MS. CAMPBELL: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONORS AND MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, ERIN
CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT HOURN PROSECUTOR ON BEHALF OF THE STATE. MR.
YOMTOV: STEVEN A YOMTOV, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR AMICUS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
NEW JERSEY. MS. ROMEO: SUSAN L ROMEO ASSIST PUBLIC
GUARDIAN FOR MR. BELL. MR. LEVY: ZACHARY LEVY, ASSOCIATION OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS OF NEW JERSEY. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: GOOD
AFTERNOON, MISS CAMPBELL, PLEASE GO AHEAD. MISS CAMPBELL, I CAN'T HEAR YOU.
MS. CAMPBELL: I APOLOGIZE, JUDGE, I WAS MUTED.
GOOD MORNINGS AND MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT SHS I'D LIKE TO RESERVE TWO MINUTES
FOR REBUTTAL AT THE END OF ARGUMENTS IF NECESSARY. CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER: 90'S FINE. MS. CAMPBELL: WE ARE HERE TODAY ON TWO
ISSUES, FIRST DISCHARGING MULTIPLE COUNTS OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF A FATAL ACCIDENT
VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST MULTIPLICITY, DID THE APPELLATE DIVISION IN RE SENTENCES
GO THIS DEFENDANT TO AN AGGREGATE TERM OF FIECH YEARS RATHER THAN AS IT STOOD
FOLLOWING THEIR RULING. THIS DEFENDANT PLEAD GUILTY TO TWO COUNTS OF LEAVING THE
SCENE OF A PHI TALL ACCIDENT, PURSUANT TO THE PLEA AGREEMENT, HIS EXPOSURE
WAS CAPPED AT 5 YEARS EACH, DUE TO THE SENTENCING LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE, ALL
PARTIES, THE STATE, THE COURT AND THE DEFENDANT, UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD
BE SENTENCED CONSECUTIVELY AND THAT THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT WOULD RECEIVE AN AGGREGATE
TERM OF 10 YEARS, THIS DEFENDANT HAD AN ASK FENCE ZIV CRIMINAL HISTORY AND
WAS SUBJECT TO A DISCRETIONARY EXTENDED TERM ON SECOND DEGREE CHARGES, TWO PARTIES
WERE AGRIEVED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S RULING, FIRST THE STATE WHOSE
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS UNDER THE PLEA AGREEMENT WERE VIOLATED AND SECOND THE TRIAL
COURT WHO ACCEPTED AN AGGREGATE TERM OF 10 YEARS AS WITHIN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE, THIS IS CONTRARY TO RULE 3:9-3, A PLEA REQUIRES A MEETING OF THE MINDS
BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE DEFENDANT, AND THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO REJECT
A PLEA IF IT CONCLUDES THAT THE PROSECUTOR HAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REACHING THE AGREEMENT, IF FOLLOWING THE PLEA THE COURT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE WOULD BE SERVED BY EFFECTUATE GO IT, SKIPPERS COURT
HAS THE AUTHORITY TO VACATE THE PLEA, THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S DECISION HERE GRIEFD
THE TRIAL COURT OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THAT PLEA AGREEMENT
FOLLOWING THEIR RULING AND IN FACT ACTED AS A COURT OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN
DETERMINING THAT A FIVE YEAR SENTENCE WAS ACCEPTABLE AND APPROPRIATE UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S RULING HERE VIOLATED THE LANGUAGE OF STATE V.
RODRIGUEZ WHICH UNAMBIGUOUSLY DOES APPROVES OF A "PENAL TERM THAT WOULD
BE FOR TOO TUSZ" APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT. A DEFENDANT SHOULD REASONABLY
ACCEPT THAT IF A SENTENCE WHICH IS TO BE SVSHD CONSECUTIVELY TO OTHER SENTENCES
IMPOSED FOR THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE IS FOUND TO BE LEGALLY DEFICIENT THE
TRIAL COURT MAY RECONSIDER OTHER PARTS OF THE OVER ALL SENTENCES TO I KNOW, INSTEAD
OF REMANDING TO THE TRIAL COURT TO PLEA AND SENTENCE THE APPELLATE DIVISION
IMPOSED SENTENCE ON ITS OWN. THIS COURT RECENTLY IN STATE V. TORRES PLACED GREAT
VALUE ON THE EXPLANATION THTD OVER ALL FAIRNESS OF THE SENTENCE IMPOSED
AND IT KWIERTD SENTENCING COURTS TO CONTEXTUAL LIEZ THE INDIVIDUAL SENTENCE'S LENGTH,
DE-TERNTD VALUE AND SOMETHING, IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE DISMISSAL MOTION AT THE
TRIAL LEVEL THAT THE COURT ACCEPTED THE STATE'S POSITION THAT THESE TWO COURTS
WERE TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVE Aly AND THEREFORE CONSIDERED THAT SENTENCE IN
THE AGGREGATE IN DERNL GO WHETHER THE PLEA AGREEMENT REACHED THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE, NOT ONLY DID THE APPELLATE DIVISION FAIL TO ADDRESS ANY OF THESE
CONSIDERATIONS BUT THEY HAM STRIFRNG THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE REMANDING OF A CORRECTED
J.O.C., DOES NOTHING TO FOSTER CONSISTENCY AND UNIFORMITY IN SENTENCING AND THEIR
FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE OVER ALL FAIRNESS OF THE SENTENCE MEANS THERE IS NO RECORD
FOR REVIEW, THIS MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN REMANDED FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS,
FIRST FOR THE STATE'S MOVE TO VACATE THE SENTENCE AS THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE
MINDS AND IT'S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS UNDER THE PLEA WERE VIOLATED ORB FOR
THE TRIAL COURT TO VACATE THE SENTENCE AS NOT WITHIN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
PURSUANT TO 39-3, THE STATE WOULD RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THIS COURT TO REMIND THE
APPELLATE DIVISION OF TOURS AND IT'S PROGENY SHOULD THIS ARISE IN THE
FUTURE, THE APPELLATE DIVISION INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE
CHARNGD WITH TWO COUNTS OF RECEIVING THE SCENE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT, SEVERAL
MORGSS OF THE LEAVING THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT STATUTE SHOULD BE, FIRST WITH REFERENCE
TO THE DUTIES IN NATURAL 39:4-29 WHICH IMPOSES A DUTY ON A DRIVER KNOWINGLY
INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND RENDER REASONABLE AID TO A PERSON
INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT, THE DUTY IS NOT TO REPORT BUT TO HELP, A DRIVER
THAT HAS ONLY RENDERED AID TO ONE OF THE TWO VICTIMS HAS NOT FULFILLED HIS DUTIES
UNDER THE STATUTE, THIS MEANS THE DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED TO RENDER AID TO
BOTH VICTIMS EITHER BY REPORTING THE ACCIDENT TO THE POLICE OR BY TAKING THEM TO
RECEIVE AID HIMSELF. FURTHERMORE, THE LEASING THE SCENE STATUTE REFERENCES
ANOTHER PERSON AND BOTH OF THOSE WORDS ARE IN THE SINGULAR, THE LEGISLATURE CHOSE
TO SAY ANOTHER AND NOT ANY, WHEN CHARGING LEAVING THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT THE
STATE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO CHOOSE WHICH VICTIM GETS JUSTICE, SKIPPERS
LEGISLATURE COULD HAVE SAID ANY PERSON AND IT COULD HAVE REFERRED TO THE DEFENDANT'S
AWARENESS OF DEATH OR DEATHS. THE HISTORY OF THIS STATUTE FURTHER SUPPORTS
ESCALATING PUNISHMENT, IN 1987 THE STATUTE WAS ENACTED AS A THIRD DEGREE CRIME
WITH A MANNED TARRY PERIOD OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY IN 2003 THE RESUMPTION
FOR FIRST TIME OFFENDERS WAS REMOVED AND IN PURCHASE 2007 PUN ON SURT TO
MICHELLE'S LAW THIS STATUTE WAS HE WILL VALTED TO A SECOND DEGREE OFFENSE, MICHELLE
IS A VICTIM IN UNION COUNTY WHO WAS STRUCK CROSSING THE STREET AND LIVED
FOR SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE ACCIDENT, THERE ARE TWO BILLINGS PENDING BEFORE THE
LEGISLATURE RIGHT NOW, ONE THAT SEEKS TO ELEVATE THIS CRIME TO A FIRST DEGREE
OFFENSE AND A SECOND CALLED MA RIS IS A'S LAW WHICH SEEKS TO IMPOSE A MANDATORY
PERIOD OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY, MA RIS IS A WAS A MONMOUTH COUNTY TEENAGER
LEFT TO DIE ON ROUTE 36, SHE WAS AIR LIFTED TO A HOSPITAL AND PATCHED THE NEXT
DAY, AT A TIME WHEN OUR STATUTE ENACTED FOCUS ON REHABILITATION THE FACT THAT
THIS STATUTE FOCUSES ON PUNISHMENT IS SIGNIFICANT. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE STATUTE CLEARLY SEEKS TO REMOVE ANY INCENTIVE TO LEAVE THE SCENE AND A DRIVING
FORCE BEHIND THAT INCENTIVE IS TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO STOP AND HELP
VICTIMS INSTEAD OF LEAVING THEM TO DIE. REVIEWING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY HIEMGD
THE STATUTE -- WITH OTHER HOMICIDE OFFENSES AND ALLOWING ONLY ONE CHARGE FRUSTRATES THAT PURPS -- THE COURT: MISS CAMPBELL, WE'RE INTERPRET
COMMON LANGUAGE, IF A DRIVER STRIKES ANOTHER CAR THAT HAS TWO PASSENGERS IN IT,
HOW MANY ACCIDENTS HAVE THERE BEEN? MS. CAMPBELL: THERE'S
ONLY ONE ACCIDENT, YOUR HONOR, HOWEVER, THE APPELLATE DIVISION --
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: AND IF THAT DRIVER THEN WALKS OR DRIVES AWAY FROM THE SCENE,
HOW MANY TIMES HAS THE PERSON LEFT THE SCENE? MS. CAMPBELL:
HE'S ONLY LEFT ONCE, YOUR HONOR, BUT THAT'S NOT THE ENTIRETY OF THE STATUTE, HE
ALSO HAS A DUTY TO HELP THE PERSON HE HITS. CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER: I'M GOING TO ALLOW YOU TO EXPAND YOUR ANSWER, I JUST WANT TO COME TO THE
CORE OF MY QUESTION HERE AND THAT IS FOCUS ON THE STATUTE'S WORDING ITSELF,
WHAT IS THE OPERATIVE CONDUCT THAT IT ADDRESSES, WHAT IS THE -- NOT THE RESULT,
BUT WHAT IS THE OPERATIVE BEHAVIOR BY AN ACTOR THAT IT CONDEMNS?
MS. CAMPBELL: IT'S LEAVING THE SCENE WITHOUT FULLY PERFORMING HIS DUTIES
TO THE PASSENGERS OF THE OTHER VEHICLE. IT'S NOT JUST ABOUT LEAVING THE SCENE,
JUDGE, IT'S ABOUT LEAVING THE SCENE WITHOUT FULLY PERFORMING HIS DUTIES UNDER THE
TITLE 39 STATUTE WHICH INCLUDE SOMEONEING AID OR DP AID WOULD BE FUTLIE, SUM
AMONG ASSISTANCE FROM THE POLICE, A PERSON WHO FULFILLS THOSE DUTIES UNDER THE
STATUTE AND THEN LEAVES HAS MAYBE TECHNICALLY VIOLATED THE LEASINGLY SCENE BUT
HE HASN'T VIOLATED THE STATUTE BECAUSE HE'S FULFILLED HIS DUTIES UNDER 4:39.
JUSTICE ALBIN: SO FOLLOWING UP ON THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S QUESTION,
YOU'RE RIGHT, THERE ARE CERTAIN DUTIES ATTACHED, SO IF THERE ARE TWO VICTIMS AND
YOU ONLY COME TO THE AID OF ONE, YOU'VE VIOLATED THE STATUTE, BUT IT DOESN'T
MEAN THAT YOU'VE VIOLATED THE STATUTE TWICE, IT JUST MEANS YOU VIOLATED HE IT ONCE,
YOU HAVEN'T FULFILLED ALL OF THE DUTIES UNDER THE STATUTE, YOU CAN'T LEAVE
THE SCENE, LEAVING THE SCENE REQUIRES THAT YOU DO SOMETHING, IF YOU DON'T FULFILL
THE OTHER I AM PER TIFS OF THE STATUTE, YOU VIOLATED THE STATUTE. IT DOESN'T
MEAN THAT YOU'VE VIOLATED THE STATUTE MULTIPLE TIMES. ISN'T THAT A REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE? AT LEAST ONE REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTE? MS. CAMPBELL: IT IS A POTENTIALLY REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE, YOUR HONOR, BUT IT'S THE STATE'S POSITION --
JUSTICE ALBIN: WHICH LEADS ME TO THE NEXT QUESTION, IF THERE ARE TWO REASONABLE
-- LET'S ASSUME THAT YOUR INTERPRETATION IS REASONABLE AND THE ONE THAT HAS
BEEN PROPOSED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE OR SUGGESTED IN HIS QUESTIONING IS REASONABLE,
AND THEREFORE THE STATUTE IS INSOLUBLY AMBIGUOUS, THEN WE'RE IN THE RULE OF LEM
TEA, AND THEREFORE WE WOULD HAVE TO INTERPRET THIS STATUTE IN A WAY THAT
WAS FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT, AM I CORRECT? GO AHEAD. MS.
CAMPBELL: JUDGE, I'D SUBMIT THAT THE SINGULAR LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE INDICATES
A PURPOSEFUL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE LEGISLATURE TO PERMIT MULTIPLE LEAVING
THE SCENE CHARGES FOR EACH PERSON TO WHOM THE DEFENDANT OWES A DUTY. THAT EACH
VICTIM IN THIS CASE WAS OWED A DUTY UNDER THIS MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTE AND EACH
PERSON WAS THEREFORE VICTIMIZED BY DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT IN HIS FAILURE TO PERFORM
THAT DUTY. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: SO YOU'VE ADVANCED AN
INTERPRETATION, JUSTICE ALBIN ASKED YOU IF THERE ARE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS AND
THE EMPHASIS IS GIVEN ON THE VERB LEAVE THE SCENE, WHERE HAS THAT -- WHERE DOES
THAT LEAVE US IN TERMS OF CANNONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND ASSUME
THAT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOESN'T CLEAR OUT THE QUESTION FOR US, THERE MAY BE
LITTLE PIECES HERE AND THERE BUT IT DOESN'T ANSWER THE PRECISE QUESTION,
DOESN'T THE DOCTRINE OF LEVITY APPLY. MS. CAMPBELL: I WOULD GO BACK
TO MY INITIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE, IT'S NOT JUST ABOUT LEAVING
THE SCENE, IT'S ABOUT LEAVING THE SCENE AND VIOLATING YOUR DUTY TO EACH PERSON
IN THAT ACCIDENT AND EACH PERSON IS THEIR OWN VICTIM UNDER THE LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTE BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE IS PLAINLY SINGULAR. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
SO YOU VIEW THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE STATUTE WHEN IT CRIMINAL LYSIS LEAVING
THE SCENE WITH ATTENDANT DUTIES, THAT PERMITS MULTIPLE CHARGES FOR THE SAME ACCIDENT
AND THE SAME SINGLE DEPARTURE. MS. CAMPBELL: YES, JUDGE,
LEACHING THE SN IS ONLY PART OF IT, IT'S LEAVING THE SCENE WHILE FAILING TO
FULFILL YOUR DUTIES TO EACH PERSON INVOLVED IN THAT ACCIDENT AND THAT INTERPRETATION
IS SUPPORTED BY STATE V. HER RER RA, THAT WAS ADMIT THELY A SINGLE VICTIM CASE
THAT INVOLVED LEAVING THE SCENE INVOLVING SERIOUS INJURY AND ENDANGERING
A VICTIM, BUT THE STAFRP TOLLS US THAT -- TO BEEN OCCURRING PERSONS TO TAKE AFFIRMATIVE
STEPS TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS, THE CULPABLE ACT AS DESCRIBED BY HER IS NOT
JUST LEAVING THE SCENE BUT LEAVING THE SCENE WITHOUT RENDERING AID OR CALLING FOR
EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. JUSTICE FUENTES: COUNSEL WITH
RESPECT TO THE LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE THAT SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT IF
THE EVIDENCE SO WARRANTS NOTHING IN THIS SECTION SHALL BE DEEMED TO PRECLUDE A
N INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER, RECKLESS VEHICULAR
HOMICIDE, AND STRICT LIABILITY VEHICULAR HOMICIDE, DOESN'T THAT FOCUS ON THE OCCUPANTS
OF THE VEHICLE AS OPPOSED TO THE ACCIDENT ITSELF, IT LEAVES THE STATE WITH OTHER
WAYS TO PUNISH AND ADDRESS THE INJURIES OR THE DEATHS CAUSED IN THE ACCIDENT, IN THIS
CASE MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE DRIVER WAS DETERMINED THE DRIVER WAS GOING
TWICE THE SPEED LIMIT AT THE TIME THAT THEY STRUCK THESE TWO BOYS ON A BICYCLE.
THAT WOULD APPLY, ONE OF THESE, THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
WARRANT ONE OF THESE INDICTMENTS, WOULDN'T THAT BE THE CASE? MS.
CAMPBELL: JUDGE, PART OF THE ISSUE WITH THE LEASING THE SCENE OF A FATAL ACCIDENT
STATUTE IS THAT WHEN A DEFENDANT LIKE MR. BELL LEAVES THE SCENE HE DEPRIVES
THE STATE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO INVESTIGATE. I MENTIONED MA RIS IS A THE MONMOUTH
COUNTY TEENAGER WHO WAS STRUCK, THE WOMAN WHO STRUCK HER SHOWED UP AT THE POLICE
STATION HOURS AFTER THE ACCIDENT, SHE HAD COCAINE IN HER STEM AND SHE TOLD THE POLICE
THAT SHE HAD GOTTEN HIGH AFTER THE ACCIDENT, SHE DERIVED THE POLICE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO INVESTIGATOR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, SO YES, THERE ARE SITUATIONS
WHERE AN INDIVIDUAL LEAVES THE SCENE AND THE POLICE ARE ABLE TO PIECE IT BACK
TOGETHER AND PERHAPS PUT TOGETHER A CASE BASED ON CAUSATION UNDER THOSE
STATUTES, BUT WHEN A DEFENDANT LEAVES THE SCENE AND DEPRIVES THE POLICE COMPLETELY
OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO INVESTIGATE, IF HE GOES HOME AND SOEB BERS UP AND COMES
BACK IN 3 DAYS LATER, WE'VE LOST AN AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER CHARGE AND WE CAN'T
PROVE THAT, BUT ALLOWING FOO CHARGES OF LEAVING THE SCENE WOULD APPROPRIATELY
PUNISH -- JUSTICE ALBIN: NO, LEAVING THE SCENE AS A SECOND
DEGREE CRIME IS NO MINOR THING, THAT'S A FIVE TO TEN YEAR PRISON SENTENCE FOR LEAVING
THE SCENE, THAT'S A VERY SERIOUS CRIME, EVEN IF IT APPLIES WURNS, AND AS JUDGE
FUENTES HAS SUGGESTED BECAUSE YOU HAVE SPEED OVER HERE, YOU COULD HAVE TWO CASES
OF RECKLESS MANSLAUGHTER, IN ADDITION, WHICH WOULD BE CONSECUTIVE UNDER THE
STATUTE. CORRECT? MS. CAMPBELL: YES, JUDGE. HOWEVER, IF THIS
DEFENDANT IS LOOKING AT SAY TWO COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER VERSUS
ONE COUNTER OF LEAVING THE SCENE THAT'S A FLAT NUMBER INSTEAD, IT'S A NO-BRAINER,
HE'S GOING TO FLEE. ALLOWING TWO COUNTS OF LEAVING THE SCENE FURTHER REMOVES
THAT INCENTIVE. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: ALL THAT SAID, WE
NEED TO FOCUS ON THE STATUTE AND TRY TO FIGURE OUT WHAT IT SAYS. WOULD YOU AGREE?
MS. CAMPBELL: YES, JUDGE. THE COURT: AND YOU'VE
COME FORWARD WITH A PRESENTATION ABOUT HOW IT CAN BE READ TO ALLOW FOR MULTIPLE
CHARGES FOR A SINGLE ACCIDENT AND A SINGLE LEAVING OF THE SCENE AND YOUR ADVERSARIES
HAVE COME FORWARD WITH A STRONG PRESENTATION ABOUT HOW IT ONLY APPLIES
TO ONE. WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US? IN TERMS OF THE APPROPRIATE ANALYSIS OF A STATUTE.
MS. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, MANY OTHER STATES HAVE INTERPRETED
THEIR LEAVING THE SCENE STATUTES AND THE DIVIDING LINE FOR THEM WAS THE USE OF THE
WORD ANY VERSUS THE WORD ANOTHER, AND I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THE STATE -- THE
LEGISLATURE'S PURPOSEFUL CHOICE OF SAYING THE DEATH OF ANOTHER PERSON AND DEATH
SINGULAR AT THE END OF THE STATUTE MEANS THAT IT REFERS TO ONE DEATH, EACH
CHARGE REFERS TO ONE DEATH. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WHAT I'M HEARING
YOU SAY IS THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE READING OTHER THAN THE ONE THAT
YOU'RE PUTTING FORWARD, IS THAT YOUR POSITION THAT THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY AND THE
ONE WAY TO READ THE STATUTE IS THAT IT PERMITS MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR
THE ACT, THE SINGLE DEPARTURE FROM THE SCENE? HAVE I HEARD YOU CORRECTLY?
MS. CAMPBELL: YES, YOUR HONOR, MULTI VICTIM ACCIDENTS ARE NOT SO UNCOMMON
THAT IT'S UNFOR RECEIVABLE THAT THE LEGISLATURE WOULD CONSIDER THEM IN DRAFTING
THE STATUTE. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: I'M ASKING A SLIGHTLY
DIFFERENT QUESTION, IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT THERE IS NO OTHER REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION TO THIS STATUTE AND THUS NO AMBIGUITY, YOUR POSITION IS THE ONE
AND ONLY CORRECT READING OF IT. MS. CAMPBELL: YES, JUDGE,
I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT REFERS BACK TO
THAT TITLE 39 OFFENSE THAT IMPOSES A DUTY FOR EACH PERSON THAT'S INJURED AND THE
SINGULAR LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE MEANS THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT STATUTE
TO APPLY TO EACH VICTIM SEPARATELY. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
PLEASE GO AHEAD WITH YOUR ARGUMENT. MS. CAMPBELL: OKAY.
THE APPELLATE DIVISION IMPROPERLY RELIED ON STATE VS. HILL-WHITE, HILL-WHITE IS
AN ARSON CASE AND ARSON IS PLAINLY A PROPERTY CRIME, IT'S COMPLETE WHEN
THE FIRE IS STARTED AND THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE IS TO PROTECT THE PROPERTY OF
ANOTHER. THE PURPOSE HERE AS STATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION IN HER HER
IS TO PROTECTOR AN INJURED VICTIM. THERE'S A CAUSATION ELEMENT IN THE ARSON STATUTE
THAT'S NOT PRESENT HERE AND THE GRADING OF THE ARSON STATUTE IS NOT BASED
POJ THE HARM TO THE VICTIM BUT ON THE MENTAL STATE OF THE DEFENDANT. YOU CAN
COMMIT AN AGGRAVATED ARSON WITHOUT ANY HARM TO A VICTIM. I HAD
MENTIONED THE OTHER STATES THAT USED THE WORD ANY RATHER THAN ANOTHER AND SEVERAL
STATES HAVE FOUND THAT THE VERBIAGE USED IN THE STATUTE SHOULD DRIVE THE
RESULT OF THE INTERPRETATION. FOR EXAMPLE IN DATE VERSUS STHAT 665 SOUTHERN 2
D-1655 A 1985 ALABAMA MRIT CASE, THE COURT ASKED HOW SHOULD THE, IS CLEAR BEEN
AN UNKWIFSHG AL. INSTEAD OF USING THE WORD ANY TO DESCRIBE THE UNITS OF
PROSECUTION, THE SINGULAR WORDS A OR ANOTHER SHOULD BE USED. AND IN STATE V. PAL
A WISCONSIN CASE, PAL WAS CHARGED NOT FOR JUST LEAVING THE SCENE BUT FOR
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH HIGS STATUTORILY RESPONSIBILITIES TO EACH VICTIM, THE WIS
CONSIN COURT REASONED THE STATE WOULD HAVE TO PROVE BOTH FAILURES TO GET
A CONVICTION UNDER THAT STATUTE. COURT OPINED THAT GIVEN THE STATUTE PERTAINS
TO A VEHICLE OPERATOR'S DUTIES TO CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS AT AN ACCIDENT SENATE
MAKES SEX OFFENSE TO ALLOW PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF DUTIES TO SEPARATE
INDIVIDUALS. YOUR HONOR, STATE WOULD RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THERE CAN THE COURT
ADOPT ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE LEAVING THE SCENE STATUTE AND REVERSE THE
JUDGEMENT OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION. IF THE COURT HAS NO REMAINING QUESTIONS,
I SUBMIT. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: WOULD YOU LIKE TO ADDRESS
THE -- THE SECOND ARGUMENT THAT YOU BEGAN WITH AT THE OPENING. MS.
CAMPBELL: THE SENTENCING, YOUR HONOR. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: YES.
THE PLEA AGREEMENT AND THE STATE'S POSITION AND IT'S EXPECTATION, AS A
N ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR PRINCIPLE POSITION IS YOU'RE READING
THE STATUTE SHOULD PREVAIL AND THERE SHOULD BE TWO COUNTS AND IF THE COURT
DOESN'T ACCEPT THAT, WOULD YOU LIKE TO ADDRESS THE PLEA AGREEMENT ISSUE.
MS. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, THIS DEFENDANT PLEAD GUILTY TO TWO COUNTS OF LEAVING
THE SCENE AND IT WAS EVERYONE'S UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD BE SENTENCED
CONSECUTIVELY, WHEN THE STATE ENTERED INTO THAT PLEA AGREEMENT IT ONLY DID SO
BECAUSE IT BELIEVED THAT THIS DEFENDANT WAS GETTING AN AGGREGATE SENTENCE OF TENSE
YEARS, THE APPELLATE DIVISION HAD THAT SENTENCE AND REMANDED IT TO THE TRIAL
COURT FOR AN ENTRY OF A NEW J.O.C., IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR THE STATE TO ONE, RECONSIDER WHETHER IT THOUGHT THAT 5 YEARS KWAU A
N APPROPRIATE PLEA OFFER, GIVEN THAT THERE WERE TWO CHILDREN KILLED IN THIS ACCIDENT
AND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A CAN TENSE ZIV CRIMINAL HISTORY, THAT THE DEFENDANT
HAD NO LICENSE TO DRIVE AND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING AN UNREGISTERED UNINSURED
CAR WITH FICTITIOUS PLACES. THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE -- JUSTICE
ALBIN: CAN I ASK YOU A QUESTION ABOUT REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS. WHY DIDN'T -- THIS
WAS A PLEA AGREEMENT, AND IN THE PLEA AGREEMENT THE DEFENDANT WITH THE
PERMISSION OF THE PROSECUTION RESERVED THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE STATUTE. CORRECT? YOU KNEW THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GOING TO ARGUE THAT
SENTENCING ON TWO WAS UNLAWFUL. CORRECT? WHY DIDN'T THE STATE THEREFORE IN THE
PLEA AGREEMENT SAY IN THE EVENTS THAT YOU ARE SUCCESSFUL, THIS CASE WILL BE
REMANDED FOR A RESENTENCE, LIKE WHY DIDN'T THE STATE DO THAT?
MS. CAMPBELL: BECAUSE, YOUR HONOR, THE ENTIRE BODY OF CASE LAW SAYS THAT WHEN THE
DEFENDANT HAS A WINDFALL ESSENTIALLY IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND RECEIVES
A LOWER SENTENCE BASED ON LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT ARE WHOLLY UNRELATED TO THE SENTENCING
AND TO THE LEGITIMATE SENTENCING FACTORS ENUMERATED IN THE STATUTE THE STATE
IS ENTITLED TO EITHER MOVE TO VACATE THE PLEA OR THE DEFENDANT SHOULD EXPECT TO BE
RESENTENCED TO THE TOP OF THE AGGREGATE RANGE. THE STATE CAN'T BEYOND THOSE
10 YEARS BUT THE STATE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO MOVE TO RESENTENCE HIM OR RENEGOTIATE
THE PLEA. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER: YOUR ARGUMENT IN ESSENCE
IS YOU BARGAINED FOR A TEEN YEAR SENTENCE ISN'T THE AGGRAVATE AND IF THERE'S A
LEGAL ERROR IT SHOULD GO BACK AND THE PARTIES SHOULD START ANEW.
MS. CAMPBELL: YES, YOUR HONOR, OR THE TRIAL COURT SLUFSH MERMENTED TO WEIGH IN
AND EXPLAIN WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE FIVE YEAR PLEA
GIVEN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER:
ANYTHING ELSE YOU'D LIKE TO PRESENT? MS. CAMPBELL: NO, YOUR
HONOR.