'S FAIR TO SAY YOUR HONOR, THE SOLE ISSUE IS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL OF SUBSECTION G. AND I WILL MENTION THAT IN C K THE COURT TALKS
ABOUT IMPERICAL RESEARCH SHOWING LOW RECIDIVISM RATES OF CLIRN ON THE REGISTER
TREE. THE CASE LAW ESTABLISHING THAT THERE NEWS BE A MECHANISM FOR
INDIVIDUALIZED RISK ASSESSMENT WITH THAT IS 20 OR 30 OR 50 YEARS LATER FOR INDIVIDUALS
WHO WERE CLIRNL AT THE TIME OF COMMITTING THEIR OFFENSE BEFORE SOME DIEF
MANDATORY LIFETIME CONSEQUENCE IS KWOEG TO FOLLOW SNFRMENT GOING TO FOLLOW. THE
COURT BASED ITS DECISION ON A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS AND YES IT DID SAY
THAT THERE IS SUBSECTION F WHICH IS A MECHANISM TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC. HOWEVER,
IT WAS ALSO REFERRING TO THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVE THAT THAT REGISTRANTS ARE NOT
LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. SO IT WAS REFERRING TO
SUBSECTION F BUT IT HAS TWO PARTS AND WE SUBMIT THAT THE PUBLIC SAFETY PRONG IS
FLT CASE OF JUVENILES SPECIFICALLY IS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECTS THE PUBLIC.
AND IN FACT THAT'S WHAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED. CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER: QUESTIONS ANYONE? COUNSEL HAVE A LOOK AT YOUR NOTES.
ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD? JESSE M. DE BROSSE: I WANTED
TO MENTION AN ISSUE ABOUT EKS PUNG MENT BECAUSE THE STATE HAD RAISED THAT
PERHAPS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY REGISTRANTS SEEKING EKS PUNG:
I THINK THAT THAT CANNOT CURE THE PROBLEM BECAUSE NOT ALL OFFENSES CAN BE
EKS PUNGED FIRST OF ALL. BUT EVEN OFFENSES THAT CAN BE EKS PUNGED THE STATUTE
SAYS THAT THEY MAYBE USED IN SKWENTS JUDICIAL PROEGS FOR SOME PURPOSE.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: DOES THIS HELP WITH YOUR PLAIN LANGUAGE STATUTORY
ARGUMENT OR YOU ARE YOU TRYING TO LORN IN ON YOUR FRENLTDZ IN THE NEXT CASE
AGAIN. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: YOU CAUGHT ME, YOUR HONOR.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: ALL RIGHT. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: UNLESS
THERE ARE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: I DO
HAVE ONE MORE QUESTION. JUST LOOKING AGAIN AT SOME OF THE OTHER PROVISIONS
IN 7- 2, IN 7- 2, 7- 2 C 4, THIS IS ANOTHER SUBSECTION THAT USES THE TERM A PERSON
REQUIRED TO REGISTER AND THEN THE TERM CONVICTION. SO SECTION C 4 REFERS
TO INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE
AND THE TIMEFRAME WITHIN WHICH THEY MUST THEN REGISTER AFTER PASSAGE OF THE
STATUTE. DO YOU KNOW IF THIS IS A SUBSECTION THAT ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO JUVENILES,
DID IT APPLY TO JUVENILES AT THE TIME, DID IT ALSO APPLY TO INDIVIDUALS WHO
WERE FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY BECAUSE IT USES THE TERM PERSON
REQUIRED TO REGISTER IT ALSO USES THE TERM CONVICTION AND THE INTRODUCTORY PHRASE,
CLAUSE FOR SUBLG SECTION G GENERALLY JUST TALKS ABOUT PEOPLE REQUIRED TO
REGISTER SHALL DO SO IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER, AND THEN PROCEED WITH THE NUMBERED
SUBSECTIONS. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: YES. SO SUBSECTION C 4
MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT IT REFERS BACK TO BECAUSE IT'S TALKING ABOUT INDIVIDUALS
WHO ARE REQUIRED TO REGISTER PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE WHO ARE CONVICTED PRIOR TO
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT, IT'S REFERRING BACK TO SUBSECTION B ONE. IN THAT
PARAGRAPH ICHL POSES REGISTRATION ON INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE CONVICTED, NOT
ADJUDICATED DLING WENT OR UNION COUNTY, FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY,
CONVICTED OF CERTAIN OFFENSES AND FOUND TO BE REPETITIVE AND COMPULSIVE. AND
THAT WAS THE WHOLE ISSUE THAT WAS BEFORE THE COURT IN DOE BECAUSE ONLY INDIVIDUALS
WHO WERE FOUND WERE QUICK OF CERTAIN OFFENSES FOUND TO BE REPETITIVE AND
COMPULSIVE WERE REQUIRED TO RE ACCOUNT #I6R9 THAT WAG THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE THERE.
ACTUALLY WE BELIEVE THAT THIS WHOLE PART OF THE STATUTE SUPPORTS OUR PLAIN
LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION BECAUSE B ONE ONLY APPLIES TO INDIVIDUALS REGARDLESS OF THE
DATE OF CONVICTION. AND THAT ONLY APPLIES TO ADULTS EVERYONE GREASE. SO THAT
'S AN EXAMINATION ANOTHER EXAMPLE IN THE MEGAN'S LAW STATUTE WHERE THE
LEGISLATURE IS USING THE WOSHD CONVICTION TO APPLY TO ONLY A SUB SET OF VITSDZ.
SO IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION DOES THAT APPLY TO INDIVIDUALS FOUND NOT GUILTY
BY REASON OF INSANITY? THE ANSWER IS NO. BUT I DON'T THINK THAT THAT IS CONTROVERSIAL
I THINK THAT NO ONE HAS EVER TO MY KNOWLEDGE APPLIED RETROACTIVE
REGISTRATION ON INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE ACQUITTED IN G R I. CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER: THANK YOU COUNSEL. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: TUN.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: MR. SHALOM. ALEXANDER SHALOM: MAY
IT PLEASE THE COURT. OUR BRIEF IN THIS CASE ADDRESSED WE ADOPT THE ARLTHS
THAT YOU HAVE JUST HEARD FROM THE OFFICE FTS PUBLIC DEFENDERER OUR BRIEF FOCUSED
ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOID AND ALSO. THAT DOCTRINE OBVIOUSLY
GETS TO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND SO IN SERVICE OF TIME I WILL DEFER THAT WOEL
ANALYSIS TO PROFESSOR CULL EVEN WHO WILL BE ARGIROPOULOSING THE NEXT CASE ON OUR
BEHALF. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO A COUPLE 6
QUESTIONS THAT CAME UP EARLIER. JUST FLOR, CHUB RAJ INTERPRETER AND
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS SPECIFICALLY. JUSTICE NORIEGA YOU ASKED
A TLESH HOELG QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER ANY PART OF SUBSECTION F APPLIES FO
JUVENILES ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT. I THINK IT MIGHT BE LEVEL TO STEP BACK FOR A
SECOND AND EXPLAIN HOW I CONCEPTUALIZE THE STATUTE. SOMEONE WHO IS REQUIRED TO
REGISTER AND THAT IS PEOPLE WITH A JUD INDICATED DLING WENT, PEOPLE FOUND
NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY AND PEOPLE QUICK OF PREDICATE CRIMES, CAN GET
OFF OF MEGAN'S LAW IF THEY CAN SATISFY 3 DIFFERENT THINGS. THE FIRST THING
IS THE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR LIFE OFFENSE BASED LIMITATIONS FOUND IN SUBSECTION
G. AND WE KNOW THAT AS A RULE OF C K THOSE DOEJTS APPLY TO KIDS ADJUDICATED
DELINQUENT. WITHIN F THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE COMPONENTS. AND ILTHS OUR BELIEF
THAT THE FIRST COMPONENT APPLIES TO ALL THOSE WHO ARE REQUIRED TO REGISTER,
SO FWEN THOSE 3 CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE. AND THAT IS THE CRITICAL PUBLIC SAFETY SHOWING
THAT EVERYONE MUST MAKE. THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL LIMITATION ONLY THAT ONLY
APPLIES TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OR RELEASED FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
WHICH WOULD APPLY TO WAIVED YOUTH BUT NOT TO ADJUDICATED YOUTH. AND SO
WE DO BELIEVE THAT PART OF SUBSECTION F APPLIES, JUST NOT THE PART THAT IMPOSES
THE 15-YEAR TIME BAR. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER INNER LET ME JUST ADOPT MR. DEE
PROES EAST ANSWER TO THE QUESTION THAT YOU POSED ABOUT, POSED IN THE EARLIER ARGUMENT
TO MR. INGRAM ABOUT WHY HE WAS FIETDING WHETHER ABOUT WHETHER J G NEEDS FOBL
RECONFIGURED. IT DOES. THIS ISSUE WASN'T RAISED IN J G, AND SO IT'S NO SHADE ON
JUSTICE STEIN THE ISSUE WASN'T BEFORE THE COURT IT'S ALSO NO SHADES ON THE THEY
WERE ARGIROPOULOSING A PARTICULAR THING AND IN 1 CASE GOT THE RESULT THEY
WERE LOOKING FOR AND ANOTHER CASE THEY DIDN'T BUT THE COURT WILL NEED TO CONFORM
ITS PRIOR DECISIONS TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE. JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS YOU RAISED THE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR LIFE TROUBLING QUESTION ABOUT
THIS IMMEDIACY OF BEING ABLE TO RETURN TO COURT BECAUSE IT SOUNDS COUNTER
INTUITIVE WHO COULD WE WANT THIS I THINK YOU WILL HEAR FROM PROVES ARE OR CULL
EVEN THAT IS NOT PARTICULARLY INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CODE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE. BUT LET ME JUST SAY THAT FUNDAMENTALLY AND YOU HAVE HEARD
THERE FROM MY COLLEAGUES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PUBLIC SAFETY PRONG OF F DOES
A LOT OF WORK. AND SO EVEN PARTICULARLY FOR PEOPLE FOUND NFRMENT G ARE I NOT GUILTY
BY REASON OF INSANITY BUT EVEN FOR YOUTH A JUTD KADED DLING WENL WERE THEY
TO COME BACK A WE CAN LATER OR MONTH LATER IT WOULD BE VERY UNLA LIKELY THEY COULD
MAKE THAT SLOWING BUT ALL WE ARE REALLY ASKING THIS COURT TO DO IS NOT SAY
THAT GETS KIDS GETS OFFER OF UNTIL EASILY OR THAT THEY HAVE AN APPROPRIATE WHEN
APPROPRIATE THEY MAKE THAT DIFFICULT SLOWING TO GET BEFORE THE LAW DIFRLGS
AND DO SO. UNLESS THE COURT LAST IN I OTHER QUESTIONS.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: SO THE LINE IS BEEK DRAWN WAIVER THEN. SO YOU ARE DRAWING
THE LINE AT WAIVER, ^ WHAT I CAN ^ WAKE YOUR OPINION THEY ARE QUICK, THEY ARE
IN, IF THEY ARE NOT WAIVED UP, THEY ARE NOT. ALEXANDER SHALOM:
STATUTORILY THAT IS CORRECT THIS THERE BY THE REPLY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WITH
WAIVED YOUTH BUT STAT TRRLY WITHOUT A DOUBT IT IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL ARNTS TO THE QUESTION
THAT WAS POSED. JUSTICE PATTERSON: WHEN THE LEGISLATURE
REALLY REVAMD THE WAIVER STATUTE IN I THINK IT WAS 2015 YOU WOULD KNOW BOTH EARN
I. ALEXANDER SHALOM: I WAS THERE. JUSTICE PATTERSON:
AND IT TALKED A LOT ABOUT THE RAMIFICATIONS OF WAIVER, AND IT NEVER
MENTIONED IN ALL OF THAT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THAT AS FAR AS I CAN RECALL TELL ME
IF I AM WRONG, THAT ONE OF THE RACHL FILE INDICATIONS OF WAIVER IS THAT MEGAN'S
LAW WILL IMPOSE A 15-YEAR BAR IF THE JUVENILE IS WAIVED AND IT WILL NOT
#I78 POLES THAT 15-YEAR BAR. SO IF THIS IS HOW THE LEGISLATURE WAS SO CLEARLY VIEWING
MEGAN'S LAW, THIS SUBSECTION F, WHY DIDN'T IT TELL US IN A VERY SUBSTANTIVE
LEGISLATIVE LIST TRI THAT WE HAVE FOR THAT AMENDMENT THAT ONE OF THE REALLY SERIOUS
CONSEQUENCES OF WAIVER IS THAT YOU ARE GOING TO BE TREATED AS ADULT UNDER
MEGAN'S LAW. ALEXANDER SHALOM: SO I THINK I AGREE WITH YOUR
RECITATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF S 2003. LET ME TRY AND SAY DIFFERENT
LY WHAT MY FRIEND HAVE ALREADY SAID. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 15-YEAR TIME BAR
BECAME MORE SERIOUS IN H D. ONCE WE SAID THAT PEOPLE WHO HAVE REALLY SMALL
SUBSEQUENT NON SEXUAL CONVICTIONS THINGS LIKE CURSING IN PUBLIC, ONCE WE KNOW THAT
THEY ARE ON FOR LIFE, IT BECAME MORE SERIOUS. HAD THAT BEEN KNOWN TO THE
LEGISLATURE IN 2015, I'M SURE THE AT VOEKTS WHO WERE PUSHING FOR WAIVER REFORM
WOULD HAVE RAISED THAT CONSEQUENCE. THE CONSEQUENCE WASN'T AS SERIOUS UNTIL
H D AND THAT GELTHS PLEA TO MY LAST COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR LIFE CONCLUDESING
POIN. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: BEFORE YOU GET THERE. IF YOU ARE
CORRECT THAT THE LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN AT WAIVER, THAT WOULD MEAN THAT THOSE JUVENILES
WHO HAVE COMMITTED THE MOST SERIOUS OFFENSES WOULD FACE THE 15-YEAR LOOK
BACK. ALEXANDER SHALOM: WOULD THOSE JUVENILES WHO FACE THE
MOST SERIOUS OFFENSES WHO THEREFORE GOT WAIVED, WOULD STILL HAVE TO SHOW.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: HAVE TO SATISFY PRONG ONE AND PRONG TWO.
ALEXANDER SHALOM: AND PRONG TWRO CORRECT THEY WOULD HAFRLT MORE OWN YUS TAFRNG
A HEADS OF THEM THE. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: IS THERE ANY SFOT?
THE LETHD I HAVE LIST TRI THAT DEALS DIRECTLY WITH THE QUESTION THAT WE
HAVE HERE, THE EXTENT TO WHICH JUVENILES ARE COVERED UNDER F.
ALEXANDER SHALOM: THERE IS NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE ANYTHING IN THE LEGISLATE #I6
HISTORY AND SO THAT'S WHY I THINK IT PLAIN LANGUAGE IS THE BEST PLACE TO
LOOK THERE WERE TIMES IN THE STATUTE WHERE THE COURT I AM SORRY WHERE THE LEGISLATURE
DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN CONVICTIONS, ADJUDICATIONS AND NOT GUILTY BY REASON
EVER INTEREST SANT THERE WERE TIMES THEY WERE INCLUDED THERE ARE TIMES THEY WERE
NOT THIS IS WHEN THEY ARE NOT INCLUDED #I6R789 THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD LOOK
AT WAIVER THEN WOULD POTENTIALLY HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS FENDERS.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WHO ARE JUVENILES WHO POTENTIALLY POSE THE GREATEST SECURITY
RISK SAFETY RISK GET THAT EXTRA LOOK. JESSE M. DE BROSSE:
THAT'S RIGHT UNDER THE STATUTE YOU THE AGAIN I THINK THERE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS THAT WILL COME UP LATER BUT I WILL TRY AND CONFINE MYSELF AND LENL SAY
KWON LAST. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: TO DLAR FILE THE SUGGESTS
THAT WAIVER IS THE LIENL IS NOT A SUGGESTION THAT YOU ARE COMING UP 2000 BECAUSE
YOU THINK IT IS A GOOD POLICY REASON YOU ARE JUST SAYING THAT JUVENILES WHO
ARE WAIVED TO ADULT COURT AND CONVICTED IN ADULT COURT. JUSTICE
WAINER APTER: THEREFORE HAVE A FOLLOWING CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY AND THEREFORE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OBVIOUSLY APPLIES TO THEM.
ALEXANDER SHALOM: THAT'S RIGHT MY ANSWER FLOWS DIRECTLY FROM THE REQUEST
E THAT WAS ASKED ERL YER WHICH IS DO WAFTD YOUTH ARE WAIVED YOUTH CONVICTED AND
THE AND ALSO IF IS IF THEY ARE HELD ACT ABL WANL WAYNE IF THEY ARE CONVICTED.
ALEXANDER SHALOM: IF THEY ARE CULPABLE THEY ARE QUICK. I
WILL JUST SAY THAT IN H D I THINK READING THE PIVEN THERE APPEARS TO BE TENSION
IN THE COURT BECAUSE I THINK IT COURT RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS A PARTICULARLY
HARSH CONSEQUENCE THAT SOMEONE WHO SHOP LIFTS WIENDZ UP ON THE REGISTRY BUT THE COURT
SEEMGD TO SAY LISTEN, THAT'S NOT OUR JOB FRM WE'RE NOT SETTING POLICY MAKERS
WE INTERPRET THE STATUTE AS WRITTEN. I DIDN'T LIKE THE RESULT IN R D BUT IT'S
ASK FOR THE SAME TYPE OF ANALYSIS HERE THE STATUTE AS WRITTEN FAVORS THE
INTERPRETATION PUT FORTH BY THE RENL TRAFRNTS. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
THANK YOU MR. SHALOM. ALEXANDER SHALOM: THANK YOU.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: MS. HEF RON. LAUDE CAROLINE HEFFRON:
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. I WILL BE UNDER 10 MINUTES FOLLOWING MY ABLE
COLLEAGUES AND #I78 I WILL JUST JOIN IN THE MAJORITY OF THEIR ARGUMENTS AND RELY
PRIMARILY ON MY PAPERS. THE ON THING I DID WRANT TO POINT OUT IS
THAT IN HARM NICEING THE JUVENILE CODE AND MEGAN'S LAW IN J G THE COURT
REFERENCED N.J.S.A. 2 AFRMENT 4 A 47 A WHICH HOLDS THAT WHICH REQUIRES THAT A
CHILD'S A JUD DISPOSITION TERMINATE AT AGE 18 OR WITHIN 3 YEARS OF THE ORDER
OF DISPOSITION. SO WHILE I DO JOIN MY COLLEAGUES IN THEIR PLAIN LANGUAGE ARJTS
THOSE HAVENL AND PLEA NAD AND WOI ONLY OFFER TO THIS COURT THAT IN DRAWING
THE LINE IN J G AT AGE 18, THAT WAS I THINK A MODIFICATION OF THE 18 OR WITHIN
3 YEARS. SO THAT STATUTE THAT WAS ATTEMPTED TO BE HARMONIZED DID ALSO
OFFER FOR THAT 3-YEAR PERIOD SHOULD THIS COURT BE INTERESTED IN HARM NICE GOES THE
SAME MANNER I THINK THAT WOULD BE ONE WAY TO ADDRESS THE CONCERN THAT I HAVE
HEARD REGARDING HOW DOES A 14-YEAR OLD HAVE TO BE ON MEGAN'S LAW FOR LONGER THAN
A 17-YEAR A.M. WHO IS GOING TO TURN 18 A FEW DALS LATER. THAT IS THE ONLY
BOINLT I WANTED TO ADD I AM HAEN TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THE COURT MAY HAVE I THINK
MY COLUMN MREEGS ANSWERED MOTOR V IT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: THANK YOU,
MS. SPANARKEL. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: UNLESS THE COURT HAS ANY IMMEDIATE QUESTIONS
I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE POINTS THAT. MAURA SULLIVAN: FIRST I WILL START
WITH THE OPINION OF J.G. HERE A REGISTRANT HAS CONCEDED THAT J.G. WOULD BE SUPERSEDED
BY THE REGISTRANT'S ARGUMENT. I WOULD TAKE THAT A STEP FURTHER AND SAY WHAT ESSENTIAL
WOULD HAPPEN IS THAT IT WOULD BE OVERTURNED. IT WOULD ALSO MEAN THAT THIS COURT IN J.G.
HAD DRAWN A NEEDLESS LINE AT THE AGE OF UNDER 14 IF THAT SUBSECTION F HAD NEVER INDEED
APPLIED TO ADJUDICATIONS TO BEGIN WITH. IT WOULD ALSO UNDERMINE THIS COURT'S
OPINION IN C.K. WRITTEN BY JUSTICE AL BIN, IN WHICH IT POIND AFTER FINDING SUBSECTION
G UN CONSTITUTIONAL, IT POIND TO SUBSECTION F IN PROVIDING THE REMEDY IN SAYING THAT A
JUVENILE WHO WAS ADJUDICATED COULD APPLY UNDER SUBSECTION F AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER THAT
SUBSECTION. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WHY IS IT THAT J.G. WOULD HAVE TO BE TOSSED
OUT THE IN DOE, I AM PARAPHRASING WHAT YOU'RE SUGGESTING COULDN'T IT BE READ TO SAY THAT
IT COULD BE NO MORE THAN THAN AGE 18, BUT IT COULD BE LESS. MAURA SULLIVAN:
UNDER REGISTRANT'S ARGUMENT IT APPEARS THEIR PROPOSED RULE WOULD UN UNDO J.G. AND AN
ADJUDICATED JUL COULD APPLY IMMEDIATELY. I KNOW THEY SAY IN PRACTICE THAT WOULDN'T HAPPEN
BUT THERE IS NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULDN'T APPLY IMMEDIATELY. THEY ARE SAYING THERE WOULD BE
NO 15-YEAR OFFENSE FREE BAR TO THOSE JUVENILES SEEKING TERMINATION. UNDER
J.G., THIS COURT EVEN ALLOWED FOR A WAITING PERIOD UP UNTIL 18, BUT UNDER THE
REGISTRANT'S ARGUMENT, THEY ARE SAYING THERE IS NO WAITING PERIOD SO THERE WOULD BE NO
LOOK BACK, THERE WOULD BE NO PERIOD. THEY COULD APPLY IMMEDIATELY AND IT WOULD ALSO
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THOSE JUVENILES WHERE IF YOU HAD AN OFFENDER WHO WAS ADJUDICATED
AT 13, THEY ARE WAITING UNTIL 18 AND WOULD BE SUBJECT TO MEGAN'S LAW DURING THAT WHOLE
PERIOD WHEREAS A 17 WHO COMMITS AN OFFENSE WOULD ONLY BE ON A MEGAN'S LAW FOR A YEAR,
DESPITE THE SCIENCE, THAT SAYS THAT JUVENILES WHO ARE 17 ARE MORE DEVELOPED, MORE AWARE.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: I THOUGHT THE REN STRANTS WERE CLEAR THAT THEY THOUGHT
IT APPLIED TO JUVENILES WHO ARE 13 ALSO. MAURA SULLIVAN: I BELIEVE THEY ARE
SAYING THEIR PROPOSED RULE SHOULD APPLY TO JUVENILES OVERALL, THAT THEY CAN IMMEDIATELY
APPLY WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE AND UNDO J.G. IN WAITING UNTIL 18 AND THAT WAS FOR 14.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: BUT YOU AGREE THAT THE PLAIN LANGUAGE ARGUMENT RAISED HERE
WAS NEVER RAISED IN J.G. OR IN C.K., CORRECT? MAURA SULLIVAN: I BELIEVE
THOSE WERE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS THAT WERE BEFORE THE COURT AT THAT TIME. J.G. HAD
DRAWN THE LINE AT UNDER 14 AND C.K. WAS ADDRESSING SUBSECTION G, BUT IT'S RULING
NECESSARILY ADDRESSED F BECAUSE IN FINDING J.G. UN CONSTITUTIONAL, IT THEN POINTED TO F
FOR A JUVENILE ADJUDICATION IN SAYING THAT THEY HAD SATISFIED THOSE CONDITIONS IN F,
BOTH THE 15 OFFENSE FREE AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASPECT. THE COURT:
YOU'RE MAKING A STATUTORY ARGUMENT AS WELL HERE. MAURA SULLIVAN: YES.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WHICH IN ITS ESSENCE IS AN INDIVIDUAL IS IN ELIGIBLE FOR EARLY
TERMINATION UNDERSTAND F EITHER AN ADULT OR JUVENILE UNLESS THEY CAN ANSWER NO TO TWO
QUESTIONS, HAVE YOU COMMITTED ANOTHER OFFENSE, DO YOU POSE A THREAT OF SAFETY TO THE PUBLIC.
MAURA SULLIVAN: AS WELL AS THE 15 YEARS, YOUR HONOR FAIR ENOUGH.
LET'S LOOK AT THE STATUTE ITSELF AND I WANT TO TRACK THE WORDS AND ASK YOU TO APPLY IT
TO YOUR CLIENT, YOUR CLIENT IS REQUIRED TO REJ STRER. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THERE.
MAURA SULLIVAN: WRE. THE COURT: HAS YOUR CLIENT, QUOTE, COMMITTED AN OFFENSE
WITHIN 15 YEARS FOLLOWING A CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTION IF FACILITY FOR ANY
TERM OF IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED? YES OR NO. MAURA SULLIVAN: NO.
THE COURT: IS YOUR CLIENT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS
BASED ON THE RECORD WE HAVE HERE, YES OR NO. MAURA SULLIVAN: THE STATE
DID NOT ARGUE BELOW THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL REGARDING SAFETY. I RELY ON THE RECORD FOR
THAT POINT BUT THEY MAY HAVE GONE AS FAR AS CONCEDE ITTING OR SAYING THEY ARE NOT
CONTESTING IT. THE COURT: UNDERSTAND THE LITERAL TERMS OF F ISN'T YOUR CLIENT
ELIGIBLE FOR EARLY TERMINATION. MAURA SULLIVAN: NO, YOUR HONOR.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WHY NOT. MAURA SULLIVAN: CLEARLY THE WORD ADJUDICATION
IS ABSENT FROM THE STATUTE. THE COURT: LET'S STAY WITH THE WORDS THAT ARE
IN THE STATUTE. UNDER THE LITERAL TERMS THAT WE JUST WENT OVER, WHY IS YOUR
CLIENT NOT ELIGIBLE? WHY IS THE REGISTRANT HERE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EARLY
TERMINATION? MAURA SULLIVAN: BECAUSE AS THIS COURT -- WELL, STARTING AGAIN
WITH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE, THE SUBSECTION BEGINS WITH A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER
UNDER THIS ACT. CATEGORICALLY, THAT APPLIES TO ADULTS AS WELL AS JUVENILES ADJUDICATED
OF MEGAN'S LAW OFFENSES. EVERYTHING STEMS FROM AN INITIAL LANGUAGE, WHICH
RUNS WITHOUT EXCEPTION OR ANYTHING AS APPLIED TO DISTINGUISHING JUVENILES OR ADULTS BECAUSE
BOTH ARE PERNGS LIRD TO REGISTER. THAT IT INCLUDES THE WORD CONVICTION,
CONVICTION IS SIMPLY A WAY TO START THE 15-YEAR CLOCK. THE CLOCK STILL EXISTS UNDERSTAND
SUBSECTION F BUT IT IS JUST A WAY THAT 15-YEAR CLOCK WOULD START TO RUN.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WOULDN'T IT NEVER START TO RUN IF THERE IS NO CONVICTION?
IT SEEMS YOU JUST TOLD THE CHIEF YOU AGREE THAT A JUVENILE WHO IS AN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT
DOES NOT HAVE A CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTION FACILITY FOR THE 15 YEARS TO
RELATE BACK TO SO HOW DOES THE CLOCK START. MAURA SULLIVAN: IT CAN BE CLEARLY
READ AS APPLIESING TO ADJUDICATIONS. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SO YOU'RE ASKING
US TO READ THE WORD FOLLOWING CONVICTION OR JUVENILE ADJUDICATION. MAURA
SULLIVAN: YES. I THINK THAT AS HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PAST, IT COULD BE EQUALLY READ.
AS I SAID IT WAS JUST A WAY TO START THE CLOCK. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: I WILL
ASK THE SAME QUESTION THAT I ASKED OPPOSING COUNSEL, WHAT ABOUT INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN
FOUND NOT GUILTY, BY REASON OF INSANITY. THEY CERTAINLY HAVE NOT BEEN CONVICTED OF
ANYTHING, BUT ACQUITTED. MAURA SULLIVAN: I THINK THAT'S A SEPARATE QUESTION
THAT IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT RIGHT NOW IN TERMS OF HOW IT WOULD APPLY IN A DIFFERENT
SITUATION IN TERMS OF NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY, BUT, AGAIN, I THINK IT CAN STILL
BE READ AS A WAY IN WHICH THE COURT WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE WHEN EXACTLY THE CLOCK IS
GOING TO START, NOT THAT THE CLOCK DOESN'T APPLY TO PERSONS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON
OF INSANITY, JUST AS THE CLOCK STILL EXISTS FOR JUVENILES WHO HAVE O WHO HAVE ADJUDICATIONS.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: FEE AGREE WITH YOUR POSITION, THE NEXT CASE THAT COMES
BEFORE US WITH REGARD TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY,
WOULD YOUR ARGUMENT BE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUBSECTION F CLEARLY STATES THE WORD
CONVICTION AND RELEASE -- OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, WE SHOULD BE APPLYING
THOSE WORDS TO ALSO ENCOMPASS SOMEONE WHO WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY AND RELEASED FROM A
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITY. MAURA SULLIVAN: I WOULD JUST BECAUSE THE INITIAL
LANGUAGE IS SO ENCOMPASSING OF A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THE ACT.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHY COULD IT NOT BE THAT A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THE
ACT HAS TO MAKE THIS APPLICATION TO TERMINATE UPON PROOF THAT THE PERSON -- AND THEN THE
FIRST PART DOESN'T APPLY TO THEM BECAUSE THEY DON'T HAVE ANY CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM
A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY BUT THE SECOND PART STILL DOES WHICH SAYS AND IS NOT LIKELY TO
TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. SO IT MAKES SENSE THAT F IS REQUIRED
TO REGISTER UNDERSTAND THE ACT BECAUSE A VERY IMPORTANT OF F IS TO SHOW THOO THE REGISTRANT
IS NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS DOES APPLY. IT IS JUST
THAT THE FIRST PART THAT IS PREDICATED ON CONVICTION OR RELIEF FROM A CORRECTION
FACILITY ONLY APPLIES TO THOSE WHO ARE RELEASED OR. MAURA SULLIVAN: THERE IS
NO REASON TO SUMP OVER THAT LANGUAGE OF THE 15 YEARS FOLLOWING CONVICTION OR RELEASE.
THERE IS NO INDICATION FROM THE LEGISLATURE THAT IT INTENDED THAT THAT ADDITIONAL CONDITION
WOULD NOT APPLY TO ALL PERSONS WHO ARE REQUIRED TO REGISTER. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: DOESN'T THE FACT THEY USE CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WHEREAS
IN PLENTY OF OTHER PLACES IN THE STATUTE THEY USE, FOR EXAMPLE, CONVICTION OR ADJUDICATION
OF DELINQUENCY OR FINDING OF NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY OF THE THEY USE THAT IN
A ONE. THEY COULD HAVE USED THE SAME LANGUAGE IN F IF THEY WANT TO BUT THEY WROTE FOLLOWING
RELEASE OR CONVICTION FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WHICH YOU SAID A JUVENILE DOES NOT
HAVE IN FER ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AND NOT WAIVED TO ADULT COURT AN CONVICTED.
MAURA SULLIVAN: I WOULD SAY IT WAS AN UN INDEPENDENT INTENDED OR. CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER: LET'S LOOK AT THE WORDS THEMSELVES. ISN'T IT MORE
COMPLICATED STILL FOR YOU BECAUSE EVERYBODY COMBRAES SOME JUVENILES SUBJECTED TO THE
FIRST PRONG, SOME JUVENILES END UP WITH A CONVICTION AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO SATISFY
BOTH PRONG 1 AND PRONG 2, CORRECT? MAURA SULLIVAN: YES. CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER: DOESN'T THAT MAKE IT HARD FOR YOU TO SAY WE HAVE TO READ ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE
IN WHEN IT ALREADY COVERS SOME CATEGORY OF JUVENILE OFFEND ERS. MAURA
SULLIVAN: I THINK WE SHOULD LOOK TO THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE IN HAVING THIS LANGUAGE.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: SO TELL US WHERE IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IT SAYS
THAT SUBSECTION F IS INTENDED TO APPLY TO ALL JUVENILES. MAURA SULLIVAN:
WELL, THIS COURT HAS FOUND THAT IT APPLIES. THE COURT: IN THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY. YOU'RE RELYING ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SO I WANT YOU TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT.
MAURA SULLIVAN: I WOULD ALSO SAY THE LEGITIMATE YOUR DID NOT ACT FOLLOWING C.K. OR
J.G., IN ADDING ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE. I KNOW YOUR HONOR IS FOCUSING ON THE LANGUAGE IN
THE ACTUAL STATUTE. I WOULD ALSO POINT TO THE ABSENCE OF LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE.
THE COURT: IS THERE ANY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THAT SPEAKS TO THE VERY ISSUE WE'RE
STRUGGLING WITH TODAY. MAURA SULLIVAN: I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY, YOUR HONOR.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: AND IN SUBSECTION C 2, THE BEGINNING PHRASE OF THAT
PARTICULAR SUBSECTION BEGINS, A PERSON CONFINED IN THE CORRECTIONAL OR JUVENILE FACILITY
OR INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED. COULDN'T THE LEGISLATURE HAVE USED THAT EXACT
SAME LANGUAGE IN F AS OPPOSED TO JUST CONVICTED OR RELEASED FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
BECAUSE JUST A FEW PROVISIONS PRIOR THE LEGISLATURE LISTED THE DIFFERENT FACILITIES
IN WHICH JUVENILE IS AN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AND INDIVIDUALS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF
INSANITY ARE COMMITTED, SO THE SAME EXACT PROFESSION MAKESES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
DIFFERENT TYPES OF FACILITIES WHERE THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE HELD BUT IN SUBSECTION F IT
ONLY SAYS CONVICTION AND ONLY SAYS A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY. MAURA SULLIVAN:
I I UNDERSTAND THAT THAT WORD IS CLEARLY ABSENT FROM HERE. THE ADJUDICATION IS LEER CLEARLY
NOT INCLUDED IN THE STATUTE, BUT THE REGISTRANT'S THEMS SEFLS CONCEDE THAT JUVENILES
ADJUDICATED, ARE SUBJECT TO MEGAN'S LAW AS WELL AS SUBSECTION F APPLIES TO INDIVIDUALS
ADJUDICATED. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THEY'RE CONCEDING ONLY THAT THE OPENING
PART OF SECTION F AND THE SECOND PART NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS
BECAUSE THEY SAY A JUVENILE IS A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THIS ACT. THEY
DON'T SEEM TO EVER CONCEDE THAT THE WORDS, THE 15-YEARS THAT ARE PREDICATED ON CONVICTION
OR RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY APPLIES TO JUVENILES. THAT SEEMS TO BE WHAT THE
REAL DISAGREEMENT IS ABOUT. IT'S NOT THAT SUBSECTION F APPLIES TO JUVENILES, EVERYONE
AGREES IT DOES, EVERYONE AGREES THAT THOSE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT WOULD HAVE TO SHOW
THEY DO NOT POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. MAURA SULLIVAN: AND I
THINK THAT, AT MOST, IF THE STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS TO LOOK TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT GOING BACK
TO THAT INITIAL LANGUAGE. ALSO, IN GOING TO THE REASON THAT MEGAN'S LAW WAS
CREATED IN THE FIRST PLACE WAS TO CREATE A REGISTRY. TO FOLLOW THE REGISTRANT ARGUMENT
THAT THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY GET OFF OF THAT REGISTRY WOULD CONVICT WITH WITH THAT MEGAN'S
LAW ENACTMENT TO CREATE A REGISTRY THAT WOULD EQUALLY APPLY TO JUL ADJUDICATIONS AS IT
DOES TO ADULTS. THE COURT: THAT'S AN IMPORTANT POINT. CAN YOU
TELL US IN YOUR EXPERIENCE HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE FOR SOMEONE TO PREVAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS
ON THIS SORT OF APPLICATION? THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO FILE IT, WOULD THEY BE
ABLE TO PREVAIL IF THEY FILED IT WITHIN A WEEK OR A MONTH AS I ASKED EARLIER.
MAURA SULLIVAN: UNFORTUNATELY, I CAN'T SPEAK TO THAT. I KNOW MY COLLEAGUE FROM DMRAUS
STER -- THE COURT: I KNOW. MAURA SULLIVAN: UNLESS THE COURT
HAS ANY OTHER QUESTIONS? HAD. THE COURT: ONE MORE, THERE IS A STATEMENT
AT THE END OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION DECISION THAT I'M READ THAT JUVENILES 15 YEARS AFTER
ANOTHER OFFENSE MAY APPLY FOR RELEASE OF MEGAN'S LAW REQUIREMENTS IF THEY NONE THAT THEY ARE
UNLIKE TO POSE A THREAT TO OTHERS WOULD YOU DPRAE THAT'S NOT AN ACCURATE STATEMENT.
MAURA SULLIVAN: I WOULD AGREE. THAT IS INACCURATE, BUT IT'S INCONSEQUENTIAL GIVEN
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN HD. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: THANK, COUNSEL.
MAURA SULLIVAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. THE COURT: MS. SPANARKEL.
SARAH A. SPANARKEL: THANK YOU, JUSTICES AND MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. I WOULD
FIRST LIKE TO INCORPORATE EVERYTHING THAT MY COUNSEL, A P SAID AND I WOULD INCORPORATE
THAT INTO MY ARGUMENT L AS A P SUL DID INDICATE I AM THE DMRAUS COUNT PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED
TO MEGAN'S LAW SO PRACTICALLY I WOULD LIKE TO APPROACH THIS SUBJECT AND HOW SPECIFICALLY
THE LEGISLATURE CREATED SUBSECTION F TO APPLY TO JUVENILE. SPECIFICALLY IN
R.H.'S CASE, CURRENTLY HE IS IN HIS 11TH YEAR OUT OF 15 IN THE LOOK BACK PERIOD. HE
IS CURRENTLY IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSECTION F AND ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE. CURRENTLY
HE HAS A TIER 2 REGISTRANT WITH TIER 1 NOTIFICATION. TIER 2 REGISTRANT'S
ARE MODERATE RISK. CURRENTLY HE HAS THE OBLIGATION OF A TIER 1 REGISTRANT WHICH
IS LOW RISK. DURING HIS LAST TIER HEARING, WHICH WAS IN 2020, HE TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY DURING HIS HEARING TO APPROACH THE COURT AND EXPLAIN TO THE COURT THROUGH A
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION THAT HE WOULD NOT BE A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY IF HIS OBLIGATION
WAS LOWERED TO A TIER 1 STATUS. NOW WHAT ARE HIS OBLIGATIONS? YOU
HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT MEGAN'S LAW IS A REMEDIAL STATUTE, REMEDIAL PURPOSE. HIS
ONLY OBLIGATION CURRENTLY IS TO REGISTER WITH THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AND ADVISE
THEM OF WHERE AND WHEN HE MOVES. THAT IS HIS ONLY OBLIGATION AS A TIER 1 REGISTRANT SO
WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THE OBLIGATION, ALTHOUGH IT IS A 15-WREER PRONG, THE FIRST PRONG,
DOES CREATE THAT 15 YEARS, HIS ONLY OBLIGATION IS TO REGISTER WITH THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY ANNUALLY. THIS IS REALLY A PRIME EXAMPLE OF HOW THE LEGISLATURE EVEN
TENDED MEGAN'S LAW TO APPLY TO JUVENILES AS WELL AS REGULAR ADULT OFFEND ERS. ALL
OFFEND ERS UNDER MEGAN'S LAW HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO REDUSZ THEIR TIER, TO GO MAKE
AN APPLICATION IN FRONT OF THE TRIAL LEVEL COURT AND REDUCE THEIR TIER TO THAT LOW LEVEL
TIER 1 STATUTORY STATUS, WHICH, AGAIN, LOWERS THEIR OBLIGATIONS. IN R.H.'S
CASE WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THE FACTS AN CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. HE WILL ALWAYS
BE DEEMED A TIER 2 MODERATE RISK OFFENDER BASED ON HIS FACTS AN CIRCUMSTANCES AN HIS R
A F SCORE. NOW, IN RESPONSE TO THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT IF JUVENILES,
IT'S THE FIRST PRONG OF SUBSECTION F DID NOT APPLY TO JUVENILES, THAT JUVENILES WOULD
NOT IMMEDIATELY APPLY. IN PRACTICE, I SEE A FLOOD GATE OPENING FOR JUVENILES
TO APPLY WITHIN MAYBE A MONTH, MAYBE A YEAR OF THEIR ADJUDICATIONS. JUSTICE
MICHAEL NORIEGA: WOULD THEY BE SUCCESSFUL. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: IT DEPENDS
ON THE COURT. IT DEPENDS ON THE JUDGE AND I THINK THAT'S WHY THE LEGISLATURE CREATED
THIS TWO PRONG BECAUSE THE FIRST PRONG KEEPS CONSISTENCY THROUGHOUT THE STATE.
IF THESE APPLICATIONS GO BEFORE A JUDGE ON THE TRIAL LEVEL, FIRST THEY HAVE TO SATISFY
SOMETHING THAT HAS NO DISCRETION, THE COURT HAS NO DISCRETION. IF THEY HAVE A CONVICTION,
THEN YOU DON'T MAKE IT TO THE SECOND PRONG. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: DO WHAT
DO THEY NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO CONVINCINGLY SHOW THAT THEY ARE NOT A THREAT TO SAFETY.
SARAH A. SPANARKEL: IN MOST CASES THEY PROVIDE A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION,
AS WELL AS AN INDICATION THAT THEY HAVE FULL EMPLOYMENT, THAT THEY HAVE COMPLETED SEX
OFFENDER COUNSELING. THERE IS A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT EXAMPLES THAT THEY DO PRESENT TO
THE COURT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SO HOW COULD THEY POSSIBLY SHOW THAT ONE
DAY AFTER THE JUVENILE ADJUDICATION, THAT THEY HAVE FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT, THAT THEY
COMPLETED ALL THE COUNSELING, THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE THERAPY. HOW
COULD THEY POSSIBLY SHOW THAT. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: WE HAVE TO REMEMBER
ABOUT LATE DISCLOSURES. FOR EXAMPLE, I DID HAVE A CASE RECENTLY THAT A JUVENILE
UNDERSTAND THE J.G. STANDARD, IT WAS A LATE DISCLOSURE, THE REGISTRANT CURRENTLY WAS 17
YEARS OLD, ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AND WAS PLACED ON PROBATION FOR THAT ADJUDICATION.
HE DID MAKE AN APPLICATION TO THE TRIAL LEVEL FOR REMOVAL BECAUSE CURRENTLY HIS OFFENSE
OCCURRED WHEN HE WAS UNDER THE AGE -- 13 AND YOUNGER SO UNDER THE J.G. STANDARD ONCE HE
TURNED 13 WHILE HE WAS STILL ON PROBATION, HE MADE AN APPLICATION TO THE COURT MENT.
WE DIDN'T GET TO THE ISSUE OF DANGEROUSNESS BECAUSE HE DID HAVE OTHER
PENDING CHARGES BUT I DO SEE THAT AS OPENING THE GATE FOR OTHER REGISTRANT'S TO -- HE
DID COMPLETE HIS SEX OFFENDER COUNSELING WHILE ON -- IT WAS ABOUT A YEAR AFTER HIS -- OR
MAYBE HE WAS ON HIS THIRD YEAR OF PROBATION AND HE WAS PENDING VIOLATIONS BASED ON HIS
NEW CRIMINAL CONDUCT, R HOWEVER, IT WAS WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD -- HE WAS STILL SERVING
HIS SENTENCE FOR HIS UNDERLYING SEX OFFENSE. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: YOU SAID
THE FIRST PRONG DIDN'T APPLY TO THOSE WHO WERE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT.
CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES WOULD STILL BE RELEVANT TO
WHETHER THAT PERSON WAS LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS SO IF THAT PERSON
HAS COMMITTED MANY CRIMES AFTER THEIR ORIGINAL JUVENILE ADJUDICATION AND HAS PROVED THROUGH
THOSE CRIMES THAT THEY WERE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS, THAT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO
THE CONDITION THAT EVERYONE AGREES APPLIES TO JUVENILES, CORRECT? SARAH A.
SPANARKEL: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. HOWEVER, I WOULD SAY AS TO THE SECOND PRONG,
THE FIRST PRONG KEEPS CONSISTENCY THROUGHOUT THE STATE AND WOULD MAKE SURE THAT WHEN SOMEONE
MAKES AN APPLICATION TO THE TRIAL LEVEL, THAT THAT KEEPS CONSISTENCY THROUGHOUT THE STATE.
NOW, IF WE JUST APPLY PRONG 2 AS IT APPLIES TO JUVENILES FIRST, THEY WOULD
OVERTURN J.G. AS THIS COURT HAS FOUND AND, SECOND, IT WOULD CREATE AN INCONSISTENCY
THROUGHOUT THE STATE AS TO JUVENILES 14 AND OLDER. AS WELL AS, IF J.G. WERE TO STAND,
IT WOULD CREATE A SITUATION WHERE JUVENILES 14 AND OLDER COULD APPLY FOR REMOVAL BEFORE
JUVENILES 13 AND YOUNGER. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SORRY I AM CONFUSED.
WHAT WOULD THE CONSISTENCY BE IF THEY WERE CORRECT THAT IT WOULD APPLY TO ALL JUVENILES?
M. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THEY ARE REQUESTING THAT ALL JUVENILES, EVEN 13
AND YOUNGER BE ALLOWED TO REQUEST TERMINATION WHENEVER THEY CAN PROVE THAT IT'S NOT LIKELY
THAT THEY WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. YOU SAID IF THEY WERE
CORRECT, THAT WOULD CREATE AN INCONSISTENCY. WHAT WOULD THE INCONSISTENCY
BE? SARAH A. SPANARKEL: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. I WOULD SEE IT
ASCERTAIN COUNTIES WOULD TAKE THESE APPLICATIONS AND SOME -- IN SOME JURISDICTIONS, JUDGES
WOULD LOOK AT AN APPLICATION THAT IS SIMILAR AND SAYING A POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION,
HOWEVER, WITH TWO SUBSEQUENT CONVICTIONS. SOME WOULD CONSIDER THAT, OKAY, THEY'RE OFF
OF PROBATION, THEY'RE REHABILITATED AND REMOVE THAT JUVENILE OFF OF MEGAN'S LAW.
HOWEVER, SOME JURISDICTIONS, MIGHT NOT DO THAT ABDOMEN MIGHT SAY SAY NO, THE TWO SUBSEQUENT
CONVICTIONS GOES TO THE DANGEROUS PRONG THAT PERSON HAS TO REMAIN ON MEGAN'S LAW.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: ISN'T THAT WHAT HAPPENS ANYWAY WITH ALL JUDGES THROUGHOUT THE
STATE, WHERE A JUDGE HAAS TO MAKE A DETERMINATION BASED ON THE REGISTRANT BEFORE THEM;
ISN'T THAT WHAT HAPPENS ALREADY. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: CORRECT, BUT WITH
THE FIRST PRONG BEING 15 YEARS FOR JUVENILES 14 AND ABOVE IT CREATES CONSISTENCY THROUGHOUT
THE STATE, AS WELL AS FOR ADULT OFFEND ERS, WITH THAT PRONG, IT KEEPS CONSISTENCY THROUGHOUT
THE STATE AN THEN YOU MOVE ON TO THE SECOND PRONG. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA:
IN TERMS OF YOUR FLOODGATES ARGUMENT, AT THIS POINT ISN'T IT FAIR TO SAY THAT IT DOESN'T
MATTER WHAT WE DECIDE, REGISTRANT'S CAN ALWAYS FILE AN APPLICATION TO ATTEMPT.
THOSE APPLICATIONS COULD COME AT ANY POENT JUST LIKE THEY COULD FOR PROBATION NERS WHO
WISH TO TERMINATE THEIR PROBATION EARLY. DEFENDANTS OFFEND ERS HAVE THAT RIGHT
TO SATISFY SOME CONDITIONS ON THEIR. THE COURT IS OBLIGED TO DO THAT AND A
PROSECUTOR WILL MAKE THEIR POSITION KNOWN IF THEY ARE GOING TO OPPOSE IT SO WHAT FLOODGATES
ARE YOU REFERRING TO. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: THE FLOODGATES WOULD BE IF THIS
COURT CHOSE TO NOT APPLY THE FIRST PRONG OF SUBSECTION F TO JUVENILES 14 AND OLDER. I
DO SEE THAT THERE WOULD BE -- AND IF ONLY THE SECOND PRONG APPLIED TO JUVENILES, IN GENERAL
BECAUSE RIGHT NOW WE HAVE A SITUATION WHERE J.G. STATES, JUVENILES WHO ARE 13 AND BELOW
HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL 18. THAT CREATES A BRIGHT LINE RULE WHAT TIME THEY CAN APPLY FOR
REMOVAL. JUSTICE PATTERSON: DO YOU HAVE ANY SENSE OF HOW MANY JUVENILES
NOT WAIVED UP, WHO HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED FOR A MEGAN'S LAW OFFENSE IF COMMITTED BY AN
ADULT, HOW MANY ARE OUT THERE WHO WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THIS. SARAH A.
SPANARKEL: JUDGE, I DON'T HAVE THOSE NUMBERS. HOWEVER, IN MY PRACTICE, IT IS A LOWER
NUMBER OF ADD JUTD INDICATIONS DASH DASHL JUVENILES WHO ARE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT
DELINQUENT WHO ARE PLACED ON MEGAN'S LAW. BASED ON MY COUNTY LOAN I KNOW THAT.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: LOWER THAN WHAT? IN OTHER WORDS, OF THE
ENTIRE POOL OF JUVENILES WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED BECAUSE THEY WAIVED -- AFTER BEING
WAIVED OR HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT, NOT WAIVED UP, WHAT WOULD BE YOUR GENERAL
SENSE OF THE PERCENT ANL OR PROPORTION OF HOW MANY GET WAIVED WITH UP BECAUSE OF THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE VERSUS NOT. I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE
NOT ELIGIBLE FOR WAIVER UNDER THE STATUTE SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT 15 AND UP.
SARAH A. SPANARKEL: YOUR HONOR, I DO HAVE TO JUST LIMIT THIS TO GLAUS COUNT APPLICATION.
I DO HAVE TO SAY THAT IN OUR JUVENILE UNIT, THERE IS NOT MANY ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT KWENTS
WHO ARE PLACED ON MEGAN'S LAW. A LOT OF TIMES, IT IS SET OUT OR ADJUDICATED
DELINQUENT TO SOMETHING ELSE SO THEY ARE NOT PLACED ON MEGAN'S LAW. IT IS ONLY THE MOST
SERIOUS OF SEXUAL OFFENSES THAT GET PLACED ON MEGAN'S LAW AND THAT DOESN'T HAPPEN OFTEN.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: MOST OF THOSE JUVENILES, WHO ARE 15, 16, 17 WAIVED UCH
OR AT LEAST AN ATTEMPT TO WAIVE THEM UP. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: I AM NOT AWARE
OF THOSE NUMBERS. JUSTICE PATTERSON: I KNOW YOU DON'T HAVE STATUTORY
TIS PARTICULARS. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: IN THE SENSE OF MY OFFICE, NOT MANY
GET WAIVED UP. WE DEAL WITH THE SEXUAL OFFENSES IN JUVENILE COURT. WE ALSO
HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT A LOT OF THESE JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS ARE SEXUAL OFFENSES AGAINST
HOUSEHOLD FAMILY MEMBERS SO THAT DOES CREATE A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS FAMILY RELATIONS
INVOLVED IN THIS AND I KNOW THAT THAT IS FOR MORE SERIOUS OFFENSES THAT ARE WAIVED UP
SUCH AS HOMICIDE AND OTHER CASES. JUSTICE PATTERSON: IF THERE IS A 15, 16
OR 17 YEAR OLD APPEND THERE IS, LET'S SAY, AN AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT ON A YOUNGER CHILD
IS THAT LIKELY TO BE A WAIVER SITUATION. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: WE VRNLT HAD
ONE RECENTLY TO MY KNOWLEDGE. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: THE APPLICATIONS THAT
YOU RECEIVE ARE THEY SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL OR ARE THEY SUBMITTED BY THE REGISTRANT.
SARAH A. SPANARKEL: MOSTLY BY COUNSEL. THEY USUALLY APPLY TO THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
AND GET OR GET PRIVATE COUNSEL AND MAKE AN APPLICATION AND/OR, IF THEY MOVE WITHIN THE
COUNTY I DO A PRELIMINARY REVIEW AND IF THEY DO -- IF ARE A F SCORE LOWERS THEIR SCORE
TO A TIER 1, I WILL TAKE THAT APPLICATION. SUCH AS, LET'S SAY, I GET INFORMATION
THAT THEY COMPLETED SEX OFFENDER COUNSELING OR THEY'RE FULLY EMPLOYED OR THEY'RE IN STABLE
HOUSING WHERE BEFORE THEY WERE MOVING ALL AROUND, THAT TUESDAY LOWER THEIR SCORE AND IT
COULD LOWER THEM FROM A TIER 2 OFFENDER TO TIER 1 AND I DO TAKE THAT INTO CONSIDERATION
WHEN REVIEWING APPLICATIONS. THE COURT: DOES THE FACT THAT MOST OF THESE
COME FROM COUNSEL, FROM THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE THAT WE WON'T NECESSARILY SEE A DMRUD
WITHIN WEEKS OR MONTHS AFTER? SARAH A. SPANARKEL: I DON'T NECESSARILY
THINK THAT BECAUSE COUNSEL IS AWARE, LET'S SAY, SUBSECTION F IS ONLY -- IF THE SECOND PRONG
APPLIES TO JUVENILES, COUNSEL WOULD BE AWARE. I DO HAVE TO SAY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR WE
DID HAVE AN INCREASE IN REMOVAL MOTIONS. I DON'T HAVE THE NUMBER AS TO JUST JUVENILES
OR TASH DASH BUT, IN GENERAL, IN GLOUCESTER COUNTY, WE'VE HAD 18 IN THE PAST YEAR.
JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: FOR ADULTS AN JUVENILES? IS. SARAH A.
SPANARKEL: ADULTS AN JUVENILES, APPROXIMATELY 18. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
SO, FWEN, YOU FOCUSED ON CONSEQUENCES AND THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE IS WHAT WILL CONTROL
IN THIS CASE. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD ON THAT POENT POINT?
SARAH A. SPANARKEL: NO, I HAVE FURTHER QUESTIONS, THANK YOU OR I MEAN I HAVE
NO FURTHER ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS? THE COURT:
THANK YOU, COUNSEL. SARAH A. SPANARKEL: THANK YOU. THE
COURT: MS. MATTHEWS. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONORS.
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. I, OF COURSE ADOPT THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY BOTH THE
ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS FROM THE STATE AND I WANT TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE ISSUES AN EXPAND
ON THEM OR GIVE MAYBE AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS YOUR HONORS HAVE
RAISED HERE TODAY. I WANT TO TURN TO A QUESTION THAT JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS
RAISED REPEATEDLY THROUGHOUT THE ARGUMENT ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THIS WOULD IMPLICATE THOSE,
YES, APPLIES TO THOSE WHO ARE CONVICTED, IT WOULD NEGATE TWO-THIRDS OF THE PERSONS REQUIRED
TO REGISTER UNDER THE ACT SO THERE BY CREATING THE FIRST PORTION OF THE STATUTE THAT SAYS
A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER BECOMING VOID IN A SENSE THAT THE LEGISLATURE INSTEAD COULD HAVE
JUST SAID THE ONE-THIRD IT DOES APPLY TO RATHER THAN THE TWO-THIRDS IT DOESN'T.
THE COURT: YOU MEAN TWO-THIRDS OF THE CATEGORIES. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: YES, YOUR
HONOR. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WHAT IS THE BREAK DOWN, WHAT PERCENT OF CASES
ARE DISPOSED OF IN THIS CASE. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I DON'T HAVE STATUTORY
TIS PARTICULARS ON THOSE NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY. THE COURT: IT'S
NOT A THIRD IS IT. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I'M SORRY. I WAS NOT IMPLYING A
THIRD OF THOSE REQUIRED TO REGISTER. THE COURT: I'M NOT SUGGESTING YOU WERE.
I AM TRYING TO ESTABLISH WHETHER OR NOT IT'S A MUCH SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF THE OVERALL
NUMBERS. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CERTAINLY TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WITHOUT HAVING,
YOU KNOW, THAT INFORMATION BEFORE ME, IT DOESN'T SEEM TO BE AS BIG AS THE ADULTS THAT ARE
REQUIRED TO REGISTER. I KNOW JUSTICE PATTERSON, YOU ASKED ABOUT SOME NUMBERS,
I DON'T HAVE THE EXACT NUMBERS YOU'RE ASKING FOR. I DO HAVE SOME ROUGH NUMBERS IF THE
COURT IS INTERESTED IN THEM. JUSTICE PATTERSON: JUST TO GET AN IDEA OF
HOW MANY ARE IN THIS -- IF WAIVER IS THE KEY -- WERE TO BE THE KEY LINE, HOW MANY WOULD BE
LEFT IN THE THIS CATEGORY WITHOUT WAIVER WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THIS. KAILI E.
MATTHEWS: I HAVE TWO RESPONSES TO THAT, YOUR HONOR. ONE OF THEM MIGHT NOT
BE AS RESPONSIVE AS I WISH IT WAS, BUT I DON'T HAVE THE AMOUNT OF ACTIVE REGISTRANT'S
WHO WERE JUVENILES AT THE TIME THEY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE AN THEN WERE WAIVED UP BUT WE
KNOW IN TERMS OF ACTIVE REGISTRANT'S WHO WERE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AND HAVE NOT BEEN
ABLE TO TERMINATE THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS. IT'S ABOUT 1300. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: THAT MEANS THEY WERE NOT WAIVED UP BECAUSE IF THEY WERE ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT
THEY WERE NOT WAIVED UP. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT, BUT I DON'T HAVE A
COMPREHENSIVE NUMBER OF ALL OF THOSE WHO COMMITTED THE OFFENSE AN THEN THEIR CASE WAS
DISPOSED OF IN SOME MANNER WHETHER IT WAS A WAIVE UP RESULTING IN CONVICTION, NOT GUILTY
BY REASON OF INSANITY OR AN ADJUDICATION. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THE TOTAL
NUMBER. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: ACTIVE REGISTRANT'S. THAT'S A VERY ROUGH NUMBER.
JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: THAT'S JUST BELOW THE AGE OF 18 GENERALLY.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: THOSE ARE THE ACTIVE, SEX OFFENSE. WE HAVE, I BELIEVE IT'S ABOUT
30 ACTIVE REGISTRANT'S WHO ARE CURRENTLY ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT, WHO ARE STILL UNDER
THE AGE OF 18 AND I BELIEVE IT IS FOR OF THOSE WHO ARE UNDER THE AGE OF 15. AGAIN, THOSE
ARE ROUGH NUMBERS, I AM HAPPY TO SUBMIT FURTHER IF YOUR HONORS NEED IT. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: LET ME ASK YOU A QUESTION, YOUR GLOUS COUNT PROSECUTOR COLLEAGUE INDICATED
THAT -- I THOUGHT I WAS HEARING A PREFERENCE FOR HANDLING SOME OF THESE CASES IN JUVENILE
COURT AND THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY POLICY REASONS BEHIND THAT. DO YOU THINK THAT
-- ABSENT WAIVER, THE 15-YEAR BAR WERE CONSTRUED TO BE UNAVAILABLE, THERE WOULD BE MORE
ATTEMPTS TO WAIVE UP 15, 16 AND 17 YEAR OLD WHO HAVE COMMITTED MEGAN'S LAW OFFENSES BECAUSE
OF CONCERNS ABOUT REAS I SAID D-RECIDIVISM. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I THINK THAT'S
A POLICY AND STRATEGY DECISION. I WILL RESPOND TO JUSTICE PATTERSON, REGARDING
THE ISSUE OF WAIVER. NOW, GRANTED, I AM NOT A BOOTS ON THE GROUND ASSISTANT
PROSECUTOR WHO IS HANDLING THESE WAIVER HEARINGS AND I DON'T HAVE THE ENTIRETY OF THE
STATUTE OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD BUT MY UNDERSTANDING IS IT IS A DISCRETIONARY BASIS.
THE ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR HAS TO ACTUALLY MOVE FOR THE JUVENILE TO BE WAIVED UP AND SO
WE'RE LEAVING WHAT THE LEGISLATURE IN TERNDED FOR IF A PERSON IS REPETITIVE AND COMPULSIVE
TO BE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE STATE AND NOT THE COURT'S OR THE CATEGORICAL BAR IN
THE FIRST PRONG THAT THE LEGISLATURE LAID OUT. AND SO, IT WOULD CREATE THIS
ISSUE OF LIKE, A LACK OF UNIFORMITY AND IT COULD LEAD TO MORE JUVENILES BEING WAIVED UP
ON THE FEAR THAT THEVEN THEY WOULDN'T BE SUBJECT TO THAT BASIS. I WOULD JUST
NOTE FOR PURPOSES OF THE WAIVER STATUTE MY UNDERSTANDING IS ONE OF THE FABT TORS THAT
ARE LOOKED AT IS WHETHER SOMEONE IS REPETITIVE AND COMPULSIVE. JUSTICE PATTERSON:
YOU MEAN, WAIVER, BUT NOT ONE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS. KAILI E.
MATTHEWS: I DON'T THINK THAT'S A DIRECT LANGUAGE THAT IS USED FOR A FACTOR THAT A PROSECUTOR
COULD SET FORTH OR THAT THE COURT, FOR. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: WOULDN'T
THAT DETERMINES BE MADE AT THE END OF THE CASE AFTER THERE IS SOME KIND OF ADJUDICATION
OR CONVICTION? THE WAIVER ISSUE WOULD COME UP AT THE COMBINING OF THE CASE
WHEN DECIDING WHERE TO PROSECUTE, NOT WHETHER THEY ARE COMPETITIVE AND COMPULSIVE FOR
PURPOSES OF DISPOSITION. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CERTAINLY, YOUR HONOR.
I WASN'T TRYING TO APPLY THAT YOU NEED TO DETERMINE IF THE REGISTRANT IS XRULS S-I AM
NOTING THAT'S ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT THE LEGISLATURE WAS CONCERNED OF IT'S SOMETHING
CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT MEGAN'S LAW WITHIN THE TIERING PROCESS AND WHEN YOU ATTEMPT TO MEET
THE SECOND PRONG, I WOULD SAY THE SECOND PORTION OF IT WOULDN'T ACCOUNT FOR DIRECTLY,
MAYBE, INDIRECT MEANS, AGAIN, I DON'T KNOW ALL THE FACTORS OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD, BUT
IT DOESN'T HAVE THE WORDS REP. TET ACTIVE AND COMPULSIVE, RISK OF REOFFENSE OF A SEXUAL
OFFENSE IN TERMS OF WHAT THE PROSECUTOR WOULD LOOK LIKE. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: WHERE ARE YOU READING THE REP. TET PET ACTIVE AND COMPULSIVE PIECE INTO SUBSECTION
F. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I'M SAYING AS A POLICY MATTER. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: YOU'RE SAYING IN WAIVER DERMSDZ, IF IN FACT A WAIVER DETERMINATION WERE DETERMINED
TO BE ULTIMATELY DISPOSITIVE ASSUMING THERE IS A CONVICTION OR THERE IS A CONVICTION AS
TO WHETHER OR NOT THE 15-YEAR PROVISION OF SUBSECTION F APPLIES, THERE IS NOTHING IN THE
WAIVER DETERMINATION THAT WOULD ALLOW THAT CONCERN TO BE WEIGHED BY THE COURT?
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR, AT LEAST TO MY KNOWLEDGE, DIRECTLY. THERE
MIGHT BE, INDIRECT MEANS, THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR CLEARING THAT UP. I WAS NOT ATTEMPTING
TO IMPLY THAT THE REPETITIVE STAND SRD IS SOMEHOW IMPORTANT TO SECTION F. IT.
WE'RE LOOKING AT A MARCH FAR MORE INCONSISTENT AN UNIFORM AND DISCRETIONARY.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: RELATED TO THAT, WHAT IS THE A G'S VIEW AS TO WHY THE LEGISLATURE DID
A COUPLE OF DIFFERENT THINGS IN SUBSECTION F AND ONE OF THOSE WAS THE FIRST PRONG, THE
15 YEARS. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CERTAINLY, YOUR HONOR. SO, THE
LEGISLATURE HERE OBVIOUSLY DETERMINED THERE WAS A NEED FOR MORE THAN JUST A COURT'S PREDICTIVE
JUDGMENT OF IF SOMEONE WOULD BE A DANGER TO SOCIETY AN THEREFORE -- A DANGER TO THE
COMMUNITY AN THEREFORE, HAVE A RISK OF REOFFENSE AND THAT'S WHY IT CREATED TWO PRONGS.
I THINK AN IMPORTANT WAY THAT IS HELPFUL TO LOOK AT IT IS THE PRONGS LOOK
AT TWO DIFFERENT CHAFSHTH I SEE. STICKS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, WHEN WE HAVE THE
OFFENSE-FREE 15 YEAR TIME SPAN WE'RE LOOKING AT THE RETROACTIVE CONDUCT OF THE REGISTRANT
AND THAT IS SOMETHING THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS PUT INTO PLACE. THIS IS NOT DISCRETION
ARY. WE'RE LOOKING AT RETROACTIVE CONDUCT ON A BASELINE LEVEL ACROSS THE BOARD.
WHEN WE HAVE THAT SECOND PRONG OF A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY, IT'S THE COURT'S PREDICTIVE
JUDGMENT BASED OFF OF WHAT HE IS ABLE TO PROVIDE AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION, IF HE IS
NO LONGER A DANGER TO SOCIETY SO WE'RE LOOKING AT TWO DIFFERENT COURSES OF CONDUCT HERE
SO I THINK THAT IS VERY IMPORTANT WHEN WE'RE LOOKING AT THE LEGISLATIVE EVEN TENT.
IF THE LEGISLATURE SIMPLY INTENDED FOR THE COURT TO LOOK AT PROSPECTIVE CONDUCT, IT
WOULDN'T HAVE THAT AND AND IT WOULDN'T HAVE THE IMPLICATION IT HAS THAT WE'RE LOOKING
AT RETROACTIVE CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND PROSPECTIVE CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL.
AND I THINK THAT CREATES WHAT THE STATE WAS GETTING AT EARLIER, THIS CONSISTENCY THAT
WE'RE LOOKING AT. WHEN U THAT FIRST PRONG, WHICH OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD THE
ONLY INSTANCES I CAN THINK OF ARE SENTENCING AND PUNITIVE OF COURSE AN WE ARE IN A RE
MEDIAL SCHEME, BUT THERE ARE OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THE LEGISLATURE HAS SAID I'M GOING TO
LEAVE PART OF THIS TO THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT AN THE REMAINDER OF IT IS AN OUTRIGHT
HERE IS WHAT YOU NEED TO DO. JUSTICE PATTERSON: MANDATORY MIN MUMS.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. WHILE WE'RE ON THE ISSUE OF SENTENCING
LAW THAT COULD XOERT INTO OUR INTERPRETATION HERE WHEN LOOKING AT THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION,
THE STATE, OR EXCUSE ME, THE PETITIONERS SEEM TO IMPLY THERE ARE NO OTHER INSTANCES WHERE
THIS COURT HAS EVER INTERPRETED CONVICTION TO EQUALLY APPLY EQUALLY TO THOSE ADJUDICATED
AND THOSE CONVICTED. AGAIN THIS IS IN A PUNITIVE CONTEXT NOT CITED IN OUR BRIEF, BUT
STATE V. FRANKLIN ISN'T EXACTLY ON POINT BUT IT LOOKS AT THE GAP TIME CREDIT STATUTE WHERE
IT'S ONLY READ TO INCLUDE CONVICTION BUT THIS COURT HAS INTERPRETED TO APPLY TO BOTH AN
ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AN THOSE WHO ARE CONVICTED, TO SHOW THAT JUVENILES, CONVICTED
ADJUDICATED, THERE WOULD BE A GAP IN THE STATUTE AN THERE WOULD BE ALL OF THESE ISSUES
IN HAD NOT APPLYING CONVICTION EQUALLY TO BOTH. JUSTICE PATTERSON: ONE OF THE
ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS INDICATED THAT HER VIEW IS THAT THE LEGISLATURE USED SOME PERHAPS
NOT PRECISE LANGUAGE OR MADE A MISTAKE, WHAT IS THE A G'S VIEW ON THAT. KAILI
E. MATTHEWS: CERTAINLY. I THINK THERE IS AN ARGUMENT TO BE MADE THAT THE LANGUAGE IS
IN ARTFUL, BUT I THINK WE CAN DISCERN FROM SEVERAL SPORS ES OF TRADITIONAL STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION WHAT WAS IN TENNED HERE AND I WOULD POENT YOUR HONORS TO A TIME LINE OF
EVENTS, IF I MAY, F HAS BEEN A PART OF MEGAN'S LAW IN ALL THE 30 YEARS THAT IT HAS BEEN
ENACTED. IT WAS PART OF THE ORIGINAL ENACTMENT IN 1994 AND INCLUDED, OF COURSE, AS WE
HAVE DISCUSSED AT LENGTHS TODAY ALL OF THOSE REQUIRED TO REGISTER. WHEN
SUBSECTION FWCHLT WAS ENACTED A FEW YEARS LATER, IT, AGAIN, TOOK A PERSON REQUIRED TO
REGISTER AND SUBJECTS THEM TO SUBSECTION G, IF WE TOOK PETITIONERS INTERPRETATION TO READ
THAT THEY NEVER INTENDED F TO APPLY -- THE FIRST PRONG OF F TO APPLY TO JUVENILES, BUT
WE DO INTEND THE HASH ES OBLIGATIONS TO APPLY TO JUVENILES, THAT WOULD MEAN THE LEGISLATURE
WENT FROM ONE EXTREME TO THE OTHER AND TO CLARIFY WHAT I MEAN BY THAT, UNDER PETITIONER'S
INTERPRETATION THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO WALK IN THE DOOR, THE NEXT DAY, I UNDERSTAND THE
COUNTER ARGUMENTS THEY ARE MAKING ABOUT THE PRACTICALITY OF THAT, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO
WALK IN THE DOOR THE NEXT DAY AND SAY I'M NOT A DANGER TO SOCIETY, TAKE ME OFF, BUT THEN
A FEW YEARS LATER THE LEGISLATURE WOULD DO A 180 AND SAY THESE PEOPLE ARE SUBJECT TO LIFE,
THAT'S BEEN OVERRULED BY C.K. I THINK IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
INTENT NOT ONLY DID THEY USE THE PHRASE A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER BUT THEY CONTINUED
TO DO SO AND CONTINUED TO APPLY IT TO JUVENILES IN SUBSECTION G. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: HOW DOES THAT HELP YOU. IN SUBSECTION G IT SAYS A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER
UNDER THIS SECTION WHO HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT OR NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY. DOES THAT. CONVICTED THEY HAD TO USE DIFFERENT
WORDS TO DO SO. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: THEY ADDED ON ANOTHER OFFENSE
TO DISTINGUISH IT. THERE WAS ANOTHER OTHER OFFENSE CATEGORY OF INDIVIDUALS SO IT WAS
PT JUST JUVENILES WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL PENALTY E. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I
AGREE WITH THE READINGS BOTH OF YOUR HONORS HAVE BROUGHT UP. I DISAGREE IN THE SENSE
THAT I DON'T THINK IT'S NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF HOW THE COURT POSSIBLY INARTFULLY CONSTRUCTED
SUBSECTION F AND TO DO THAT WE SHOULD TURN TO OTHER SECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN STUSED TODAY
AND BEEN BRIEFED WHERE CONVICTION WAS USED AND IT'S APPLIED EQUALLY OR WHERE THE LEGISLATURE
HAS GONE OUT OF ITS WAY TO SENG L OUT A CATEGORY OF PERSONS REQUIRED TO REGISTER TO SHOW
THAT THEY ARE TREATED DIFFERENTLY. I WILL JUST NOTE WE REFERENCE B 4 IN OUR
BRIEF THAT TREATS JUVENILES DIFFERENTLY THAN ALL OTHER PERSONS REQUIRED TO RENL STER.
IT SHOWS THAT THE LEGISLATURE KNEW HOW TO CARVE OUT ONE OF THE TWO CATEGORIES
THAT ARE REQUIRED TO REGISTER TO SHOW HOW THEY ARE TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY AND THE
LEGISLATURE COULD HAVE PUT THAT IN SUBSECTION F. JUSTICE SOLOMON: ONE QUESTION.
EARLIER IN YOUR ARGUMENT, YOU MADE THE POENT, I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU INFER
FROM THIS, UNDER F THERE IS THE CONJUNCTIVE AND WITH THE FIRST PART THE 15 YEAR LOOK BACK
AND IS NOT LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT. THE LEGISLATURE USED THAT WORD. NOW WE'RE
TALKING ABOUT IT'S BEEN INARTFULLY DRAWN AND ALL THESE ISSUES BUT THEY USED THE WORD AND
IN IMPLYING BOTH SECTIONS APPLY UNDER F HOW DOES THAT AFFECT YOUR ARGUMENT OR THE DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENT. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I THINK IT IS HELPFUL TO OUR ARGUMENT AN
UNDERCUTS. IT IS USED IN THE CONJUNCTIVE TERM THERE. WE HAVE A PERSON
REQUIRED TO REGISTER HAS TO DO ONE AND THE OTHER. THIS ISN'T AN INSTANCE WHERE WE CAN
LOOK AT THAT WORD AND TAKE IT OUT OF THE DICTIONARY DEFINITION AND SAY OR.
THE COURT: YOU DON'T HAVE TO BOTH. YOU HAVE TO SATISFY BOTH SEPARATE THAT FAIR TO SAY.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: YES, YOUR HONOR. I THINK -- I DON'T THINK
THERE IS A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION TO SAY THAT IT IS ONE OR THE OTHER AND I THINK THAT
AGAIN DATES BACK TO THE -- CIRCLES BACK TO THE RETROSPECTIVE VERSUS PROSPECTIVE.
IT ALSO SHOWS THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED BOTH TO APPLY TO ALL PERSONS REQUIRED TO REGISTER
UNDER THE ACT OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE SEGREGATED IT OUT LIKE THEY HAD DONE IN
SECTIONS LIKE BEFORE. AND SO -- JUSTICE PATTERSON: HOW WOULD
IT READ? BASED ON HOW THEY PHRASED BEFORE AND SOME OF THE OTHER SECTIONS,
IF THEY HAD INTENDED THE JUVENILE ADJUDICATION AND PERSONS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF
INSTANT TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE FIRST PRONG, HOW, APPROXIMATELY WOULD THEY HAVE SAID THAT? ?
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I THINK THEY CERTAINLY COULD HAVE USED FOR EXAMPLE, IN
B 4 THEY FWIN THE SECTION WITH -- SORRY. SHALL NOT INCLUDE AN ADJUDICATION
OF DELINQUENCY FOR ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD PURSUANT, INSERT OAE LIPS SEE THERE.
I THINK THE SAME THING COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO SAY A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER HAS TO
PROVE THEY ARE NO LONGER A DANGER TO SOCIETY AND YOU HAVE TO HAVE 15 YEARS OF OFFENSE
FREE CONDUCT UNLESS YOU ARE A PERSON WHO WAS ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AS THEY DID IN D 4
WHEN CORE VING OUT THE ENDANGERED CHILD. THE COURT: YOU'RE READING OUT AN
ENTIRE STRING OF WORDS THAT APPLIES ONLY TO INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND
SERVED TIME IN A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND SO ON. THAT'S A SUBSTANTIAL REWRITE.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: SORRY, YOUR HONOR, IF I COULD CLARIFY WITH REGARDS TO B 4. THE
COURT: THE FRAMEWORK YOU JUST OUTLINED OVERLOOKED LANGUAGE THAT APEERS ON TO APPLY EITHER
TO WAIVED UP JUVENILES OR ADULTS, CONVICTION OR RELEASE FROM A CONVICTION FACILITY SO
COME BACK TO THE JUSTICE'S QUESTION, HOW SHOULD THIS HAVE BEEN WRITTEN? KAILI
E. MATTHEWS: MY BEST WAY TO CONSTRUCT IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE TO TAKE THE LANGUAGE CONVICTION
OR RELEASE FROM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY OUT WITH REGARDS TO HOW THE CLOCK STARTS.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: JUST TO CLARIFY, I WAS ASKING YOU HOW THEY SHOULD HAVE SAID IT IF YOUR
COLLEAGUES ON THIS SIDE ARE CORRECT, HOW THEY SHOULD HAVE ARTICULATED THAT DISTINCTION.
I WASN'T ASKING HOW THEY COULD HAVE DONE BETTER TO ARTICULATE THE MEANING THAT YOU ARE
ASCRIBING TO US. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. THINK
EXACTLY RIGHT UNDER THAT, IN ORDER TO GET TO THE INTERPRETATION THAT PETITIONERS ARE ASSERTING
WITHOUT DOING THE TYPE OF MENTAL GYMNASTICS THEY ARE ASKING THIS COURT TO DO WOULD REQUIRE
QUALIFYING LANGUAGE AFTER THAT FIRST SECTION THAT CONVICTION ISN'T MEANT TO APPLY EQUALLY
AS IT DOES IN OTHER PORTIONS OF NOT ONLY MEGAN'S LAW BUT THE GAP TIME CREDITS STATUTE.
THE COURT: LET ME FLIP IT ROUND. HOW SHOULD IT BE WRITTEN TO
ACCOMPLISH WHAT YOU'RE SUGGESTING IT SAYS. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: THE BEST WAY
WOULD PROBABLY BE TO POINT A D AND IT'S INTERPRETATION, THAT CONVICTION AND RELEASED
FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY JUST BEGINS THE STARTING OF THE CLOCK SO WHATEVER IS THE
MOST ARTFUL WAY TO IMPLY THAT YOUR REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 15-YEAR OF OFFENSE
FREE TERM WOULD START AT THE TIME THAT THE CLOCK KWINS TO RUN AND WHETHER THAT BE INSERTING
THE LANGUAGE, I THINK IT'S POSSIBLE YOUR HONOR IS TRYING TO IMPLY SPECIFICALLY PUTTING
IN THE LANGUAGE, ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT. THE COURT: ISN'T THAT WHAT IT
REALLY BOILS DOWN TO YOU'RE ASKING THAT WE READ THE WORDS JUVENILE ADJUDICATION INTO THE
STATUTE WHERE THEY DON'T EXIST. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR WITH
THE CAVEAT THAT WE'RE NOT ASKING YOU TO OVERRULE THE JURISPRUDENCE THAT SAYS WE CERTAIN
LINGO FOR ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT AN CERTAIN LANGUAGE FOR THOSE THAT ARE CONVICTED. JUST
THAT IN THIS CONTEXT WHEN THE LEGISLATURE ALREADY DEFINED A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER
AN THEN THEY USED THE WORD CONVICTION, THEY SIMPLY WERE MEANING TO INDICATE WHERE THE
CLOCK WAS STARTING. I APPRECIATE THE POINT, THAT, OF COURSE, MAYBE THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE ARGUMENT TUESDAY NT GET US ALL OF THE WAY THERE, BUT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
POSITION IS THAT THE INTERPRETATION THE STATE IS SOCIETYING FORTH IS A FAR MORE REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION WHEN WE LOOK AT BOTH THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE LANGUAGE THAT IS
THERE, THE CONJUNCTIVE LANGUAGE, A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER. I WOULD
NOTE JUSTICE WAINER APTER APARTMENT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: CAN I ASK ONE
QUESTION FIRST. WHAT ARE THOSE CASES THAT SAID A CONVICTION IS NOT THE SAME
AS A JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, THAT IS OAE SOMETHING I ASKED TO THE OTHER SIDE AS WELL.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I DON'T HAVE KROOITS OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD, CITES, OFF
THE TOP OF MY HEAD BUT IT'S CERTAINLY THOSE THAT INTERPRET THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE AND
THERE ARE CERTAIN THINGS TO FIND, WHERE WE USE DIS SPOS SIGS AS OPPOSED TO SENTENCE. IT'S
SOMETHING I CAN ABSOLUTELY FORWARD TO YOUR HONORS IF YOU LIKE. JUSTICE MICHAEL
NORIEGA: ARE YOU SULTHING THERE ARE CASES THAT EXIST THAT EQUATE BOTH, ADJUDICATED
DELINQUENCY AND CONVICTIONS ARE IDENTICAL. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: IDENTICAL FOR
TERMS OF STATUTORY PURPOSE NOT NECESSARILY FOR THE PUNITIVE CONTEXT THEY MAY BE IN AND
I WOULD POINT YOUR HONORS TO THE GAP TIME CASE THAT I CITED TO YOU EARLIER.
JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: THAT WAS APPLYING GAP TIME TO BOTH ADULT CONVICTIONS AND
ADJUDICATIONS BUT THAT WASN'T NECESSARY LEASE SUGGESTING THAT THEY WERE EQUIVALENT OR EQUAL
IN TERMS OF THE LANGUAGE, RIGHT? KAILI E. MATTHEWS: ANNOUNCE, I AM NOT
IMPLYING THEY ARE EQUIVALENT FOR TERMS OF OTHER PURPOSES OF -- JUSTICE MICHAEL
NORIEGA: THAT COULD BE THE RESULT. IF WE READ IN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT INTO
SUBSECTION F, FOR FUTURE PURPOSES, OTHERS COULD NOW LOOK BACK AND SAY WELL THE COURT USED
CONVICTION HERE TO MEAN ADJUDICATED DELINQUENCY, THEREFORE, WE CAN NOW USE IT IN A NEW
SITUATION GOING FORWARD BECAUSE THE COURT HAS READ IT IN AS IDENTICAL TO CONVICTION.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I THINK IT WOULD HAVE TO COME WITH A PLETHORA OF OTHER
ANALYSIS CEASE THAT GO INTO THAT INCLUDING WHAT I AM ASKING THIS COURT TO DO HERE WHICH IS
TO LOOK AT THE LEGISLATIVE EVEN TENT OF THE WORD AND WHAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED
SPECIFICALLY IN SF SUBSECTION F SO I APPRECIATE YOUR HONOR SAYING IT, THIS ONE LINE COULD BE
CITED IN A FUTURE LINE IN ORDER TO EQUATE THE TWO AND THAT COULD HAVE A. BUT
THAT IS SOMETHING YOU DON'T HAVE TO REACH HERE IN THIS REMEDIAL SCHEME WHEN WE LOOK AT THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND. JUSTICE PATTERSON: ARE YOU SAYING IN ESSENCE THAT
WHEN IT IS USED TASH DASH THE LEGISLATURE HAS, AT TIMES, USED CONVICTION TO BE A SHORTHAND
FOR CONVICTION OR ADJUDICATION AND PERHAPS IT SHOULDN'T HAVE, BUT IT DOESN'T OAE OAE VINS
A LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO MAKE THAT DISTINCTION. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: THAT'S
A FAIR ASSESSMENT. I THINK IT'S INDICATIVE IN OTHER PORTIONS OF THE MEGAN'S LAW STATUTE
ITSELF. JUSTICE PATTERSON: IS THAT WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT IS AND I AM NOT FAMILIAR
WITH THIS GAP TIME CASE JUST TO BE CLEAR, I HAVEN'T READ IT. IS YOUR ARGUMENT
THAT THERE IT WAS INTENDED TO BE A SHORTHAND IN THAT STATUTE AND THAT'S THE WAY THE COURT
THAT YOU CITED TO, IN THE CASE THAT YOU CITED TO US SAW IT TO BE. KAILI E.
MATTHEWS: I DON'T WANT TO MISREPRESENT THE EXACT HOLDING OF STATE V. FRANKLIN BUT IT DOES
SEEM TO APPLY. THE COURT: LOOK AT THE MEGAN'S LAW STATUTE ITSELF THAT WE'RE
WRESTLING WITH BRAUS THERE ARE OF COURSE WHERE ELSE, YOU SAID LOOK AT B 4, WHAT OTHER
SECTIONS WOULD YOU ASK US TO LOOK TO. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I WOULD POINT TO
A SECTION THAT JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS POINTED OUT EARLIER THAT IS 72 E AND I WANT TO MAKE
A CLARIFICATION ON SOMETHING PETITIONER RESPONDED TO SAYING THE SECOND SENTENCE OF SUBSECTION
E ONLY APPLIES TO THOSE WHO ARE PACED ON A PREVIOUS CONVICTION BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF
MEGAN'S LAW OR COME FROM AN OUT OF STATE, THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THAT TUESDAY NT READ
THAT WAY AND IT'S NEVER BEEN APPLIED THAT WAY IT'S ALL THOSE REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER
B 2 AND B 3. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: DOES SUBSECTION E HELP YOUR ARGUMENT
BECAUSE ALTHOUGH SUBSECTION E USES THE PHRASE A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER AND THEN LATER
USES A TERM CONVICTION, SUBSECTION E CROSS REFERENCES B THE AND 3 WHERE THE PHRASE, AD
JUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY OR ACQUITTAL BY REASON OF INSANITY ARE PRESENT. KAILI
E. MATTHEWS: NO, YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE WHEN WE READ IN ITS ENTIRETY IT FWINS WITH A PERSON
REQUIRED TO REGISTER AND THEN USES THE TERM CONVICTION AND SO IF WE PARSE OUT INDIVIDUAL
PORTIONS OF THIS SENTENCE WE CAN CERTAINLY COME TO AN INTERPRETATION ON EITHER END OF
IT BUT WHEN YOU READ THAT SENTENCE AS A WHOLE IT IS IDENTICAL IN HOW IT IS CON INSTRUCTED
TO SUBSECTION F. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: SUCCESS SECTION F HAS NO CROSS
REFERENCE TO OTHER SECTIONS THAT REFER TO TO. DO YOU SEE WHAT I'M SAYING?
THIS SECTION E DISCUSSES THE ADDRESS VERIFICATION FOR REGISTRANT'S AND
WHAT MUST HAPPEN WITH REGARD TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION AN UPDATING THEIR ADDRESS, BUT
THIS SECTION VERY CLEARLY REFERS BACK TO SUBSECTION B 1, SUBSECTION B 3, SUBSECTION B
2 AND SUBSECTION B 2 AND B 3 BOTH SPEAK WITH A CONVICTION, ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY
OR ACQUITTAL BY REASON OF INSANITY. SUBSECTION F HAS NO SUCH CROSS REFERENCE.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: PERHAPS A BETTER RESPONSE TO YOUR HONOR'S QUESTION IS
IT DOES BUT IT IS A TWO-PART ANALYSIS IF WE LOOK AT IT THIS WAY. JUSTICE
PIERRE-LOUIS: SUBSECTION F DOES. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT. TO
CLARIFY WHAT I MEAN BY THAT IT BEGINS WITH A RERN REQUIRED TO RENL STER A TERM THAT'S
ALREADY DEFINED IN 72 A SO FIRST WE LOOK TO 72 A WHICH THEN POINTS US TO THOSE SUBSECTION
OF 72 B 'IT'S A TWO PART STEP, FAB FAB WHY WOULD SUBSECTION E HAVE TO THEN CROSS REFERENCE
SUBSECTION B IF JUST SAYING A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER TAKES YOU TO THAT POSITION AN
INCLUDES ANYONE. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: I AM NOT TRYING TO IMPLY IT WAS THE
MOST ARTFUL WAY TO CONSTRUCT THIS. MY POINT WAS TO SAY OTHER PORTIONS USED THIS TERM
AND FEE APPLY THAT CONVICTION TO OM APPLY TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED OF AN
ENUMERATED SEX DECHLS BUT NOT THOSE REQUIRED TO RENL STER IT WOULD LEAD A GAP IN THIS
PORTION OF THE STATUTE. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: THIS PORTION.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: SUBSECTION E. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: IT DOESN'T BECAUSE
IT REFERS BACK TO INDIVIDUALS WHO -- IT REFERS BACK TO A PERSON REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER
PAR FWRAF 1 OF SUBSECTION B OR UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF SUBSECTION B AN THEN, AGAIN, IN THE
SECOND SENTENCE UN PARAGRAPH 2 OF SUBSECTION B SO, FWEN, THERE IS A CROSS REFERENCE THERE.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS:
I AM REALLY ASKING BECAUSE I AM TRYING TO MAKE SENSE, AS WELL, AS TO WHAT THIS SUBSECTION
IS STATING IN RELATION TO TO SUBSECTION F AN HOW IT'S CONSTRUCTED. KAILI E.
MATTHEWS: THE PORTION THAT COMES AFTER THAT ON THE BASIS OF A CONVICTION THAT'S WHAT I
AM REFERENCING SEEMS TO IMPLY IT WOULD ONLY BE THOSE IN B 2, B 3 WHO ARE REQUIRED TO
REGISTER UNDER B 2 AND B 3 UNDER THE BASIS OF A CONVICTION. MY UNDERSTANDING IS IT HAS
NEVER BEEN INTERPRETED TO APPLY THAT WAY. OF COURSE THEY ARE NOT BINDING ON THIS COURT
BUT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FWIED LINES DON'T INTERPRET IT THAT WAY AND I THINK IF IT WAS
INTERPRETED THAT WAY, IT WOULD LEAVE A GAP IN THE CREDIT WHEREBY THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED
OF ONE OF THOSE ENUMERATED OFFENSES HAVE A TIMETABLE BY WHICH THEY NEED TO REGISTER.
THIS WAS ENACTED BEFORE THE TIERING PROCESS TO MY UNDERSTANDING, WHICH MORE THOROUGHLY
LAYS OUT THE REQUIREMENTS AN TIME LINES TO REGISTER BUT IT WOULD REFLECT A GAP IN THE
CREDIT WHEREBY THOSE WHO ARE ADJUDICATED TLIN CONSEQUENT OR NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSTANT
HAVE A REQUIREMENT TO RENL STER, PUNITIVE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY DON'T REGISTER BUT NOT
CLARIFICATION ON WHEN THEY NEED TO REGISTER SO IT WOULD CREATE THIS KEEPD OF GAP THAT
WOULD LEAD TO A BLANK RESULT. SO IMPLYING CONVICTION HERE TO ONLY READ TO
THOSE WHO ARE CONVICTED OF AN ENUMERATED SEX OFFENSE WOULD THEN IMPACT THESE PORTION OF
THE SAME EXACT STATUTE LEAVING THE SAME GAPS IN THE SAME STATUTE. CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER: COUNSEL CAN I ASK YOU ABOUT A DIFFERENT AREA. WE HAVE FOCUSED ON THE
WORD CONVICTION. ARE ANY JUVENILES WHO ARE WAIVED UP AN PROSECUTED IN ADULT
COURT AN CONVICTED SENTENCED TO A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT. KAILI E.
MATTHEWS: IN TERMS OF THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, MY RESPONSE I THINK WOULD
NEED TO BE YES. IF I'M UNDERSTANDING YOUR HONOR'S QUESTION, CORRECTLY, IN THE
SENSE THAT IF THEY ARE WAIVED UP THEY ARE THEN SUBJECT TO THE PUNITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF
ADULT COURT IS THAT A FAIR RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION, YOUR HONOR? AND SO,
I THINK WHAT YOUR HONOR IS GETTING TO, POSSIBLY THE SECOND PORTION OF THE RELEASE FROM
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, THAT TERM RELEASE FROM A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY IS USED IN OTHER
PORTIONS OF MEGAN'S LAW. I THINK THE TERM USE IS USED IN FRONT OF IT. SO I AM NOT IMPLYING
THAT IT, AGAIN, WAS THE MOST ARTFUL TERM OF IT BUT IF WE'RE ONLY LOOKING AT THIS FROM
A. THE COURT: I AM JUST TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT THE LAY OF THE LAND IS.
ARE THERE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE A JUVENILE CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS IN A CORRECTIONAL FACILITY. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: WITHOUT KNOWING
ALL OF THE INS AN OUTS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD, I AM NOT
CERTAIN, YOUR HONOR. I KNOW THERE ARE INSTANCES WHERE THERE IS AN INDETERMINATE
AMOUNT OF TIME THAT THEY ARE SUBJECT TO. THE COURT: I THINK WE CAN ASK PROFESSOR
COHEN LATER. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: JUST A FEW MORE THINGS I WANT TO TOUCH
ON. ONE IS CIRCLING BACK TO. THE COURT: I NEED YOU TO TRY TO
CONDENSE YOUR ARGUMENT. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: THERE IS SOMETHING I WANT TO
REFERENCE WITH REGARD TO A QUESTION JUSTICE WAINER APTER APT ASKED WHY WE CAN'T JUST JUMP
OVER THAT FIRST SECTION. I THINK THERE ARE TWO RESPONSES, BUT THE SECOND ONE, WHERE A
LEGISLATURE HAS CLEARLY DEFINED A CATEGORY OR A DEFINITION, IT DOESN'T THEN CONTINUOUSLY
USE THE DEFINITION AFTER IT EM EMPLOYS THAT PHRASE IN FUTURE PARTS OF THE STATUTE AND
I DO THINK THAT IMPLYING THAT A PERSON APPLYING TO REGISTER APPLIES TO YOU, YOU HAVE THE
CONJUNCTIVE WORD AND BUT THEN WE HAD TO REDEFINE WHAT A PERSON REQUIRED TO RENL STER MEANS
IN ORDER FOR THE FIRST PRONG TO APPLY DOES A LITTLE BIT, AGAIN OF MENTAL GYM NAS STICKS
BUT DOES IMPLY THE LEGISLATURE HAD HAD TO REPEAT TA DEFINITION THROUGHOUT. THE
COURT: THE LEGISLATURE DID THAT IN G AND WHEN THEY AMENDED F AFTER INCLUDING THE ADD JUD.
KAILI E. MATTHEWS: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR, AGAIN, THAT WAS ENACTED AT A LATER
TIME WHERE POSSIBLY THERE WAS MORE CONSIDERATION THAN PLACE THE TIME OF THE LANGUAGE THAT WAS
USED BUT THERE ARE OTHER PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE THAT DON'T REQUIRE A PERSON TO REREGISTER
EVERY TIME, THAT THE TERM IS IMPLIED. AND THEN THE LAST POINT I WOULD JUST
LIKE TO MAKE MAKE FOR URNSZS IS THIS HARMONIZATION OF J.G. AND WHETHER OR NOT IT
NEEDS TO BE OVERRULED I THINK THE PETITIONERS ARE ASKING FOR THIS COURT TO OVERRULE J.G.
THEY ARE NOT SIMPLY ASKING IT FOR TO BE HARMONIZED BECAUSE THE HARMONIZATION THAT WAS
HAPPENING WAS WITH RESPECT TO HOW THOSE UNDER 14 WERE TREATED DIFFERENTLY THAN ALL JUVENILES
ADJUDICATE DIFFERENT. THERE WERE NINE JUSTICE THAT LOOKED AT IT THEN, NINE JUSTICE THAT
REEVALUATED IT IN C.K. WHO ALL EVALUATED -- WHO LOOKED AT IT AND SAID THIS DOES APPLY
TO JUVENILES EVEN IF THE QUESTION WASN'T SQUARELY BEFORE IT AND ON THAT LAST POINT I WOULD
JUST NOTE THERE ARE OF COURSE MEMBERS OF THIS COURT WHO ARE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE
ARGUMENTS IN C.K., BUT I DO THINK IT IS A WRONG ASSERTION TO SAY THAT F WASN'T SQUARE
LY RAISED IN C.K., MORE SO WITH REGARDS TO, AS YOUR HONOR SEEMS TO BE INDICATING YOU WANT
TO REFERENCE IN THE NEXT CASE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS, BUT IF YOU WATCH
THE ORAL ARGUMENT AT C.K. THE ISSUE OF SUBSECTION F WAS DIRECTLY BROUGHT UP BY THE PETITIONERS,
C.K. HIMSELF AND THE AMICI WHO WERE SUPPORTING C.K. JUSTICE PATTERSON: WITH
NO REFRPS TO THIS ISSUE. KAILI E. MATTHEWS: WITHOUT REFERENCE TO WHETHER
THE CONVICTION APPLIED BUT REFERENCE TO HOW IT OPERATED AND AT THAT POINT THERE WAS ALSO
SUFFICIENT CLARIFICATION FOR THE COURT -- AT ARGUMENT BEFORE THE OPINION, OF COURSE WAS
ISSUED ABOUT HOW HG WAS OPERATING. THE COURT: WE HAVE TO. KAILI E.
MATTHEWS: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR, I AM NOT USING THE ARGUMENT IN PLACE OF THE OPINION. I
SIMPLY MEAN WHEN IT'S REFERENCED IN C.K., THAT I THINK IT'S A FAIR ASSESSMENT TO SAY THAT
THE COURT WAS AWARE HOW F WAS OPERATING BASED OFF THE ARGUMENTS THAT WERE PRESENTED TO
IT AT ARGUMENT AN THE QUESTIONS TONDED TO IT. THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL.
MR. DEB, DO YOU WANT MR. BROSSE, DO YOU WANT TO OFFER A BRIEF REBUTTAL.
JESSE M. DE BROSSE: I JUST WANT TO DIRECT THE COURT TO OUR PETITION, PAGES 9 AND 10,
THERE ARE TWO APPELLATE DIVISION CASES THAT DISCUSS THAT ISSUE AND THERE EXISTS, A
DECISION BY THIS COURT IN, I BELIEVE IT'S D J B, 2014, IT'S NOT CITED IN OUR BRIEF AND
I APOLOGIZE FOR THAT BUT IT ALSO DISCUSSES THAT SO UNLESS THE COURT. JUSTICE
WAINER APTER: CAN YOU SAY THE CASE NAME AGAIN. JESSE M. DE BROSSE: D J B,
2014. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: THANK YOU COUNSEL, THANK YOU TO ALL COUNSEL
FOR THE VERY, VERY HELPFUL ARGUMENTS.