APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL (APPEARANCES TENDERED.) CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
GOOD AFTERNOON, COUNSEL AND WELCOME. MR. RIB, PLEASE RICKY, MR. RICOBONO,
PLEASE. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: THANK YOU, CHIEF JUSTICE IF I COULD RESERVE
A FEW MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL I WOULD APPRECIATE IT. THE COURT: THAT'S FINE.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONORS AND MAY IT PLEASE THE
COURT MENT. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S DECISION AN
HOLD THAT THE CHAPTER 212 AMENDMENTS OF THE NEW JERSEY WAGE THEFT ACT DO THE NOT APPLY
RETROACTIVELY TO VIOLATIONS OF THE WAGE PAYMENT LAW AN THE WAGE HOUR LAW THAT OCCURRED
PRIOR TO THE AUGUST 6TH, 2019 EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS. THIS CASE
IS ABOUT WHAT IT MEANS FOR A STATUTE TO BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. FORTUNATELY, NUMEROUS
DECISIONS FROM THIS COURT HAVE ALREADY CLEARLY AN CONSISTENTLY ANSWERED THIS QUESTION
BY HOLDING THAT A LAW OF WILL HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT IF IT EITHER ONE, APPLIES TO EVENTS
OCCURRING BEFORE ITS ENACTMENT OR, TWO, CHANGES THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACTS COMPLETED
BEFORE ITS EFFECTIVE DATE. IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE APPELLATE
DIVISION'S DECISION DOES BOTH OF THOSE THINGS WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS THAT
PREDATE THE AUGUST 6TH 2019 EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS. WITH RESPECT TO
THESE CLAIMS, THE EFFECT OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S DECISION WAS TWOFOLD:
FERS, IT REVIVED DEAD CLAIMS UNDER THE WAGE AN HOUR LAW WHICH WERE TIME BARRED WHEN
PLAINTIFF'S FILED THEIR COMPLAINT. SECOND, IT ALLOWS PLAINTIFFS TO RECOVER
CATEGORIES IN AMOUNTS OF DAMAGES WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO THEM AT THE TIME THOSE CLAIMS
ACCRUED. THE APPELLATE DIVISION THEREFORE APPLIED THE AMENDMENTS TO EVENTS
WHICH OCCURRED BEFORE ITS EFFECTIVE DATE, BUT MS CHANGING THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THOSE
EVENTS, AS WELL. IN DOING SO, THE APPELLATE DIVISION MISTAKENLY RELIED ON
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN HILDRETH AND HELD THAT IT WAS NOT APPLYING THE AMENDMENTS
RETROACTIVELY. MAKE NO MISTAKE, YOUR HONORS, THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF A STATUTE LOOKS LIKE AND THIS CASE IS NOT HILDRETH. THE QUESTION
I WOULD POSE TO THE COURT IS THIS: IF WHAT THE APPELLATE DECISION DID HERE WAS NOT RETRO
ACTIVE APPLICATION, THEN WHAT WOULD RETRO APPLICATION LOOK LIKE? IF THE
ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS THE SAME AS WHAT THE PLAINTIFFS HERE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CALL
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION, THEN WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE APPELLATE DIVISION RETROACTIVELY
APPLIED THE AMENDMENTS. AS A RESULT, IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON THE APPELLATE DIVISION
TO FIRST CONSIDER THE THREE FACTORS THAT THIS COURT IN KROOUZ, JAMES AN OTHERS HAS HELD
GOVERN WHETHER A STATUTE CAN BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. THE APPELLATE
DIVISION DID NOT CONSIDER ANY OF THESE FACTORS. HAD IT DONE SO, IT WOULD HAVE CONCLUDED
THAT THE AMENDMENTS DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY. THERE ARE THREE REASONS WHY
THIS IS SO. FIRST, THE LANGUAGE THE LEGISLATURE USED REGARDING THE EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS, THAT IS, QUOTE, THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY IS LANGUAGE
THAT THIS COURT HAS LONG HELD INDICATES THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED ONLY PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE. SECOND, THE AMENDMENTS MAKE SUBSTANTIVE AND NOT
MERELY CURATIVE CHANGES TO THE LAW. THE AMENDMENTS CREATE A KNEW CAUSE OF ACTION,
THEY EXPAND THE TIME PERIOD UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF CAN SEEK RECOVERY AN THEY PERMIT PLAINTIFFS
TO RECOVER NEW TYPES OF DAMAGES NOT PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE TO THEM. THESE CANNOT
BE FAIRLY CONSIDERED AS MERELY CURATIVE CHANGES TO THE LAW. THIRD AND FINALLY,
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SUGGEST THAT ANY OF THE PARTIES HAVE ANY EX SPENT TAGS
THAT THE EXPECTATION THAT THE AMENDMENTS WOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. SO
WITH THESE POINTS IN MIND, YOUR HONORS, THIS CASE PRESENTS THE COURT WITH AN OPPORTUNITY
TO REAFFIRM THAT WHEN THE LEGISLATURE EVEN ACTS LEGISLATION THAT CHANGES THE LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES OF ACTS THAT TRANSPIRED BEFORE THE LAW'S EFFECTIVE DATE, COURT'S MUST CONDUCT
A THREE-STEP ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE IF SUCH LEGISLATION APPLIES RETROACTIVELY.
TO HOLD OTHERWISE WOULD UNDER CUT DECADES OF PRIOR NEW JERSEY DECISIONS AN PRECEDENT AND
RENDER OBSOLETE THIS COURT'S WELL ESTABLISHED RETROACTIVE ANALYSIS AS SET FORTH IN JAMES,
KROOUZ AND OTHERS. THOSE ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF MY ARGUMENT TODAY. YOUR
HONOR'S WITH THE COURT'S PERMISSION, I WOULD LIKE TO GO INTO A LITTLE BIT MORE DETAIL WITH
RESPECT TO EACH OF THEM. I AM HAPPEN ME TO PAUSE HERE AND ANSWER ANY IMMEDIATE
QUESTIONS. THE COURT: THE PROVISION, SECTION 25.1 STATUTE PROPOSE OR A
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND DOES IT MATTER. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: IT IS A
STATUTE OF REPOSE YOUR HONOR. I THINK IT DOES PARTY BECAUSE IT OPERATES AS A STATUTE
OF REPOSE AN AS WE KNOW, STATUTES OF REPOSE OPERATE TO ESSENTIALLY DECLARE INVALID A
CLAIM AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME HAS PASSED. THE EFFECT OF THAT AS OUR AMICI HAS ARGUED IN
THEIR BRIEF IS THAT AFTER A PASSAGE OF TIME, THOSE CLAIMS ARE SIMPLY DECLARED INVALID.
THEY ARE NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE LAW. THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S DECISION HERE
HAS THE EFFECT OF REVOOIFG THOSE CLAIMS. ESSENTIALLY CREATING NEW CLAIMS THAT WERE
OTHERWISE INVALID AS OF THE DATE THE PLAINTIFF'S FILED THEIR COMPLAINT. THE
COURT: HELP ME UNDERSTAND THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE. INDEPENDENT THAT IS THE POSITION
AND HOW THE APPELLATE DIVISION TREATED THE LANGUAGE AS WELL. STATUTES OF REPOSE TRIG
FWERD FROM A DATE EVENT CERTAIN, THE BUILDING WAS FULLY CONSTRUCTED AN CONSTRUCTION WAS
COMPLETE. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PIVOTED OFF OF THE ACCRUAL DATE. HERE WE HAVE LANGUAGE
THAT SAYS NO CLAIM FOR UNPAID MINIMUM WAGES DOT, DOT, DOT SHALL BE VALID WITH RESPECT TO
SUCH CLAIM THAT HAS ARISEN MORE THAN SIX YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION.
WHAT DOES ARISEN MEAN IN THAT CONTEXT. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO:
I THINK IT WOULD BE ON THE DATE THE WAGES -- THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO PAY THOSE WAGES.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: THAT SOUNDS LIKE ACCRUAL AND IT SOUNDS LIKE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS. EXPLAIN WHY THAT IS INCORRECT? MICHAEL J.
RICCOBONO: I THINK BECAUSE WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE CHAPTER 212 AMENDMENTS, IT TALKS ABOUT
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION. RIGHT? IN MY MINE WE LOOK AT THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE ACTION, THE DATE THE COMPLAINT IS FILED IN COURT, WE GO BACK THE PERIOD OF TIME,
WHATEVER THE STATUTE OF REPOSE MAY BE, TWO YEARS OR SIX YEARS. I THINK THE ISSUE IN THIS
CASE AN THE QUESTION IN THIS CASE IS WHEN THAT PERIOD OF TIME GOES BACK BEYOND THE EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE STATUTE, THAT'S WHEN THE RETROACTIVE ANALYSIS COMES IN TO PLAY BECAUSE IT
OPERATES AS A STATUTE OF REPOSE, THOSE CLAIMS WERE LEGALLY DECLARED INVALID AFTER A PERIOD
OF TIME. PREVIOUSLY THE STATUTE OF REPOSE WAS TWO YEARS. IT'S NOW BEEN
EXPANDEDED TO SIX YEARS. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: HOW DO WE KNOW THIS IS A
STATUTE OF REPOSE AN NOT A STATUTE OF LIMITATION? READING THE STATUTE T ITSELF
IT DOESN'T SAY THIS IS A STATUTE OF REPOSE, NOT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. WHERE
IN THE LANGUAGE DO WE SEE THIS IS A STATUTE OF REPOSE? WHAT IS THE WORD
OR WORDS WE SHOULD LOOK AT. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I THINK IT IS WHERE IT
SAYS NO CLAIM SHALL BE VALID. I THINK THAT'S THE LANGUAGE WE FOCUS ON WHEN WE LOOK AT
IS IT A STATUTE OF REPOSE OR NOT. COMBIEND WITH THE LANGUAGE OF AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION. JUSTICE PATTERSON: BUT THAT'S DIFFERENT THAN
THE -- I WOULD SAY THE BEST, MOST FAMILIAR STATUTE OF REPOSE WE HAVE IN NEW JERSEY IS
THE CONSTRUCTION STATUTE OF REPOSE AND IT IS A TEN-YEAR STATUTE AN THE LANGUAGE IN THAT
IS DIFFERENT FROM THIS IS IT NOT REK RICKY IT IS. ULTIMATELY WHETHER IT IS
A CONSIDERED A STATUTE OF REPOSE OR A STATUTE OF LIMITATION, I DON'T THINK IT L ULTIMATE
LY AFFECTS GOING THROUGH THE THREE PRONG ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN CRUISE OR JAMES. IT SETS
FOT WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THE STATUTE TO BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. I
THINK IT IS MORE EE GRUJ YOUS IF IT IS CONSIDERED A STATUTE OF REPOSE. JUSTICE
WAINER APTER: YOU MENTIONED THAT THAT IS WHAT THE APPELLATE DIVISION DID HERE IS THEY
REVIVED DEAD CLAIMS UNDER THE WAGE AN HOUR LAW BUT IN THIS CASE I DON'T SEE ANY DEAD CLAIMS.
ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS STARTED WORKING IN APRIL OF 2019 AN ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS STARTED
WORKING IN APRIL OF 2020, SO WHICH OF THE DLAMS WERE ALREADY DEAD UNDER THE TATTOO OF
LIMITATIONS ON AUGUST 6TH OF 2019. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: THERE IS A SHORT
PERIOD OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFF MY YEAH, HE ALLEGED THAT HIS UNPAID OVERTIME BEGAN ON MAY
2019. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: CORRECT, BUT THAT CLAIM HAD A TWO YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AT THAT TIME SO HOW IS IT DEAD ON AUGUST 6TH OF 2019, ONLY A FEW
MONTHS LATER. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: IT IS NOT DEAD THEN IT WAS DEAD AS OF THE
TIME THE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR COMPLAINT, APRIL 13TH OF 2022, SO FROM THE PERIOD OF MAY
2019 TO AUGUST 6TH, 2019, SO IT'S A FOUR-MONTH PERIOD THERE, THOSE ARE THE CLAIMS THAT WERE
DEAD AS OF THE DATE THE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR COMPLAINT. ANY CLAIMS THAT
AROSE ON AUGUST 6TH, 2019 OR AFTER, WE ACKNOWLEDGE AN WE AGREE THOSE CLAIMS CAN
VALIDLY BE PURSUED BY THE PLAINTIFFS HERE. THAT WOULD BE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
EXPANDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOW. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: WHEN YOU'RE USING
THE WORD REVIVAL OF A DEAD CLAIM, IT GENERALLY MEANS A CLAIM FOR WHICH THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS HAD ALREADY RUN, THEN THERE IS AN AMENDMENT THE TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
AFTERWARDS THAT SOMEHOW ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE IT. HERE, THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN.
THE CLAIM HAD NOT RUN AT THE TIME THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS AMENDED
SO THERE WAS NO DEAD CLAIM AS OF AUGUST 6TH, 2019, WHICH IS WHEN THE LEGISLATURE DECIDED
WE DON'T WANT THIS TO BE A TWO YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ANYMORE, NOW WE WANT THIS TO BE
A SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: WE HAVE TO LOOK
AT BOTH WHEN THE CLAIM ACCRUED CAN AS OF THE TIME THE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR COMPLAINT
IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CHAPTER 212 AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE APPLIED TO CLAIMS THAT
AROSE OR ACCRUED PRIOR TO AUGUST 6TH, 2019; THAT'S WHERE I THINK WE HAVE TO LOOK AT.
DID THE LEGISLATURE INTEND FOR THAT EXPANDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR DID
THE LEGISLATURE INTEND FOR PLAINTIFFS TO BE AVAILABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT EXPANDED
STATUTE OF LIMITATION -- I SAID STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR CLAIMS
THAT ACCRUED PRIOR TO THAT AUGUST 6TH, 2019, EFFECTIVE DATE. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: YOU AGREE THAT AT THE TIME THE NEW STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WENT INTO EFFECT ON
AUGUST 6TH, 2019, THERE WERE NO DEAD CLAIMS TO REVIVE? MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO:
CORRECT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: I POSE A MORE IF YOU UNDERSTAND MANY TAL
ONE, BACK IN APRIL AN MAY, EMPLOYERS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE RULES WERE THIS AND THAT THEY
WERE SUBJECT TO PENALTIES POTENTIALLY FOR VIOLATING THOSE RULES YOU CAN'T CHANGE THEM
AFTER THE FACT THE. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: YOU'RE EXACTLY RIGHT.
JUSTICE PATTERSON: AN YOU DISTINGUISH I ASSUME, HILDRETH, NOT I ASSUME, I UNDERSTAND,
BASED UPON THE LANGUAGE IN THE SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE THAT WAS CITED IN HILDRETH THAT
SPECIFICALLY SAID IT APPLIES TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO, ON OR AFTER
THE DATE. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: EXACTLY. THAT'S EXACTLY WHERE I WAS GOING
INTO NEXT. SINCE THE APPELLATE DIVISION BASED IT'S ENTIRE DECISION ON
HILDRETH, I WANT WANTED TO START OUR DISCUSSION THERE BY HIGHLIGHTING SOME OF THE KEY
DIFFERENCES IN HILDRETH AS COMPARED TO -- IN HILDRETH AND THE STATUTE AT ISSUE IN HILDRETH
WITH THE STATUTE HERE. SO, THE FIRST KEY DIFFERENCE IS THE LEGISLATURE IN
HILDRETH WITH RESPECT TO THE CHILD SEX AN ABUSE ACT, THEY EXPLICITLY MADE THAT STATUTE
AN THE AMENDMENT TO THAT STATUTE RETROACTIVE. THE LANGUAGE THAT THEY USED THERE WAS THAT
THE LAW WOULD APPLY TO CONDUCT THAT, QUOTE, OCCURRED PRIOR TO, ON OR AFTER THE EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS. THAT IS NOT THE LANGUAGE THE LEGISLATURE USED HERE.
INSTEAD, THE LEGISLATURE USED THE SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY LANGUAGE,
WHICH, AS THE COURT IS WELL AWARE, HAS LONG BEEN HELD TO INDICATE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
ONLY. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: AND OF COURSE, IN HILDRETH, WE WEREN'T ACTUALLY
ASKED ANYTHING ABOUT THE C S AA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, ITSELF WHICH AS YOU JUST POINTED
OUT THE LEGISLATURE EXPLICITLY MADE RETROACTIVE. INSTEAD WE WERE ASKED TO
INTERPRET AN AMENDMENT TO THE T C A THAT MADE A NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT NO LONGER
REQUIRED. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: CORRECT. THE COURT DID NOT
NEED TO ENGAGE -- IN HILDRETH, THE COURT DID NOT NEED TO ENGAGE IN THE THREE-FACTOR ANALYSIS
SET FORTH IN KROOUZ AND JAMES BECAUSE IT WAS ALREADY ACCEPTED BY VIRTUE OF THE LANGUAGE
THE LEGISLATURE USED IN PASSING THE AMENDMENT TO THE CSAA THAT IT WAS EFFECTIVE SO YOU
DIDN'T NEED TO GO DOWN THAT ROAD MARIJUANA MARIJUANA BECAUSE, AGAIN, IN HILDRETH WE
WEREN'T LOOKING AT THE CSAA LANGUAGE WHERE YOU'RE RIGHT WE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD TO ENGAGE
IN ANY ANALYSIS. WE WERE LOOKING AT A SEPARATE AMENDMENT THE TO THE T C A THAT DID NOT
ALSO SAY THIS APPLIES RETROACTIVELY IN THESE EXACT TERMS. MICHAEL J.
RICCOBONO: WHICH TRANSITIONS INTO THE NEXT KEY DIFFERENCE IN HILDRETH, WHICH IS THE COURT
IN THAT CASE WAS TRYING TO RECONCILE TWO STATUTORY TORE REAMENDMENTS WE HAD THE CSAA
AND THE T C A AN IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT OF EXPANDING THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS UNDER THE CSAA THE ONLY SENSIBLE READING OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE T C A
IS THAT IT WOULD APPLY TO THE ACTION AT LAW. THERE WAS A DISPUTE IN THAT CASE,
I BELIEVE THE HILDRETH CLAIM ACCRUED IN 2016, HE FILED HIS COMPLAINT IN 2020, THERE WAS
NO DISPUTE BEFORE THE COURT WHETHER HIS CSAA CLAIM WAS TIMELY THE SOLE DISPUTE WAS DID
HE HAVE TO STILL FILE THE T C A NOTICE AN IN ORDER TO GIVE BOTH V THOSE STATUTES THE
EFFECT THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT WAS THE ONLY SENSIBLE READING OF THOSE TWO STATUTES.
HAVING TO RECONCILE THOSE TWO STATUTES I THINK IS ANOTHER KEY DIFFERENCE IN
HILDRETH. IN THIS CASE WE'RE NOT HAVING INFORM RECONCILE TWO DIFFERENT STATUTES. WE'RE
NOT HAVING TO DEAL WITH ONE STATUTE THAT AFFECTS THIS TYPE OF LANGUAGE AN THEN COMPARING
IT AGAINST A STATUTE THAT AFFECTS DIFFERENT TYPES OF LANGUAGE HERE SO THAT'S ANOTHER KEY
DIFFERENCE THAT I THINK SETS THIS CASE APART FROM HILDRETH. THE LAST KEY DIFFERENCE
THAT I WOULD HIGHLIGHT FROM HILDRETH IS THE TCA AMENDMENT AT ISSUE THERE, IT WAS PURELY
A PROCEDURAL OR JURISDICTIONAL CHANGE IN THE STATUTE. UNLIKE THE AMENDMENTS HERE, THAT
TCA AMENDMENT, IT DIDN'T CREATE NEW CLAIMS. IT DIDN'T CHANGE THE FINANCIAL PENALTIES
OR IMPOSE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS. IT DIDN'T CREATE ANY REBUTTAL PRESUMPTIONS FENCE THE EMPLOYER
IF THEY DO OR DO NOT DO CERTAIN THINGS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. IT SIMPLY DIDN'T
AFFECT ANY SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES LIKE THE AMENDMENTS DO HERE. SO,
FOR THOSE THREE REASONS, I THINK THOSE ARE THE MAIN THREE REASONS WHY HILDRETH IS TWISH
ABDOMINAL AND WHY THE APPELLATE DIVISIONERED IN RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON THE HOLDING IN
HILDRETH. IT SHOULD HAVE, AS I MENTIONED BEFORE ENGAGED IN THE THREE-FACTOR
ANALYSIS. I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH ON THOSE THREE FACTORS BRIEFLY NOW. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: JULG, JUST BEFORE YOU GET THERE, HILDRETH DIDN'T DO ANYTHING TO CHANGE THE
RETROACTIVITY IN THE ANALYSIS OF JAMES BECAUSE THE PRESUMES TASH DASH THE FIRST QUESTION
ASKED IN JAMES IS WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO FWIF A STATUTE RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION. IF WE WERE TO ASK THAT QUESTION IN HILDRETH THE ANSWER WOULD BE YES AN THAT
WOULD BE THE END OF THE ISSUE. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: CORRECT, HILDRETH IN
NO WAY SHAPE OR FORM CHANGED THE WAY THIS COURT HAS HISTORILY LOOKED AT OR ANALYZED WHETHER
A STATUTE CAN BE AMRIEZED RETROACTIVELY. I KNOW IT WAS AN ARGUMENT THAT THE
DEFENDANT RAISED IN THE HILDRETH CASE BUT OUR VIEW OF HILDRETH CASE IS IT REALLY HAD
NOTHING TO DO WITH RECEIPT ARE TROE ACTIVE APPLICATION. THERE WAS NO DISPUTE IN THE
DORT THAT THE CSAA CLAIM, THAT'S WHAT WE'RE DEALING WITH CLAIMS HERE, THE CSAA CLAIM
BEFORE THE COURT WAS TIMELY FILED AND THERE WAS NO DISPUTE ABOUT THAT SO THE WHOLE ISSUE
IN HILDRETH WAS HOW DO WE GIVE EFFECT TO THE TCA AMENDMENT IN THAT CASE WITHOUT LEADING
TO AS JUSTICE WAINER APTER PUT IT ABSURD RESULTS AN THE ABSURD RESULT WHICH WOULD HAVE
RESULTED IF YOU DIDN'T BRING ALONG THE TCA AMENDMENT IN THAT CASE WOULD HAVE RESULTED
IN PLAINTIFFS TIMELY FILING CSAA CLAIMS AND THEN THOSE CLAIMS BEING IMMEDIATELY DISMISSED
BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT FILED A TCA NOTICE AT THE TIME THE CLAIM ACCRUED. SO
THAT WAS -- OUR POSITION ON HILDRETH CORRECTLY DECIDED WRONGLY APPLIED BY THE APPELLATE
DIVISION. LOOKING AT THAT FIRST FACTOR JUSTICE PATTERSON HIGHLIGHTED THERE,
DID THE LEGISLATURE IN TEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION, THE CLEAR ANSWER IS NO. THE
COURT REALLY NEEDS TO LOOK NO FURTHER THAN AGAIN, THAT SHALL FA TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY
LANGUAGE, AS THIS COURT HELD IN KROOUZ, QUOTE, THESE WORDS BE SPEAK AN INTENT CONTRARY
TO AN NOT SUPPORT I HAVE OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: ACCEPTING THAT THE LEGISLATURE WANTED THE AMENDMENT TO TAKE EFFECT ON AUGUST 6TH,
2019, CLOP EXCEPTING CLOP. DOESN'T YOUR REASONING ACTUALLY MEAN THAT IT WON'T TAKE
EFFECT UNTIL AUK 6TH, WITH 2025. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: A PLAINTIFF SEEKING
TO RECOVER A WAGE AND HOUR VIOLATION COULD NOT RECOVER AN ENTIRE BENEFIT UNTIL THAT DATE.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THAT WAS THE CHANGE WE'RE TALKING ABOUT, RIGHT?
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: YES. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THE LEGISLATURE
SAID WE WANT A SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AN WE WANT THIS TO GO IN EFFECT IMMEDIATELY
ON AUGUST 6TH, 2019 SO YOU'RE SAYING REALLY STHE SAID THEY WANT THIS TO GO INTO EFFECT
ON AUGUST 6TH, 2025. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: FOR CLAIMS THAT OH ACCRUED AFTER
AUGUST 6TH, 2019 WE DPRAE THEY CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXPANDED DAMAGES THAT ARE NOW
AVAILABLE AN UP TO, UP TO BEING THE KEY PHRASE UP TO THE STATUTE TORE RE. JUSTICE
PATTERSON: THE DAY AFTER, THE CONDUCT THAT IS AT ISSUE THAT THE LEGISLATURE IS ADDRESSING
HAS MUCH MORE SERIOUS RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE EMPLOYER GOING FORWARD BECAUSE, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, THERE IS GOING TO BE THE ENHANCED DAMAGES AN SO FORTH AN PLUS THE EXPANDED STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: AND THAT WOULD BE PROS TEKT I
HAVE APPLICATION. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: BUT THE CONDUCT HAS BEEN BLANK SINCE
1965 CORRECT. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
AUGUST 5TH, 2019, FAILURE TO PAY WAGES HAD ALREADY BEEN ILLEGAL FOR MORE THAN 50 YEARS
ARE, CORRECT? MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
ON THAT DAY, THE EMPLOYER MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT, IF THE I GET CAUGHT, I'LL ONLY HAVE TO PAY
TWO YEARS OF BACK PAY AND THEN ON AUGUST 6TH, THEY FOUND OUT THEY ARE ACTUALLY GOING TO
HAVE TO PAY 6 YEARS OF THAT PAY BUT THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WAS PROHIBITED, THE EMPLOYER
ALWAYS KNEW WAS PROHIBITED SINCE 1965, CORRECT? MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: THAT IS
CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: SO WHAT NOTICE, EXACTLY DID THE
EMPLOYER LACK IN THIS CASE? IT SEEMS LIKE BOTH IN YOUR BRIEF AND SOME OF
THE AMICUS BRIEFS THERE WAS THIS EX POST FACTO TOE CLAUSE TYPE OF ARGUMENT BEING MADE WHERE
THERE IS A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION, THE EMPLOYER LACKED NOTICE. WHAT NOTICE
DID THE EMPLOYER LACK UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WHERE THERE WAS NO -- WE ALREADY
ESTABLISHED, THERE WAS NO DEAD CLIMB CLAIM THAT WAS REVIVED THE EMPLOYER KNEW ALL ALONG
THAT FAILURE TO PAY WAGES WAS ILLEGAL AND AT THE TIME ON AUGUST 5TH OF 2019, THEY KNEW
THAT THERE WAS THIS CLAIM OR, YOU KNOW, THE CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO PAY WAGES SINCE MAY OF
THAT YEAR HAD NOT YET EXPIRED. WHAT NOTICE, EXACTLY DID THE EMPLOYER LACK
THAT WOULD SOMEHOW TURN THIS INTO A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OR AN EX POST FACTO TOE CLAUSE
PROBLEM. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: THE LACK OF NOTICE THAT THE EMPLOYER DID
NOT HAVE IS THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE THAT FOR VIOLATIONS THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO AUGUST 6TH
OF 2019, THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THESE INCREASED PENALTIES FOR THOSE VIOLATIONS.
WHEN WE LOOK AT WHAT THE RETROACTIVE ANALYSIS FOCUS CUSSES ON, IT DOESN'T FOCUS ON
NECESSARILY WHETHER THE CONDUCT HAS ALWAYS BEEN UNLAWFUL OR FOR HOW LONG THE CONDUCT HAS BEEN
UNLAWFUL. WE LOOK AT THE DUE PROCESS PIECE OF THIS AND WE SAY WELL, AS OF AUGUST 5TH,
2019, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS X AN THE DAMAGES WERE Y, AUGUST 26TH, 2019, A DAY
LATER IT IS NOW NEW. THAT WAS THE,. AS AN OUTSIDE COUNSEL, IF
I'M ADVISING A CLIENT AND THEY CALL ME ON AUGUST 5TH AND THEY SAY E MR. RICOBONO, WHAT
ARE THE PENALTIES HERE IF WE GET IN TROUBLE FOR THIS AND I ADVISE THEM IT'S A TWO-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE PENALTIES ARE Y AN THE VERY NEXT DAY WE HAVE A CHANGE IN
THE LAW AN NOW THE APPELLATE DIVISION SAYS THAT THAT LAW APPLIES TO CONDUCT THAT PREDATES
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE LAW THAT IS WHERE IN MY MIND THE DUE PROCESS AN LACK OF NOTICE
CONCERN COMES INTO PLAY; THAT'S REALLY OBL ONLY HALF OF IT THOUGH BECAUSE THE CHAPTER
AMENDMENTS ALSO CREATE A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION, WHERE UNDER THE WAGE PAYMENT LAW PREVIOUSLY
THERE WAS NO CLAIM FOR RETALIATION, NOW, THERE IS. SO, EMPLOYERS PRIOR TO
AUGUST 6TH OF 2019, THAT CLAIM DID NOT EXIST. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: UN THE
WAGE PAYMENT LAW IT SEEMS LIKE YOU HAVE A SEPARATE ISSUE WHICH THERE IS NO STATUTE OF
SIX YEARS IN THE WAGE PAYMENT LAW, CORRECT? THE. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO:
THEY, THE APPELLATE DIVISION MENTIONED THAT AND LIKENED IT TO A BREACH OF CONDUCT CLAIM
AND THAT BEING A SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IN DOING SOME OF MY OWN INDEPENDENT
RESEARCH I BELIEVE THERE IS A D N J CASE HEFR NIN THAT ALSO LIKE KENS THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS TO A WAGE PAYMENT LAW CLAIM TO SIX YEARS SO I AM NOT SURE THAT CONCERN IS
PRESENT WITH RESPECT TO THE WAGE PAYMENT LAW, A GENERAL WAGE PAYMENT LAW CLAIM, BUT CERTAINLY
WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RETALIATION, AS WELL AS THESE REBUTTAL
PRESUMPTIONS THAT THE LAW CREATES. YOU HAVE A REBUTTAL PRESUMPTION NOW THAT
IF THE EMPLOYER DOES NOT KEEP RECORDS FOR UP TO SIX YEARS I THINK THE LAW SAYS THERE IS
A PRESUMES THAT THE EMPLOYEE WORKED THOSE HOURS THAT THEY ARE CLAIMING. PREVIOUSLY, THE RECORD KEEPING REQUIREMENT WAS TWO YEARS SO AN EMPLOYER WHO WAS THE IN
TWO YEARS PRIOR, NOW THEY HAVE A REBUTTAL PRESUMES FWENS THEM THAT THE EMPLOYEE WORKED
HOURS THAT THEY CLAIM THEY DID. JUSTICE WAINER APTER: AGAIN, THAT'S NOT
IMPLICATED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THERE WERE NO RECORDS MORE THAN TWO YEARS OLD ON AUGUST
6TH, RIGHT? MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: AUGUST 6TH -- JUSTICE WAINER
APTER: I UNDERSTAND YOU'RE SAYING THERE COULD BE MANY PROBLEMS WITH DEAD CLAIMS BEING
REVIVED WHERE EMPLOYERS WERE ALLOWED TO THROW OUT ALL OF THE PAPERWORK AN NOW THEY ARE
BEING HARMED FOR DOING THAT BUT THAT IS NOT RELEVANT IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS
WEREN'T WORKING FOR THE DEFENDANT TWO YEARS PRIOR SO THERE WERE NO POSSIBLE RECORDS THAT
THE EMPLOYER COULD HAVE THOUGHT ON AUGUST 5TH THEY COULD THROW OUT AN ON AUGUST 6TH THEY
COULDN'T. THEY WERE ONLY FROM APRIL OF THAT YEAR. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO:
THAT IS RELEVANT IN THIS CASE BUT IT CERTAINLY CAN BE RELEVANT IN OTHER CASES.
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS: IF WE HOLD HERE THAT THESE AMENDMENTS WERE APPLICABLE PRIOR TO AUGUST
6TH, 2019, THAT WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO ANYONE WHO WANTS TO BRING A CLAIM. MICHAEL
J. RICCOBONO: TO CLARIFY IT'S NOT APPLICABLE TO THE TWO NAMEDS PLAINTIFFS, BUT TO THE
CLASS. JUSTICE FASCIALE: DID THE APPELLATE DIVISION DEAL WITH SNA.
I THOUGHT THEY EXPLICITLY SAID, NORMALLY DEALING WITH THESE TWO PLAINTIFFS, NOT THE PUNITIVE
CLASS BECAUSE IT HAD NOT YET BEEN CERTIFIED AM I WRONG ABOUT THAT. MICHAEL J.
RICCOBONO: THE OPINION SAID THEY WERE NOT GOING TO DEVELOP INTO WHETHER THE CLASS WAS
FRAMED APPROPRIATELY WE HAVEN'T GOTTEN THERE YET IN THE CASE. THE COURT:
DOES THIS CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT ASSERT A RETALIATION CLAIM. MICHAEL J.
RICCOBONO: IT DOES NOT SFLFRNLTS TELL US WHY WE WOULD NEED TO ADDRESS IT THEN.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I THINK TAKEN TO IT'S LOGICAL EXTREME IF OTHER COURTS ARE TO RELY
ON THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S DECISION WHERE THERE IS A RETALIATION CLAIM, OUR POSITION
IS THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S DECISION HAS THE EFFECT OF APPLYING THIS LAW RETROACTIVELY.
IT MAY NOT BE AN ISSUE FOR US IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHETHER OTHER
CASES -- I KNOW OTHER CASES MAY ALLEGE THAT CLAIM. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER OTHER CLASS
MEMBERS HERE MAY COME FORWARD AND BRING SUCH A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT HERE SO IT IS
NOT CURRENTLY PLED BUT WE HAVEN'T GOTTEN TO THE CLASS CERTIFICATION STAGE IN THE CASE
JUST YET. JUSTICE PATTERSON: LEAVING ASIDE DUE PROCESS, YOU DO SEE A
PATTERN, DO YOU NOT, IN AMENDMENTS BY THE LEGISLATURE TO CIVIL STATUTES, AN THERE HAVE
BEEN MANY, THAT INCREASE CIVIL PENALTIES, ADDING TREBLE DAMAGES AND THAT THAT IS PERSPECTIVE.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: YES, ABSOLUTELY. JUSTICE PATTERSON:
THAT'S THE PATTERN THAT PERHAPS THE LEGISLATURE IS AVOIDING POTENTIAL DUE PROCESS TAEKS
ON ITS ATTACKS ON IT IS STATUTE BY SAYING FROM THIS DAY FORWARD THE CONDUCT IS GOING TO HAVE
NEW AN MUCH INCREASED PENALTIES EVEN LOOEG ASIDE A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION. MICHAEL
J. RICCOBONO: ABSOLUTELY, YOUR HONOR AND I THINK THE LEGISLATURE WAS KEENLY AWARE OF THAT,
PARTICULARLY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE WE HAVE A 2 HUNDRED PERCENT LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND A
TRIPLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR STATUTE OF REPOSE PERIOD SO YOU'RE ESSENTIAL
LY LOOKING AT NINE TIMES THE AVAILABLE DAMAGES FOR A CLAIM THAT ACCRUED AFTER AUGUST 6TH
OF 2019 IF WE ARE TO GIVE THE STATUTE PROSPECTIVE EFFECT. CIRCLING BACK TO
JUSTICE PATTERSON'S FOCUS ON THE FIRST FACTOR OF THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT IN TEN RETRO
ACTIVE INTERPRETATION, WE GO BACK AN LOOK AT THE LANGUAGE, SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.
I QUOTE IT TO CRUISE BEFORE. I THINK THE BOTTOM LINE IS IF THE LEGISLATURE WANTED THE
AMENDMENTS TO HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT THEY ARE CLEARLY AWARE OF THE LANGUAGE THEY COULD
HAVE USED TO EFFECT THAT. THEY COULD HAVE USED THE LANGUAGE THEY USED IN HILDRETH
IN AMENDING THE CSAA, OCCURRED PRIOR TO, ON OR AFTER; THAT'S NOT THE LANGUAGE THEY USED
HERE. I THINK THIS FIRST FACTOR CLEARLY GOES IN OUR FAVOR. THE
LAST POINT I WILL MAKE ON THE FIRST FACTOR IS I DON'T BELIEVE PLAINTIFFS HAVE KAUMD OUT
TO THE COURT AND I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY CASES IN NEW JERSEY OR ELSEWHERE FOR THAT MATTER
WHICH HAVE INTERPRETED A STAT TOOT CONTAINING THAT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY LANGUAGE
AND NONETHELESS SAID THAT IT APPLIES RETROACTIVELY. I THINK OUR CASES ARE PRETTY
UNIFORM IN HOLDING THAT SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY MEANS PROSPECTIVE ONLY.
THE SECOND FACTOR IN THE ANALYSIS WE LOOK AT IS THE AMENDMENT SUBSTANTIVE OR CURATIVE.
I THINK HERE THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE AMENDMENTS ARE K CURATIVE. THEY DON'T REALLY
CLARIFY OR EXPLAIN A PIECE OF THE LEGISLATION, THEY MAKE REALLY DRASTIC CHANGES. AS I
MENTIONED BEFORE, EXPANDING THREEFOLD THE STATUTE OF REPOSE, NEW TYPES OF DAMAGES, NEW
CAUSES OF ACTIONS. THESE ARE NOT MERELY CURATIVE CHANGES AS OUR CASE LAW AS INTERPRETED
THEM. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: COUNSEL, DO YOU AGREE THAT IT WOULD ONLY
AFFECT COMPLAINTS FILED AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO:
OUR POSITION IS THAT FOR CLAIMS THAT ACCRUED AFTER AUGUST 6TH OF 2019, THOSE PLAINTIFFS
AS TO THOSE CLAIMS CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW CATEGORIES OF DAMAGES, YES.
JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: SO YOUR HYPOTHETICAL WHERE YOU'RE OUTSIDE COUNSEL INSTRUCTING
CLIENTS AN YOUR CLIENTS ARE ASKING YOU QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT IS THE LAW AT THIS TIME.
ISN'T THAT THE IDEA THAT AS OF THAT DATE, AUGUST 6TH, 2019, YOU'RE ADVISING YOUR CLIENTS
AS OF TODAY THIS IS WHAT YOU HAVE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT GOING BACK AS FAR AS SIX YEARS
IF ANY DMRANTS SHOULD ARISE GOING FORWARD THAT HAPPENED WITHIN THE LAST SIX YEARS THESE
ARE YOUR CONCERNS. IT HASN'T HAPPENED YET. IT'S HYPOTHETICAL, AS IN THIS CASE. IT
TOOK SEVERAL YEARS FOR THOSE COMPLAINTS TO ARISE. ISN'T THAT WHAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED
IN TERMS OF LOOKING BACK, THIS IS NOT A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION, BUT MERELY A
CURATIVE WAY TO AMPLIFY THE AMOUNT OF TIME THAT COMPLAINANTS HAVE A CHANCE TO LOOK BACK
TO FILE CLAIMS. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: THE FIRST QUESTION I WOULD ASK
MYSELF IS I WOULD LOOK AT THE STATUTE AN I WOULD SAY DO THE STATUTES APPLIES RETROACTIVELY
SO DO YOU NEED TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT CONDUCT THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO AUGUST 6TH OF 2019
AND DID THE LEGISLATURE INTEND FOR THESE NEW AMENDMENTS TO AFFECT PRIOR CONDUCT, ALREADY
COMPLETED CONDUCT. JUSTICE PATTERSON: THE LEGISLATURE CLEARLY DID IN
TEN THAT. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I WOULD SAY IT USES THE SHALL TAKE EFFECT
IMMEDIATELY LANGUAGE, HERE IS WHAT OUR SUPREME COURT HAS SAID ABOUT THAT LANGUAGE, LOOK
AT THE SECOND FACTOR IS IT CURATIVE OR SUBSTANTIVE AND I WOULD GIVE THEM ADVICE
BASED ON MY INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE AN THE CASE LAW WITH STATUTES CONTAINING PG
SIMILAR LAW AN MY ADVICE WOULD BE THIS LAW DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY. JUSTICE
WAINER APTER: WHAT ABOUT WHERE THE LEGISLATURE INTENTIONALLY CHANGES STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FROM ANY PERIOD OF TIME TO BE LONGER AND ANY COURT IN NEW JERSEY HELD THAT ALSO DOESN'T
FWOE INTO EFFECT UNTIL X NUMBER OF YEARS FROM NOW EVEN THOUGH IT SAYS WHEN YOU READ THE
STATUTE ITSELF THAT IT IS SIX YEARS IT'S NOT ACTUALLY SIX YEARS UNTIL SIX YEARS FROM NOW.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I AM NOT AWARE OF SUCH CASES YOUR HONOR, BUT JUST
TO CLARIFY, WITH RESPECT TO THE IT DOESN'T TAKE EFFECT EFFECT FOR SIX YEARS I DON'T THINK
THAT'S AN ACCURATE WAY TO DESCRIBE OUR POSITION IN THIS DAYS OR HOW THE CHAPTER 212
AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED. ITS OOR FOR CLAIMS THAT ACCRUED AFTER AUGUST 6TH OF
2019, THOSE CLAIMS CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXPANDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THE STATUTE DOESN'T SAY THAT. IT JUST SAYS, NO CLAIM FOR UNPAID
WAGES WHICH HAS ARISEN MORE THAN SIX YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION, ETC.,
ETC. SO WHEN YOU'RE READING IT, YOU SAY, OKAY, THIS CLAIM DID NOT ARISE
MORE THAN 6 YEARS BEFORE THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED. MICHAEL J.
RICCOBONO: SO YOU CAN GET UP TO SIX YEARS. I THINK AT THAT POINT IT IS UP TO SIX YEARS.
YOUR HONOR IS CORRECT THAT UNTIL AUGUST 6TH OF 2025, A PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO
RECOVER THE FULL SIX YEARS AND THAT'S WHY WE'RE HERE TO TODAY TO DETERMINE --
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS BEEN CHANGED,
CORRECT? MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: CORRECT. JUSTICE WAINER APTER:
YOU'RE SAYING THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY CASE THAT SAYS IT DOESN'T APPLY AS OF THE DATE
IT GOES INTO EFFECT ONLY APPLIES AS TO HOW MANY DAYS IN THE FUTURE. MICHAEL J.
RICCOBONO: I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY OF THE SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY WHICH --
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: YOU, EARLY, YER, EARLIER GAVE US AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT YOU WOULD HAVE
PRESCRIBED TO YOUR CLIENT THE DAY BEFORE THIS WENT IN EFFECT WHAT ADVICE ON APRIL 7TH,
2019. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I WOULD SAY FOR VIOLATIONS OF LAW THAT OCCURRED
AFTER AUGUST #E6 OF 2019. THE COURT: NO, WE'RE THE DAY THAT MR. MAIA BEGAN
WORKING FOR YOUR CLIENT, YOUR CLIENT CALLED AND SAID WHAT ARE MY OBLIGATIONS, TODAY.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: THE OBLIGATIONS REMAIN THE SAME UNDER THE LAW IN
TERMS OF THE OBLIGATION TO PAY WAGES TIMELY AND PAY OVER TIME SFLFRNLTS WHAT HAPPENS IF
I I DON'T? MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I WOULD SAY THEY HAVE TWO YEARS FROM THE
DATE THAT VIOLATION OCCURRED TO FILE A CLAIM, TO RECOVER THOSE WAGES AN HERE IS WHAT THE
AVAILABLE DAMAGES ARE. JUSTICE MICHAEL NORIEGA: READING THAT STATUTE, WHY
WOULD YOU HAVE TWO DWREERS AT THAT POINT, ON AUGUST 7TH, 2019, YOU WOULD TELL YOUR CLIENT
YOU HAVE TWO YEARS FROM TODAY TO BE WORRIED ABOUT. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO:
FOR CLAIMS THAT ACCRUED PRIOR TO AUGUST 6TH 2019. JUSTICE PATTERSON: I THINK
YOU WERE ANSWERING THE QUESTION IN TERMS OF WHAT YOU WOULD ADVISE MONTHS BEFORE.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: RIGHT. MAYBE TO JUST CLARIFY YOUR HONOR'S HYPOTHETICAL HERE,
AUGUST 5TH, 2019, THE DAY BEFORE THE AMENDMENTS WENT INTO EFFECT IF THE CLIENT CALLED ME
ON THAT DATE AN SAID WHAT ARE MY PENALTIES IF I DON'T PAY WAGES TIMELY OR I DON'T PAY
OVER TIME. I WOULD EXPLAIN TO THEM IT'S A TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR WAGE AN
HOUR LAW VIOLATIONS ARP HERE IS WHAT THE VAL AVAILABLE OF. AVAILABLE REMEDIES
ARE. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I WILL CONCLUDE WITH A QUICK SUMMARY OF THE
THIRD FACTOR. JUSTICE PATTERSON: I HAVE A QUESTION. I HAVE BEEN
TRYING TO FIGURE OUT A SITUATION AN NOW I GET TO THIS WHERE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
GETS LONGER THAT ISN'T HILDRETH BECAUSE HILDRETH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS EXPANDED E
NORMOUSLY AN WITH VERY CLEAR RETROACTIVITY LANGUAGE AND WHEN YOU WERE ANSWERING ONE OF
MY L COULD LEAGUE'S QUESTIONS, I WAS TRYING TO THINK OF AN EXAMPLE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE
HAS CHANGED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO EXPAND IT WITHOUT THAT RETROACTIVITY LANGUAGE
AND THERE HAS BEEN A CASE INVOLVING THE IMPACT OF THAT. I CONDITION THINK OF ONE.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I AM NOT AWARE OF NICHLT WE CERTAINLY DO NOT CITE ANY IN OUR BRIEFS
AN I AM NOT AWARE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS DID EITHER AND I THINK THAT UNDERSCORES WHY HILDRETH
WAS MISAPPLIED HERE. JUSTICE PATTERSON: IT MAY HAVE BEEN THE REASON WHY
THE LEGISLATURE WAS SO EXPRESS IN ITS RETRO ACT IFT LANGUAGE IN HILDRETH.
MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: EXACTLY. THE COURT IS AWARE OF THE PRESUMPTION. WE CAN ASSUME.
WE CAN PRESUME THE LEGISLATURE IS AWARE OF HOW THIS COURT INTERPRETS LANGUAGE REGARDING
THE EFFECTIVE DATES OF STATUTES AN SO THEY ARE AWARE OF THIS. THEY CHOSE TO USE THE SHALL
TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY LANGUAGE AND I THINK THIS CASE REALLY CAN CAN STOP AT THAT FACTOR
ONE RIGHT THERE. THAT LANGUAGE, IN MY MIND IS ON INCLUSIVE OF THE FACT THE LEGISLATURE
DID NOT INTEND FOR THE EXPANDED REMEDIES AN THE EXPANDED STATUTE OF REPOSE TO APPLY TO
CLAIMS THAT PREDECIDED THE AUGUST 6TH, 2019 EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS.
JUSTICE WAINER APTER: THE DIE AN AL LEN EQUAL PAY ACT MADE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR EQUAL CLAIMS SIX YEARS INSTEAD OF TWO YEARS I AM NOT POSITIVE OF THAT I THINK THAT'S
WHAT HAPPENED. I KNOW WE'RE TRYING TO THINK OF EXAMPLES AND CASES ABOUT THEM, DO YOU
HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THAT AND CASES THAT MIGHT HAVE INTERPRETED IT. MICHAEL J.
RICCOBONO: OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD I DON'T KNOW THE LANGUAGE THEY USED IN THE DINE B AL
ACT. I CAN'T RECALL OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD WHICH WAY IT GOES TO BE HONEST WITH YOU.
I DO NOT BELIEVE, THOUGH, I THINK IF IT DID INCLUDE THE SAME LANGUAGE THAT WE'RE DEALING
WITH HERE TR WITH THE CHAPTER AMENDMENTS THAT WOULD BE THE EXCEPTION AND I WOULD HAVE
EXPECTED THAT TO BE FRONT AN SEARCH TER OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF AND IT IS NOT SO I DON'T
THINK THAT IS A SUPPORT I HAVE EXAMPLE OF A STATUTE OR THE CASE THAT HAS HELD THE SHALL
TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY LANGUAGE NONETHELESS ALOSE THIS COURT TO INTERPRET IT AS BEING
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. THE COURT: ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD BEFORE
WE BREAK FOR LUNCH. MICHAEL J. RICCOBONO: I DON'T WANT TO STAN BETWEEN THE
COURT AN LUNCH. I WILL CONCLUDE AND I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE TODAY SFLFRNLTS